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Contesting Resilience
Negotiating Shared Urban Futures
Dorothee Brantz and Avi Sharma
In the early 21st century, resilience has become the preferred policy constellation
to address futures that are extremely uncertain but that are likely to be extreme.
The Bloomberg and Rockefeller Foundations have resilient cities programming, as
do the World Bank, Asia Development Bank, and dozens of other mega-organi-
zations. Resilience plays an important role in the UN Sustainable Development
Goals, which have set global development targets for more than one hundred na-
tions through 2030, and have on-the-ground impacts that will shape lives in all
corners of the planet for a generation (Sharma 2015: 592).1 As Aditya Bahadur and
others have argued, “The vision set out in the SDGs – for people, planet, prosperity
and peace – will inevitably fail if shocks and stresses are not addressed […] A focus
on strengthening resilience can protect development gains and ensure people have
the resources and capacities to better reduce, prevent, anticipate, absorb and adapt
to a range of shocks, stresses, risks and uncertainties” (Bahadur et al. 2015: 2).2 So-
me argue that resilience is simply a trendy term, one that has gained currency in a
variety of sectors because it is easy to use and extremely flexible. This may be true.
But resilience as a development discourse and an urban practice directly impacts
the lives of hundreds of millions of the world’s most vulnerable people: It is at the
core of funding, development, and aid initiatives worth tens of billions of dollars.
This alone – the fact that resilience does and will continue to shape lived realities
across the planet – is a reason to think seriously about the concept, discourse, and
practice.
1 More than 1.3million stakeholders participated in the development of the 17 ‘universal princi-
ples’ that make up the SDGs.
2 Resilience is acknowledged both explicitly and implicitly in a range of the proposed SDG tar-
gets. Target 1.5 represents the core resilience target, as follows: “By 2030 build the resilience
of the poor and those in vulnerable situations, and reduce their exposure and vulnerability
to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and
disasters.”
12 Dorothee Brantz and Avi Sharma
Critical Claims about Resilience Practices
Resilience has been applied to a range of issues and at a variety of scales – from
global financial and ecological systems to human development – but cities have be-
come a particular object for resilience approaches (Chandler/Coaffee 2016). There
are a host of reasons why this is the case. As population, commercial, religious, and
political centers, cities have always served as amplifiers, and when disruptions do
occur, they are felt with particular intensity in urban centers. When, for examp-
le, a natural disaster impacts a city, the sheer density of the population and built
environment regularly contributes to higher mortality rates; when financial crises
occur, urban centers are impacted more visibly than other areas because they con-
centrate financial and other capital institutions (Amin 2014: 308–9). At least since
the SecondWorldWar, the vulnerability of urban systems has been noted by armed
forces – military strategists, militias, terrorist groups – who have recognized that
attacking cities can achieve a maximal return on investment (Coaffee et al. 2009:
4; 9-27).
Cities are extremely vulnerable to a range of disruptions, but they are also (al-
legedly) extremely resilient. In their seminal 2005 publication, urbanists Vale and
Campanella note that between the years 1100 and 1800, only 42 cities damaged by
natural disasters, military conflicts, or other causes were abandoned, and the rate
of rebuilding has, again according to Vale and Campanella, risen since 1800 (Va-
le/Campanella 2005).3 There are a variety of reasons why, historically, cities have
not been abandoned: urban development is accompanied by property rights and
enormous sunk costs, and rebuilding is typically a common agenda for diverse
stakeholders and interest groups, even those who are in other instances bitterly
opposed. Cities are also repositories of shared memory and civic pride, and ma-
king sure that cities are rebuilt after a disaster – or recover from different kinds
of disruption – is a matter of great symbolic significance. Research by Vale and
Campanella; Jon Coaffee and others suggests that ‘resilience’ is in the very DNA of
the urban.
In recent years cities across the world are developing resilience strategies, of-
ten with assistance from well-financed foundations and other civil society actors.
In 2013, for example, the Rockefeller Foundation launched the 100 Resilient Cities
initiative, which would assist and guide selected cities in their efforts to develop
a ‘robust resilience strategy.’ There are dozens of other foundations, corporations,
3 This may now be changing. In a small but growing number of cases, city and state actors are
deploying a strategy known as ‘managed retreat’ rather than rebuilding. If this continues –
and given the likely impacts of climate change, one expects that it will – this will represent a
fundamental reorientation in the areas of planning, insurance, ecological and environmental
preservation, as well as property ownership.
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consultancies, NGOs, IGOs, and governmental agencies working at all scales to ad-
vance resilience thinking. And the urban occupies a crucial space in planning for
more ‘resilient futures.’ Advocates of more resilient cities believe that planning can
enhance the capacity of subnational actors to respond to crisis scenarios. From dis-
aster management to community advocates, financial institutions to the builders
of urban infrastructures, it appears that everyone wants to build more resilient
cities.
As resilience discourses have gained in popularity, though, they have also ge-
nerated opposition. Some critics argue that resilience is part of a larger neoliberal
project that leverages real or perceived crises to justify policy agenda that would
otherwise be unpalatable to the public and the international community (Cretney
2014; Diprose 2014; Slater 2014; Kaika 2017). Most obviously, critics are concerned
about the way that resilience is used to push non-governmental solutions to chal-
lenges that have typically been the responsibility of the state. In the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, for example, it was widely noted that politicians andmedia out-
lets praised the resilience of city residents only after state actors failed to contain
a slow-moving catastrophe (Kaika 2017). Community activists and critics around
the world argue that resilience is part of a larger neoliberal project that pushes
responsibility for extreme situations onto small scale actors. Resilience is, in this
view, the mask that hides the face of the shrinking state (Derrickson/MacKinnon
2013; Slater 2014).
A growing community of scholars has argued that resilience is itself a pro-
duct of the crisis-driven cycle of (neoliberal) capitalism (Pelling 2003; Eraydin 2013:
19–20). As deregulation expands on a global scale, the hedges against dangerous
land use practices, the protections against financial melt-down, the robustness of
disaster relief agencies, the funding of international aid initiatives have all been de-
graded. We as a species are, ourselves, expanding the threats to which we are sub-
ject. Humans aremore at risk to extreme weather events because we have changed
the climate through our everyday practices; societies are more exposed to milita-
ry conflict, terrorism, and ordinary violence because military grade weaponry is
easily available on the market; we are more likely to see catastrophic damage due
to natural disasters because population growth and, more importantly, real estate
speculation has seen the continual expansion of human settlement on geological-
ly and ecologically unsuitable lands. We are living in a world that is riskier, and
it is riskier because we made it that way (ibid: 19–25). In this view, resilience is a
band-aid to self-inflicted wounds (Castree 2010; Cretney 2014; Diprose 2014). The
porousness of the term, its vagueness, the variety of ways that it is used – and
as we shall see, it is used in more than two dozen ways (Meerow/Newell 2016: 41)
– is perfectly suited to provide humanitarian and ecological window-dressing to
otherwise loathsome projects. Resilience may be an increasingly ubiquitous policy
framework, but it is hardly uncontested.
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The disagreements cited above are, to a very large degree, ideological in na-
ture. There are also, though, disciplinary and professional tensions that explain
why resilience is a contested concept, and much of this is structured into the very
nature of professional practice. Hurricane Katrina is probably the most discussed
example of these kinds of structural differences, though it is hardly unique.When,
for example, massive rainfalls caused flash flooding and mudslides in Vargas state,
Venezuela in 1999, the damage was extraordinary.4 Tens of thousands were kil-
led, more than 75.000 lost their homes, food, water, and electricity supply were
profoundly disrupted, the capacities of local, state, federal and non-governmen-
tal actors were stretched to the breaking point (Schieder 1957: 65; Takahashi et al.
2001: 65; Genatios/Lafuente 2003). The most vulnerable citizens – those with limi-
ted transportation, financial, physical, mental, or emotional resources – were the
most dramatically impacted. Actors across the political and demographic spectrum
called for immediate assistance. Newly elected president Hugo Chavez simultane-
ously declared martial law (mobilizing the state apparatus) and urged residents to
“adopt a family” impacted by the disaster during the approaching Christmas ho-
liday season (Long 1999). Unlike Hurricane Katrina, which occurred in a strongly
neoliberal context, La Tragedia played out in a state-socialist one. It too, though,
was defined by high levels of engagement by civil society actors. Volunteer police
and fire, relief agencies like the Red Cross, and individuals travelled to the impact
zone or sent financial or other aid.
Architects, designers, planners, engineers, logistics and development profes-
sionals also donated time and resources to relief and rehabilitation. These were
people who, whatever their social, political, or other commitments, saw a problem,
recognized its profound impact on human lives, and wanted to act. The act of in-
tervening is, to a great extent, a personal choice, but it is also informed by a pro-
fessional ethos. Practice-oriented disciplines teach that identifying a clear causal
chain – of impact, effect, and solution – is the way to achieve meaningful trans-
formations in the lives of those impacted. Simply stated, torrential rainfall was the
cause of disruption, the destruction of housing and infrastructure was the effect,
and rebuilding shelter and infrastructure was the needed solution. This is not to
say that practice-oriented professionals were unaware of the larger socio-political,
global economic or ecological factors that shaped the Vargas floods. It is simply to
emphasize that their pressing professional imperative was to help people with their
immediate problems, and to assist in short and medium-term rebuilding. For ar-
chitects, designers, engineers, planners, logistics and development professionals,
4 Cities, peri-urban, and rural areas across Vargas were impacted, creating, sadly, many oppor-
tunities to explore differential responses to different kinds of human settlements.
Contesting Resilience 15
the nature of the crisis, its impact, and the way forward to relief, rebuilding, and
rehabilitation was more or less clear.5
Critical geographers, historians, and urbanists typically respond to crises like
the Vargas floods rather differently.Many point out that themost affected populati-
ons are the poorest ones; that there are race, gender, and class dynamics that shape
the way disasters effect individuals; that the financial and material sourcing of aid
differs depending on whether the impacted city is in the global north or the global
south. In cases like Vargas, they point out that, while the proximate cause of the
crisismay have been rainfall, the deregulation of land-use practices, speculative de-
velopment, under-resourced infrastructure, poor strategic planning, and extreme
inequality were all reasons for theway that LaTragedia played out (Hartman/Squires
2006; Castree 2010; Fainstein 2015; Squires 2015). Hundreds of thousands of peop-
le, they rightly argue, were affected in different ways by the same event because of
socio-political and political-economic unevenness that was historically and socio-
logically rooted. Highly urbanized and mostly poor districts built on alluvial fans
formed by earlier flood events were the hardest-hit areas. In some cases, whole
villages and shantytowns were swept into the sea.
In the view of critical scholars, solving the problem is not about restoring the
Vargas and other regions impacted by disaster (natural or otherwise) to the way
they were before. Indeed, ‘the way things were before’ is a central part of the pro-
blem. In this view, a resilience approach reproduces the unevenness of existing
social realities and, in doing so, both justifies and further entrenches those ine-
qualities. This example, which could be easily multiplied, shows that even when
researchers and practitioners agree on broad goals – for example, rebuilding ho-
mes after a natural disaster; limiting reliance on agricultural or financial mono-
cultures – they often disagree on the causal logics of disruption and, by extension,
the necessary responses.
This is not a particularly controversial claim, and we the editors have often en-
countered this tension between planning, practice, and critique in academic set-
tings that bring together researchers and practitioners. In their edited volume on
resilient planning, Eraydin and Taşan-Kok argue that this tension between prac-
tice-oriented disciplines and critical urbanists is itself a product of neoliberalism.
Planning, they argue, has since the 1970s “become increasingly market-oriented
and entrepreneurial […]. All around the world, urban development has become
5 This can be seen in the excellent article by civil engineering experts Nakagawa Takahashi
et al., who discuss the uneven economic geographies of rural and urban regions in Vargas,
before turning to a plan to increase “conveyance capacity” of the San Julian River. While they
clearly recognize the significance of economic and spatial inequality in shaping the impacts
of La Tragedia, the solutions – drawing in substantial part on Japanese experiencewith natural
disaster – is essentially technocratic. (Takahashi et al. 2001: 71; 80).
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increasingly fragmented […] with opportunity-led planning practices taking root
everywhere in reaction to rapid and complex change” (Eraydın/Taşan-Kok 2013: 4).
In their own calls for a shift towards a “resilient planning” paradigm, Eraydin and
Taşan-Kok argue that architects and planners have increasingly been forced to de-
sign and plan for the short andmedium term, to package and sell plans to stakehol-
ders who are committed to market principles, and this is an important point. The
question, then, is whether we can find ways to balance the short-term perspectives
based on pressing needs with a longer-term view that focuses on structural and
intersectional causes. In our view, disruptions to everyday life – from earthquakes
to uneven access to water – must be addressed both in terms of their immediate
causes and effects, as well as their longer terms drivers and desired outcomes.
This volume is motivated by a number of different but related assumptions.
First, andmost obviously, is that crises of various kinds do regularly happen around
the world, and that the people affected by those crises should be helped.What that
help should look like is, in our view, a contextual question that deserves attenti-
on that is both means and ends oriented. Second, we think that there are good
reasons to disagree about what resilience means, and how it can and should be
implemented. Should the focus of resilience be on long-term planning, the crea-
tion of redundancies and silent systems, as some critical scholarship suggests? Or
should it aim at the most rapidly possible return to the status quo ante, as was
the case with the 19th century Japanese cities detailed by Carola Hein (Hein 2005)?
Essays in this volume, particularly Florian Liedtke’s and Andreas Wesener’s respec-
tive contributions on the 1995 Kobe and 2011 Christchurch earthquakes, delineate
how both things are possible and, indeed, relatively easily so. Resilience policy and
practitioners are, indeed, vulnerable to cooptation by neoliberal agendas, and this
rightly concerns critics. This does not, however, change the fact that crises occur,
people are affected, and those people deserve aid and attention. Christian Parenti
has argued, in a slightly different context, that the work of achieving the best pos-
sible solution should not be a reason to take the difficult steps of implementing
approaches that are better than the ones that are currently in place (Parenti 2013).
We believe that eradicating poverty, race and gender discrimination, finding a ro-
bust role for the state, enhancing protections for the environment are all desirable
long and short-term goals that should make up a common agenda.
There are, of course, alternatives to resilience, including those compellinglyma-
de by eco-socialists like Ian Angus, John Bellamy Foster, Ramchandra Guha, Joel
Kovel and others (Guha/Martinez-Alier 1997; Kovel 2002; Dawson 2016; Foster/An-
gus 2016) who propose a systematic transformation of the planetary systems that
undergird inequality and exploitation of humans, plants, animals, and the planet
itself. These alternatives are very powerful, but they are also focused on a distant
horizon. The needs of actually existing people, animals, ecosystems, and the en-
vironment also demand that we act with immediacy, and this sometimes means
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implementing incremental solutions as we pursue transformational ones. In short,
ideological, disciplinary, or professional disagreement should not preclude spaces
of potentially life-saving action. Finally, it is also worth remembering that resili-
ence is both a well-funded and politically compelling umbrella terminology that
brings together stakeholders – vulnerable and powerful – across the world. This
should not be ignored, because generating consensus among international actors
at different scales is extremely challenging.
Conceptual Foundations of the Book
When we began working on this volume, we thought that we would resolve troub-
ling ideological tensions within resilience discourse, and help to generate a frame-
work that wouldmake resilience bothmore concrete andmore conceptually robust.
In this sense, our initial goals fit quite comfortably within the universe of alrea-
dy existing work. Our goals though, have evolved as we struggled to understand
the strengths and weaknesses of resilience as discourse, policy, and practice. And
working with the authors in this volume, it has become clear to us that we could
contribute to a conversation between researchers and practitioners not by doing
more definitional or even genealogical work. There is already excellent work that
lays out highly differentiated definitions, develops indicators, and proposes con-
crete strategies for resilience (Müller 2011; Taşan-Kok et al. 2013; Meerow/Newell
2016; Zhang/Li 2018). We think that we can add a new perspective by moving in a
very different direction. Resilience is applied to different kinds of disruptions that
take place in dramatically different circumstances; it is theorized and practiced in
global cities, small towns, and remote villages; it is, in the best cases, changing and
evolving to respond to on the ground needs and long-term goals. So why not take
seriously the dynamic nature of resilience, instead of trying to constrain an unruly
concept with definitions that never quite seem to fit?
The present volume brings together historical and contemporary research on
cities fromKobe toMedellín, the Arctic Circle toNewZealand.Contributors include
planners, architects, engineers, sociologists, historians, and development experts.
The authors write about post-earthquake scenarios, post-conflict recovery, urban
policy, social solidarity and informal economies, and in part because of the dif-
ferent objects of inquiry, the different temporal scales, and the different agenda,
they use resilience in different ways. None of these individual case studies is sup-
posed to offer a totalizing perspective. Each is supposed to highlight the fractured
and context-specific nature of resilience thinking, policy, and practice. Indeed, in
our view, resilience should continuously be defined and redefined in negotiations
between different actors working at different scales with often diverging agendas
working in anticipation of or response to different phenomena and processes. In-
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ternational aid agencies, environmentalists, community rights activists, citizens
rich and poor – the different actors who act in actual situations – should nego-
tiate what they mean and want from resilience. By treating the concept’s varied
usages as an essential characteristic; opening its definition to different interpreta-
tions, case specificity, and everyday usages we see a way to build on the strengths
of resilience as a set of practices, while also recognizing ideological risks, political
failings, and policy pitfalls.
This approach draws on insights generated nearly a century ago. Linguists like
Ferdinand de Saussure argued that words and their meaning are essentially con-
textual, and they evolve in a negotiation between the people who use those words.6
This is precisely how we think resilience should be used in part because this kind
of usage would make it possible for researchers and practitioners who work on
different cases with more or less different assumptions to contribute to a com-
mon project of making resilience better at achieving desired goals like enhancing
solidarity and inclusiveness, reducing environmental and ecological impacts and
risks and so on. And, in our view, these negotiations must account for the other
actors who are impacted by resilience policy and practice, even if they do not speak.
This includes the flora and fauna, the atmosphere and biosphere as well as physical
infrastructures and technological systems.
Using resilience in its contextual, vernacular, everyday sense creates space for
negotiation between different sets of actors, and opens up the possibility for new
common understandings to emerge. And this is essential, because ‘resilient re-
sponses’ and ‘resilience building’ should be different in different contexts. Most
obviously, resilient responses can and should vary in terms of the systems being
addressed: building a resilient ecosystem is, for example, different than (and po-
tentially at odds with) creating resilient financial institutions. But the nature of the
disruption is perhaps less important than the sociological, political, cultural, and
ecological differences between places and across scales. It matters, for example,
whether one is attempting to create resilience in small agricultural communities
or in a mega-city; in coastal areas or the mountains; in rich countries or poor ones;
in Nordic style social democracies or command economies; in places where the
communitarian ethos is strong or society is enclaved. The chapters in this collec-
tion illustrate, among other things, how important historical logics, geographical,
institutional, and contextual differences can be.
Sönke Kunkel’s chapter on the socio-technology of disaster prevention and mi-
tigation during the cold war, for example, shows how troubling and potentially
authoritarian assumptions continue to freight present-day resilience strategies.
He alerts us to the way that language, technology, and policy all contribute to path
6 This is not to say that de Saussure argued that individuals determine meaning, but rather to
point out that meaning is negotiated in practice.
Contesting Resilience 19
dependencies which can, nevertheless, be avoided. Another chapter by AnnMauds-
ley explores architecture and planning in extreme environments, and reminds us
that public-private partnerships carry both risks and opportunities. This is not in
itself a revelation, but looking at the way that actually built communities in the
arctic circle have survived and failed tells us something far more specific than a
general rejection of the P-P-P model can. Ann’s case shows that partnerships with
particular kinds of private partners might be particularly problematic. And unfor-
tunately, these are precisely the partners that are so active today. Marcela Lopez
writes about the formalization of car washes in present-day Medellìn, and her es-
say offers a different perspective on P-P-Ps, in this case showing how mutual inte-
rests can indeed generate spaces of resilience and protection. She argues that the
characteristics of the private partners are extremely important for explaining how
and when these can reasonably be expected to yield benefits to the community and
the environment, and when these benefits are unlikely to materialize. The anthro-
pologically and historically centered research in this volume shows that one size
fits all approaches to resilience lend themselves to co-optation by powerful actors
with questionable motives.
Acknowledging the usefulness of a contextual, vernacular, everyday usage of
resilience would also generate a methodological flexibility that builds on some of
the more desirable logics of the term itself. There is broad agreement in planning
and development communities that co-creative approaches are the key to crafting
effective resilience strategies – a top-down approach to disruptions of diverse kinds
is demonstrably less effective than approaches that engage local actors. Critical
urbanists agree with planners that local communities and a range of vulnerable
stakeholders should be given a voice in the ways that their communities respond
to disaster. Given this space of agreement between advocates and critics, then, it
makes sense to build methodological flexibility that privileges co-creativity into the
very structure of resilience approaches.The principle of co-creativity would entail a
kind of ad hoc methodology which combines the merits of the global best practices
approach (advocated by, for example, the RC100) with an extreme sensitivity to
specific contexts, local needs and conditions, and community input.
These two perspectives appear to lead in very different directions, and inde-
ed, in practice, they do.The first approach is anchored in globally centralized, top-
down, and technocratic strategies which are (despite substantial critique) extreme-
ly important.The latter is based on local, bottom-up, and often idiosyncratic tactics
that are very much in vogue in some circles. But there is no real reason that plan-
ning for, and responding to, crisis should preclude a collaborative approach which
brings together these distinct bodies of strategy and tactic. Indeed, the merits of
wedding a best-practices approach to one that takes local knowledge, needs, and
aspirations seriously is that it overcomes the twin problems of power and paro-
chialism that are so often a part of preparing for and responding to crisis. And
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despite the widespread tendency to define, classify, codify, and measure, an ad
hoc approach that uses available tools and resources – whether they come from
the United Nations, a corporate or family foundation,The Red Crescent, the village
council, the alderman’s office, the local hardware shop, the central bank or the labor
union – is what actually happens in practice anyways.
There are obvious problems with this approach. First, resilience as a global de-
velopment project that is the target of massive investment needs indicators in or-
der to assess whether certain strategies are achieving their desired goals. Second,
an everyday, vernacular approach to resilience is also open to agenda capture by
corporate actors. If resilience is not defined in very specific ways that apply to
very particular sets of circumstances, then any kind of initiative, policy, or fun-
ding stream can be described as resilience enhancing. Third, if resilience is used
by different stakeholders in different ways, resilience strategies can collide or even
cancel one another out. As already mentioned, the goal of building more resilient
ecosystemsmay be coincident with that of creatingmore resilient food production,
but may well be at odds with the project of building more resilient financial insti-
tutions. Fourth, and in very much the same vein, an ad hoc, vernacular, everyday
usage of resilience can lead to what is called mal-adaptation. Such a mal-adapted
usage might seemingly promote resilience on one level, while actually serving to
multiply vulnerabilities on another, which is particularly problematic if it further
perpetuates already existing social and environmental inequalities (Dawson 2017).
These are all reasonable objections, but it is worth pointing out that there is
a rather substantial literature that is focused on definitions, indicators, metrics,
evaluation and so on. This literature is, in our view, important in hedging against
those objections catalogued above. We believe that the perspectives presented he-
re add to the richness of this existing literature, and add useful insights about a
collaborative approach to resilience that is process-based and respectful of diffe-
rence. The cases in this book suggest that by learning about resilience in diverse
historical and contemporary cases, we can also learn how to better enact resilience
as a process negotiated by a huge number of actors who are simultaneously em-
bedded in multiple temporalities that are parts of many and sometimes competing
narratives. Instead of defining resilience, we want to open it up to on-the-ground
contestation that includes different actors and temporalities representing different
narratives of the same phenomenon.
Concepts as Strategies: Actors, Narratives, and Temporalities
Resilience thinking has been applied to everything from human development to
systems engineering, and this is one of the reasons that critics believe the ter-
minology has become hopelessly vague. But is this actually true? Are engineers,
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psychologists, international aid agencies, and ecologists really talking about such
different things? We have already discussed some of the definitions of resilience,
some of the differences between them, and the array of topics they address. As sta-
ted above, we are not convinced that it is necessary to seek a clear-cut definition
of resilience, but in terms of clarification we would like to highlight three distinct
aspects – actors, narratives, and temporalities.
Firstly, in order to identify the framing of resilience discourses, we need to have
a clear understanding of the actors involved and their specific position in a constel-
lation of actors and practices. Resilience can be focused on community building or
disaster relief, it can happen at a local, regional, national or international level; the
disruptions can come from a variety of more or less complicated and/or socially
embedded causes. It is obvious, for example, that actors are differently affected by
a military conflict, an earthquake, or an extended drought, and that responses will
vary based on scale, scope, and location.Why, though, does this mean that the goal
of fostering social (and ecological) formations capable of effectively responding to
those shocks would be different?We believe that the first step in building a resilien-
ce that is responsive to particular cases across geographies and scales is to identify
the actors who are impacted and can be impactful. When attempting to build re-
silience in a variety of different contexts, the first goal should be to understand
who the key actors are. Who is impacted by the disruption and in what way? Is it
an individual, a community, an infrastructure, an institution, a way of thinking,
an ecological habitat or environmental system? When it comes to resilience, actors
are incredibly diverse, but this is also true of other areas of sociological, histori-
cal, scientific, or planning inquiry. Actors are not always obvious, and are obviously
not always human.Earthquakes, for example, often especially affect infrastructures
and buildings. Environmental disasters often have the most devastating impact on
animals.
When it comes to actors, it is also critical to identify those who intervene in
resilience building. Are these community or environmental activists, international
agencies, corporations, state actors? Identifying such actors and the specific con-
figurations in which they perform makes it better possible to evaluate their sha-
red agendas, recognizing conflicts of interest, but also to uncover power inequali-
ties among different groups of actors as well as, the often tenuous, circumstances
that can lead from good intentions to deficient outcomes and unintended conse-
quences. The goal of identifying key actors, then, is not about defining resilience.
It is about recognizing who gets to negotiate such definitions. Identifying actors
is a vital element in crafting a resilience policy and practice that achieves widely
agreed upon goals. So, too, are narratives because actors legitimize their intentions
through the stories they tell.
On themost straightforward level, narratives are about stories –what do peop-
le say, who speaks, and why. Not surprisingly, community activists often have a
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very different perspective on resilience measures than planners or governmental
agents. Those directly affected by crisis obviously have a different view from those
who decide about measures from a desk or computer screen. So, the first question
in relation to resilience narratives should be – whose voice is heard, and how does
it get articulated? Several essays in this volume,most notably those by López, Shar-
ma, and Wesener, take up the perspective of those most immediately affected to
trace how their experiences translated into concrete actions (such as car washing,
food hamstring, or community gardening); and how, in turn, they were embed-
ded in particular policy measures (like water bills, rationing cards, and gardening
rules). For historians, anthropologists, and scholars of culture more generally, nar-
rative usually plays a central role in any kind of analysis because they know that
sources never speak for themselves, but that they gain meaning only through the
contexts in which they are placed. As the essays in this volume indicate, the broad
array of sources available (interviews, policies, maps, official and personal records,
media coverage, photographs, economic surveys, laws and ordinances to name just
a few) lends itself to varied interpretations of resilience discourses and their im-
plementation in different geographical and temporal contexts, which brings us to
a second crucial dimension of narrativity.
The concept of resilience is itself embedded in a narrative construction. From
its etymological origins in the 1620s to its present-day use, the term resilience has
been framed in numerous ways and across disciplinary contexts from philosophy to
engineering, planning, and psychology all the way to ecology and the social sciences
(Alexander 2013; Rogers 2016). Taken together these discourses provide a genealo-
gical narrative about resilience and its intrinsic norms and values. As some of the
essays in this book (especially Danneels et al., Kunkel, and Maudsley) document, a
careful reading of sources will uncover the norms and values that undergirded ma-
ny debates about resilience in the past and how theymight have laid the foundation
for current attitudes towards resilience, particularly in planning, engineering, and
policy discourses.
Finally, there is the narrative of resilience itself that needs to be critically eva-
luated. As we have seen, resilience does not just serve as critical planning tool, it
also functions as a powerful policy agenda. In urban contexts in particular, the no-
tion of resilience has become highly politicized. Resilience strategies, as advocated
by the 100 RC Initiative of the Rockefeller Foundation, the UN’s New Urban Agenda
and others, have become another driver in urban governance expansion and P-P-Ps
across the globe. Resilience has become another buzzword for urban development
– justifiably so inmany cases – but this also entails the risk that the notion becomes
part of a political greenwashing rhetoric, and hence, ineffective in debates about
urban development. We know quite well what happened to the idea of sustaina-
bility, a concept that originated in 18th-century forestry and whose meaning and
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political implications have shifted from ecological empowerment to a more or less
empty rhetoric employed to advance political, marketing, and business interests.
Recently, there has been a notable discursive reframing of urban development
efforts away from notions of sustainability towards practices of resilience. This
narrative shift can be clearly traced in the literature starting in the early 2000s
(Zhang/Li 2018). But this move is not just a matter of scholarly debate, it is al-
so taking over in governmental and policy circles signifying a demonstrative shift
towards an increasingly pervasive expectation of crisis. It almost appears as if a
more or less permanent state of crisis has become a widely accepted norm. The
question no longer appears to be if but rather when the next disaster hits. In con-
sequence, long-range sustainability efforts are frequently giving way to more im-
mediate, techno-fix-centered, approaches meant to enhance a city’s ability to bet-
ter withstand acute shocks or chronic stress. Thus, a ‘narrative of resilience’ rather
than urban sustainability appears to be the new urban paradigm and this narrative
shift needs to be critically evaluated (Sudmeier-Rieux 2014).
In general, paying more attention to narrative on all its discursive levels will
broaden the chorus of voices and sharpen our critical understanding of the various
practical and ideological uses of the concept. In an essay on governing urban resi-
lience, Bruce Goldstein et al. called for a ‘plurivocal narrative’ to give voice to the
subjective and symbolic meanings of resilience (Goldstein et al. 2015). Such a plu-
rivocal narrative combines the descriptive and normative dimensions of resilience
discourses and sheds light on the ways these discourses operate across scales - from
the concrete to the abstract, from the individual to the collective, from the very lo-
cal to the planetary. Moreover, the closer focus on narratives should also include a
critical assessment of the various temporal levels involved.
The editors of this volume, and at least some of the contributors, are historians
by training and profession, and temporality is something we think about in our
work on a daily basis. But we also think temporality is something that needs to be
more seriously considered in allied disciplines as they consider a range of dynamic
and still evolving concepts. Resilience is a perfect example of this, and happily, our
non-historian collaborators agree that temporality matters. For present purposes,
temporality matters in at least three ways.
First is temporality in terms of the relationship between past, present, and
future. The usefulness of history for the understanding of the present and future
is generally agreed, and it is quite common for non-specialists to argue that those
who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it. As historians, we the editors
think this well-known saying does not quite capture the way that history can be
useful for thinking about contemporary topics like resilience. Indeed, in many of
the historical chapters in this collection, we find that the past is best understood
not as a tool for forecasting the future, but something that is profoundly embedded
in the present. Sönke Kunkel’s essay, for example, suggests that current resilience
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discourses continue to be structured by the same assumptions that already riddled
disaster prevention and mitigation policy during the cold war. In a different vein,
Avi Sharma’s chapter asks readers to think about how historical cases of survival in
catastrophic circumstances shape the assumptions we make about being resilient
in thewake of a crisis.We hope the present volume is able to show the persistence of
the past in ways that make clear how history can actually be a resource for thinking
about and understanding the present and, indeed, the future.
Second is the issue of temporal scales. The resilience literature very often deals
with post-crisis scenarios, and this is as true of chapters in the present volume as
it is with the literature more generally. Because of this focus on crisis and post-
crisis cases, though, thinking about the practices of resilience tend to center quite
strongly on short-term scenarios. There are good reasons to focus on short term
temporal frames, not the least because the kinds of disruptions that elicit calls for
resilience often require immediate assistance. One of the key findings of the pre-
sent work is, however, that resilience building as well as post-crisis recovery happen
best when systems are already in place that enhance social solidarity, educate local
populations to risk, and multiply the number of stakeholders. Ash Amin calls these
silent systems, and as he points out, such silent systems are typically not particular-
ly sexy with regard to political showmanship. They also often do not align with the
narrow horizons dictated by legislative periods or the ‘return of investment’ logic
of so much contemporary urban design.7 The chapters in the present work suggest
that, if resilience is to avoid capture by some of the neoliberalizing tendencies of
contemporary political practice (deregulation, privatization, branding, green-wa-
shing etc.), the concept needs to become a planning and preparedness instrument
for everyday life, and not just post-crisis recovery.
A third aspect directly related to the notion of temporal scales concerns the
timeframes in which we think about urban resilience. As Florian Liedtke points
out in his chapter on the 1995 Kobe earthquake, different recovery phases following
an acute crisis aremarked by different notions of temporariness.He focusses parti-
cularly on ways that the immediate need for emergency shelters was soon replaced
by a need formore durable, yet still temporary, housing during the restoration pha-
se, which itself took many years. The example of postwar Berlin discussed by Avi
Sharma also underscores the different kinds of temporary housing arrangements
that were intended for short-term shelter but frequently became semi-permanent
living arrangements for people who had lost their homes. Resilience measures that
are insensitive to questions of temporality has the potential to create a ‘permanent
temporariness’ that leaves particularly vulnerable populations in a prolonged state
7 It should be noted, of course, that this focus on the short-term time scales, what Eraydin et
al. describe as neoliberal planning, is often an imperative despite the aspirations and profes-
sional better judgement of planners, architects, policy makers, and designers.
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of uncertainty and exposure. In a similar vein, resilience discourses that remain in-
different to questions of temporal duration might misjudge the impact of recovery
measures on affected urban populations and environments.
Finally, if resilience discourses are tied to debates about sustainability and cli-
mate change, questions of duration need to be posed with a long-term view to the
future. In other words, if as the New Urban Agenda’s SDG 11 claims, resilient cities
are to be sustainable, then resilience thinking needs to span decades maybe even
centuries.This might entail very difficult but fundamental questions regarding ur-
ban settlements, e.g., if simple ‘bounce-back’ policies of rebuilding housing in low
lying areas is advisable or if resettlement might generate a more ‘bounce forward’
approach in an age of rising sea levels (Parenti 2017). Such thinking would require
vision and it might prove quite unpopular in terms of voting cycle politics, but it
appears to be necessary with a view towards a more temporality-resilient future.
We hope that focusing on these multiple frames – actors, narratives, and tem-
poralities – brings into focus precisely this question of process, negotiation, and
contestation that is too often hidden away in resilience discourses. It needs to be
clear that what qualifies as a resilience-building agenda for one set of actors is
often rejected by others; that short, medium, and long-term perspectives can il-
luminate different logics of disruption and recovery, and that these must all be
negotiated in politically open, context specific ways. Many scholars, including the
authors who contributed to the present volume, employ the concept of resilien-
ce not because they all agree that it is the best possible way to address disaster
relief, achieve social mobility and integration, create more inclusive and less envi-
ronmentally harmful cities. The contributors to this volume realize that resilience
discourse will, for better or worse, shape the lives of millions of vulnerable peop-
le for years to come. Taken together, the goal of the chapters in this volume is to
offer other, and potentially more dynamic ways, of thinking about a challenging
concept.
The Chapters
The volume is separated into two sections. The first explores the ecologies of resi-
lience. We use the term ecologies to signal our focus both on an environmentally-
sensitive approach to questions of resilience as well as a more socially-oriented un-
derstanding of resilience as a constellation of lifeworld circumstances that include
food provision and housing.The papers in this section demonstrate how architects
and planners engaged ecological knowledge to understand, design, and rebuild ci-
ties in light of extreme physical circumstances. Each in its own way also illustrates
how green (or “white”) spaces played a crucial role in the (re)configuration of cities
following severe crises.
26 Dorothee Brantz and Avi Sharma
The first chapter, co-written by Koenraad Danneels, Greet De Block, and Bruno
Notteboom, examines the influence of Belgian natural scientists and urban desi-
gners in creating a socio-environmental perspective on urban resilience. The first
part of the chapter looks at the idea of the ‘sociobiological city,’ whichwas developed
by landscape architect Louis Van der Swaelmen as a response to the destructions
of the First World War. The second part of the essay explores the concept of the
city as an ecosystem, which ecologist Paul Duvigneaud developed in response to
the environmental crisis of the 1970s. This historical analysis draws attention to
the use of crisis, the idea of equilibrium and the (contested) sociopolitical motives
and forces in resilient urbanism as it developed in 20th-century Belgium.These two
scientific approaches also offer critical insights into the new concept of resilience,
highlighting ways that power and inequality are embedded in socio-biological me-
taphors, and asking how these metaphors continue to be used in current debates
about resilience.
Ann Maudsley’s chapter then looks at Ralph Erskine, a British-Swedish archi-
tect who designed “ideal towns” for the Arctic in the 1950s and 60s. As Maudsley
documents, Erskine set out to create a new regionalism conditioned by northern
culture and climate. He aimed to create more climatically-suited, inclusive, well-
serviced resilient communities rich with amenities and varied activities. Erksine
became internationally known as an ‘Arctic architect’ and was employed to design
several new communities north of the Arctic Circle in the succeeding decades.This
chapter focuses on two Erskine projects in Sweden, one in Kiruna and the other in
the nearby town Svappavaara. By examining design and architecture, planning, de-
velopment and outcomes in each location, this chapter is an effort to better under-
stand what resilience and survival mean in extreme geoclimatic and socio-cultural
contexts. Finally, it asks whether urban design and planning in the Arctic circle can
offer insights into the work of building more resilient cities in other ecological and
environmental conditions.
In his contribution, architecture and urban design scholar Andreas Wesener
examines the role of urban gardens for strengthening urban resilience in times of
crisis. His chapter begins with a discussion of systems-based approaches to resi-
lience, before turning to the specific example of urban community gardening as a
special crisis response following the Canterbury and Christchurch earthquakes of
2010/11. Through a close interpretation of a range of interviews with urban garde-
ners, Wesener shows how gardens have helped communities recover from social,
emotional, and other effects of this natural disaster. His chapter highlights the di-
rect impact of urban ecologies on recovery practices and hence underscores the
necessity of including community gardens in urban resilience strategies.
Avi Sharma’s chapter turns to postwar Berlin to examine how the governmen-
talities and everyday experiences of survival might offer us insights into the logics
of our contemporary discourses about resilience. From the destruction of physical
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infrastructures to the large-scale arrival of refugees and DPs, postwar Berlin was a
site of extreme social dislocation. Focusing on shelter and food in Berlin between
1945 and 1950, this essay explores what it means to survive in the context of in-
tersectional crises that cascaded across numerous scales. Sharma documents how
the close interconnections between individual fates and collective circumstances,
between private inhabitants and governmental/occupational agencies made survi-
val possible. Through this specific case study, Sharma demonstrates, among other
things, how historical examples might be productively used to elucidate current-
day challenges.
The second section shifts our attention towards infrastructures of resilience.
Bringing together scholars working in a wide range of fields, including history, ar-
chitecture, planning and science and technology studies, this section questions the
impact of institutional andmaterial infrastructures in the supply andmaintenance
of urban resilience networks.The individual chapters examine how different actors
including international agencies, local governments, commercial enterprises, and
urban inhabitants have collectively contributed – in some cases, inadvertently - to
the creation of structured networks aimed to enhance the resilience of their respec-
tive communities or cities. For all their disciplinary differences, the contributions
in this section maintain that resilience can generate tools and resources to deal
with crisis scenarios, but they also warn that the concept can easily be coopted by
powerful financial and institutional interests.
Sönke Kunkel’s chapter scrutinizes the way that changing ideas about envi-
ronmental risk in the 1960s caused the international development community to
develop new policies that focused on disaster mitigation and prevention projects.
Those policies included, among other things, funding transnational scientific rese-
arch projects on urban earthquake hazard reduction, the establishment of various
earthquake centers, and the creation of building codes and seismic risk mapping.
As he demonstrates, while those approaches promoted a new transnational dis-
course on urban disaster mitigation, they also quickly ran into problems on the
ground, not least since they paid little attention to the social dynamics of rapid
urbanization, instead treating environmental dangers in purely techno-scientific
challenges. Using the examples of major earthquakes in Morocco and Chile in the
1960s, this paper argues that a more critical understanding of historical discour-
ses about resilience policies can enhance our awareness of the potential pitfalls
and blinders in global urban development debates centered on techno-fixes and
standardized international policies. He also sharpens our understanding of how
institutional infrastructures like the UN have contributed to a a universalizing ap-
proach towards resilience strategies.
Discourses of resilience often focus on the everyday capacities of the urban poor
to overcome threats posed by extreme socio-natural events. In 2013, the Colombian
city of Medellín was labeled as one of the most resilient cities in the world due to
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its residents’ capacity to withstand violence and criminality as well as floods and
landslides.The chapter by Marcela López provides a critical lens on what a resilient
city entails by looking at the question of water supply in Medellín. She describes
how the city’s water utility company made efforts to protect the urban poor from
adversity in order to secure revenues. Facing enormous challenges to control illegal
water connections, the company has deployed different strategies in which ideas
about water scarcity, human rights, and civil society converge to facilitate, among
other things, the formalization of the illegal carwash sector. This chapter shows
that the resilience of the informal carwash – ubiquitous in Colombian cities like
Medellín – should not just be understood in relation to claims about power on the
state and other institutional levels, rather than just on everyday survival strategies
within an informal economy. Hence, this chapter sheds light on the multi-direc-
tional power relations and resilience strategies built around urban infrastructures
like water supply.
Florian Liedtke’s chapter discusses the aftermath of the 1995 Kobe earthquake
that caused massive destruction throughout the city. As Liedtke documents, parks
and open spaces became central recovery areas. Not only did people move to open
spaces to escape their destroyed homes, they also sought shelter in parks during
the first days of emergency recovery. As emergency recovery shifted to restoration,
parks and open spaces served as temporary housing areas where people could live
until their own houses were rebuilt. For many, however, these temporary shelters
turned into semi-permanent homes because in some instances rebuilding efforts
took longer than anticipated. In addition to housing, parks and open spaces were
also used for the storage of debris. Liedtke argues that both spaces provided vital
areas for urban recovery measures, and that they should be an integral part of ur-
ban resilience strategies. Moreover, he makes a plea for a more multi-functional
planning that incorporates urban green and open spaces as infrastructures of re-
creation as well as central sites of emergency and recovery planning. In that sense
he insists that resilient cities require multifunctional planning for the very diffe-
rent living situations and needs that might arise, especially in earthquake prone
areas.
Diego Silva Ardila’s contribution brings us back to Latin America, exploring
transportation infrastructures in four different cities. Mexico City, Bogotá, Medel-
lín, and Buenos Aires. He is particularly interested in the different mobility so-
lutions that evolved “organically” to fill gaps in public and private transportation
services. His examples range from Buenos Aires’Remis system, toMexico City’s Bus
Rapid Transit, the Transmillenio in Bogotá and aerial cable cars in Medellín. Silva
Ardila is not interested in judging these various interventions from an ideological
perspective, but simply demonstrating how different solutions – bottom-up; top-
down; private sector driven; public sector financed – differently stabilized dysfunc-
tional transportation infrastructures.He argues that this should be understood not
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in terms of the formal/informal dichotomy that is now widely used in urban resili-
ency literature, not least in essays in the present volume. Instead, he insists that in
many Latin American cities, the symbiotic relationship between formal and infor-
mal, elite and precarious actors is so deeply embedded in the urban fabric that it
does not make sense to disentangle. Consequently, he proposes a new framework –
urban dualism – to understand these entanglements. It is worth exploring whether
this analytic applies equally to other global cases or, as he suggests, is particular to
the Latin American city.
Timothy Moss’ epilogue brings us back to the immediate concerns of our pre-
sent time and the multiple crises we are facing right now. He uses this to ponder
where the concept of resilience has taken us; how it has lent renewed purpose to
planning, architecture, and civil engineering; and where it has left gaps in our un-
derstanding of the world, particularly when it comes to cities. Taking up the ar-
guments of some of the book chapters, he recaps the need to study resilience in
light of geographical and historical specificities as well as with a critical perspec-
tive on the politics inherent in urban resilience discourses. In closing he offers four
programmatic points to advance resilience research beyond presentism, eventism,
essentialism, and disciplining. With that he reminds us that much remains to be
done in the field of resilience scholarship.
At the outset we stated that one important reason to study resilience is that
it is – whether or not one likes it – a development approach that directly impacts
millions of lives in our own world, and in ourmid-term future. But there is another
reason. When Vale and Campanella wrote in 2005, they made a major point about
the fact that, throughout history, destroyed cities are – in the vast majority of cases
– rebuilt. Vale and Campanella signaled the assumption that, at least when it comes
to the urban, resilience is about recovering and rebuilding. Something has changed
in the last 15 years, and this makes it a good time to think resilience anew. A recent
study inScience suggested that the best response to disastermight be tomove rather
than rebuild, no longer to fight against but to work with nature (Siders/Hino/Mach
2019). Now may not be the time to redefine resilience, but it certainly is time to
rethink it.
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A Historical Perspective on Resilient Urbanism
The ‘Sociobiology of Cities’ and ‘Ecosystem Urbs’ in
Belgium, 1900-1980
Koenraad Danneels, Bruno Notteboom and Greet De Block
In one of the first books written on urbanism and spatial planning in Belgium –
published in 1916 under the title Preliminaries of Civic Art in Relation to the ‘Clinical Case’
of Belgium (hereafter Preliminaries) – landscape architect and urbanist Louis Van der
Swaelmen (1883-1929) stated that a crisis had struck the country. “Entire cities have
been destroyed,” he lamented, comparable to the power of multiple “London fires”
or “Messina earthquakes” (Van der Swaelmen 1916: 6). The crisis Van der Swael-
men was refering to was the destruction caused by World War I; a destruction he
sought to address and overcome in Preliminairies with a reconstruction agenda that
was based on what he called his “sociobiological” theory (Van der Swaelmen 1919).
Although the foundation of this theory was somewhat vague, a close reading of Van
der Swaelmen’s writings reveals that it was based in mainly French environmen-
tal thought of that period, leaning on early ethological and sociobiological research
(Thomas 2003; De Bont 2008 and 2010). Early ethology is understood as a branch of
biological research concerned with the “interactions between organisms and their
environment,” a kind of proto-ecology (De Bont 2010: 4),while sociobiology in Fran-
ce and Belgiumwas specifically concernedwith the “continuity between animal and
human societies” (Thomas 2003: 109).1 Van der Swaelmen’s sociobiological take on
urbanization was based on the same observations. He believed that the environ-
ment was crucial for urbanization processes. Using a biological analogy, he even
compared cities to natural organisms.Coupling this kind of environmental thought
to architecture and urban planning was not unique in the Belgian context - it was a
widespread international phenomenon during the late 19th and early 20th centuries
1 In the context of this chapter, ethology is not the discipline developed in the 1930s that was
concerned with animal behavior, but a “scientific attitude” developed earlier in France, in
which environmental factors were of the outmost importance for studying organisms (De
Bont 2010). Sociobiology is a general term, not used at that time, but applied by historians
of science like Marion Thomas (2003). However, Louis Van der Swaelmen did posit that he
studied the “sociobiology of cities” (Van der Swaelmen, 1919).
36 Koenraad Danneels, Bruno Notteboom and Greet De Block
(Welter 2003; Platt 2015). In addition, Kenny Cupers has demonstrated in his work
on Bodenständigkeit that new biological theories that were mobilized in urban thin-
king in early 20th-century Germany reinforced widespread nostalgic beliefs of the
loss of an original cultural and natural landscape due to industrialization (Cupers
2016: 1234). Van der Swaelmen’s work shows that in Belgium, the same logic was
at play. In Préliminaires it was his diagnosis of the disaster of wartime destruction
that revealed the ongoing conflict between modern urbanization and industriali-
zation, on the one hand, and the original natural and cultural environment, on the
other. Van der Swaelmen’s new urban theory was therefore geared towards redefi-
ning and reconfiguring the relation between city and countryside in order to solve,
or at least curb, the devastating side-effects of the urbanization of nature on both
the natural and social worlds. His self-proclaimed sociobiological theory not only
responded to the urgent crisis caused by wartime destruction but also sought to
tackle the shortcomings of 19th-century industrial cities (Van der Swaelmen 1921).
Half a century later, Brussels-based urban ecologist Paul Duvigneaud (1913-1991)
laid the foundation for a theory of the city as an ecosystem. Like Van der Swaelmen,
he lamented the “pathological” state of the modern city (Duvigneaud 1974). More
specifically, the environmental crisis caused by large-scale resource extraction, ac-
celerating industrialization, and urban consumption prompted him to formulate
a socio-ecological theoretical framework that could cope with the ‘overheating’ of
the urban metabolism (Duvigneaud 1974: 6). Thorougly based in the ascent of eco-
system science, he claimed that his écosystème ‘urbs’ would reconnect the city to its
natural substrate, thus short-circuiting such overheating. Duvignead believed that
a renewed, sustainable city could be created by analyzing the city’s flows in detail,
re-rooting them in a metabolic framework, and operationalizing this analysis in
planning policies.
Although Duvigneaud and Van der Swaelmen had different disciplinary back-
grounds and mobilized different discourses, both articulated a spatial reaction to
what they perceived as a ‘crisis’ of the modern city and landscape. Each approa-
ched this crisis with a theoretical framework fusing the natural and social sciences
in order to reconnect society and nature. Both Van der Swaelmen and Duvigne-
aud criticized the unbalanced interaction of the historical and natural landscape
with modern processes like industrialization and urbanization, and in that sense
they perceived the same sort of crisis. By blending their disciplinary expertise with
scientific research and an urban planning agenda, they both hoped to rebalance
the built environment by reconfiguring its spatial layout. Linking terms such as
‘destruction’ or ‘pathology’ to the concept of crisis enables us to draw attention to
similarities and differences between their strategies to balance society-nature re-
lationships. In this chapter we will use ‘crisis’ as an operational concept to analyze
the discourses mobilized by Van der Swaelmen and Duvigneaud. Crisis, as Rein-
hart Koselleck argued, always has subtle deviations in its meaning and can be both
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“imprecise and vague” and is used to describe “vaguely disturbing moods or situa-
tions” (Koselleck 2006: 399).2 Koselleck therefore cautioned scholars in their use of
the word, but still we mobilize it freely because ”this lack of clarity is often welco-
me, since it makes it possible to keep open what it may mean in the future”(Ibid:
399).
Nowadays, crisis is again high on the agenda of the discipline of urbanism.
Indeed, it seems to be a central component of resilient urbanism: one of the newest
‘isms’ geared to remedy today’s ecological “apocalypse” (Swyngedouw 2010). In his
essay Notes on a Resilient City, Ross Exo Adams analyzes the project Rebuild by Design
(RBD), an ambitious design initiative created by the Bloomberg Foundation that
tried to “implement strategies for rebuilding a city [New York] severely damaged by
‘Superstorm Sandy’” (Adams 2014: 127). Adams uses the RBD project as an example
of so-called ‘resilient urbanism,’ and argues that ünder the regime of resilience
the spatial order of the urban begins to exhibit radically new tendencies.”This new
regime of resilience draws its force from ïts ability to incorporate a concrete crisis
in its own discursive and political formation,änd ünlike sustainability or ecological
urbanism, [resilient urbanism] immediately frames itself as a program of response
to crisis”(Adams 2014: 127).
In this chapter, we study the relationship of urbanism and spatial planning
to crisis, as an entry into the history of resilient urbanism before Crawford Hol-
ling introduced the term resilience in ecological science (Holling 1973) and befo-
re it was coopted into urban design in recent years (Eraydin/Taşan-Kok 2013). We
analyze the two historical figures of Louis Van der Swaelmen and Paul Duvigne-
aud who proposed a resilient urbanism avant-la-lettre and link it to the use of the
concept today in order to better understand the current relationship between ur-
banism/planning and crisis. Firstly, we demonstrate that these earlier theories of
resilient urbanism were produced by the interplay of environmental sciences like
biology and ecology on the one hand, and design disciplines including landscape
architecture and urbanism on the other. Secondly, a comparison of these historical
responses to crisis with current notions of resilience aims to uncover the histori-
cally specific relationship between urbanism and crisis. Moreover, this essay will
focus on how interactions between city and nature, urbanization and the natural
environment, were thought in relation to specific crises. In addition to previous
meaningful contributions to the analysis of the concept of resilience and practices
of resilient urbanism (Bankoff 2001 and 2019; Kirchoff 2010; Walker/Cooper 2011;
Braun 2014), our analysis will show how the alliance of the natural and design sci-
ences in history is rehearsed today. We argue that resilient urbanism is not as new
as is often proclaimed, rather it is deeply rooted in a crisis of modernity.
2 In his paper on the Eco-city, Ross Adams also refers to the work of Koselleck on crisis and
relates it to the history of urbanism and planning (2010).
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With the analysis of the two case studies, we do not aim or pretend to compo-
se a continuous timeline until present-day resilient urbanism approaches. These
cases are but snapshots, two (Foucauldian) genealogies, with which we aim to de-
monstrate how elements of a resilient approach to urbanism are already present in
the discipline before the birth of the present resilient urbanism. As David Garland
already argued, Foucauldian genealogies or ‘histories of the present’ try to uncover
“hidden conflicts and contexts as a means of re-valuing the value of contempora-
ry phenomena” (2014: 365). In the first part, we offer a close reading of the book
Préliminaires by Van der Swaelmen. In the second part, we examine Paul Duvigne-
aud’s work on urban ecology and his influence on Brussels planning policy. In the
conclusion, we return to the question of crisis and the influence of environmental
science in current-day discourses on urbanism.
Sociobiological Theory: The Crisis of the Modern City
TheGerman invasion of Belgium in August 1914 caused vast destruction of the built
environment (Horne/Kramer 2001). Many urban designers immediately began to
think about reconstruction (Smets 1985). Louis Van der Swaelmen, exiled in the
Netherlands during the occupation years, was one of them. Before the war, he had
been active both as a theoretician as well as practitioner in the field of landscape
architecture (Stynen 1979). His work focused primarily on ideas regarding the crea-
tion of a modern aesthetic for gardens (Notteboom 2009). However, following a
congress on urbanism and urban governance during the Ghent World Exhibition
of 1913, Van der Swaelmen began to reconsider the urban question. At the Ghent
conference he got acquainted with a wide range of influential urbanists and plan-
ners of that period, not least biologist and urban planner Patrick Geddes and his
‘Cities and Town Planning Exhibition’ (Van Acker/Dehaene/Uyttenhove 2013). After
the outbreak of the World War that had forced him into exile, Van der Swaelmen
started to think more concretely about the question of urbanism and its potential
as a discipline and policy domain. In 1916, he wrote Préliminaires d’art civique, mis
en relation avec le ‘Cas Clinique’ de la Belgique [Preliminaries of Civic Art in Relation
to the ‘Clinical Case’ of Belgium], which examined the problem of wartime dest-
ruction alongside the long-range impacts of the industrial revolution and trans-
formation of the agricultural economy on urbanization (Van der Swaelmen 1916).
Van der Swaelmen used a series of reports by the Royal Commission of Art and
Archeology to diagnose the state of his Belgian homeland.These reports were con-
cerned with both the wartime destruction but also with the disappearance of the
original Belgian landscape (Lagasse de Locht/Saintenoy 1914). The Royal Commis-
sion reports showed how chemical fertilizers, large agricultural corporations, and
local railways were transforming the countryside at an unprecedented pace (Com-
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missions Royales d’Art et d’Archéologie 1914). The problematization of widespread
war-damage and the disappearance of the ’original’ landscape was further substan-
tiated by referring to a report by Jean Massart – a biologist and geobotanist – who
claimed that after the disasters of the war it was necessary to conserve traditio-
nal elements “so that we don’t need to deplore the fact that the traces of the past
will be irrevocably lost” (Commissions Royales d’Art et d’Archéologie 1914: 254). In
the discussions between ‘modernists’ and ‘traditionalists’ that would dominate the
debate on the reconstruction of the country during and after the war, the Com-
mission demanded that the Belgian landscape be rebuilt according to its earlier
nature (Smets 1985). While Van der Swaelmen endorsed such a policy, he also wan-
ted to go further to counteract modern society’s disconnection from the natural
landscape through a new linkage between landscape architecture and urbanism.
Van der Swaelmen believed that the “historical growth of the city” was “opposed”
to the “functioning of the modern city”, which resulted in “conflicts” (Ibid: XI). Van
der Swaelmen therefore wanted to “achieve […] harmonies between the things of
Nature and the Creations of Man” (Ibid: 100). Unlike the approach advocated by
the Commission, he argued that the new spatial lay-out should follow from the
recoupling of the natural landscape to modern urbanization patterns: instead of
a historicist reconstruction, he imagined a new landscape that would incorporate
the historical city while also making way for new settlements based on the natural
and cultural environment.
Urbanism, Science, and Politics
In Préliminaires, Van der Swaelmen used the work of contemporary ethological sci-
entists to tackle this case study of Belgium and create what he called a “sociobiolo-
gical” approach that grounded urban theory in biological laws and environmental
considerations. In his analysis, the city functioned as a biological organism deter-
mined by environmental factors, ideas that could be traced back to the philosopher
of biology Félix Le Dantec (1869–1917) (Van der Swaelmen, n.d.). Van der Swaelmen
explained the growth of cities using biological laws, assigning biological functions
to different aspects of the urban environment. In his archival notes, Van der Swael-
men noted that Le Dantec’s theorem could be “applied to the city” (Van der Swael-
men, n.d.). As a neo-Lamarckian, Le Dantec “held to a hard-and-fast determinism”,
and studied the continual “trafficking” of the organism with its environment (“Dr.
Felix Le Dantec” 1917: 489). By constructing the idea of what he called a “organisme-
cité” (city-organism), Van der Swaelmen equated the urban environment with va-
rious biological functions: buildings were cells, road networks worked like veins,
and parks were the city’s lungs (Van der Swaelmen 1916: 78). In this organisme-cité,
environmental factors had a determining influence on the growth and development
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Figure 1: Cover of Préliminaires d’Art Civique (Louis Van der Swaelmen 1916). Figure 2: The
Organisme-cité (Louis Van der Swaelmen 1916 ).
of the city. The fundamental organizing principles of the built environment were
the “horizontality of the terrain,” the “water regime,” and the “draining system of
the soil.”The “geographical condition”would put its “indelible imprint on the future
physiognomy of the city,” and “inevitably determine the internal law of its future
development” (Ibid: 9). Van der Swaelmen believed in an “absolute determinism” of
the laws of nature (Ibid: 10).
As a tool to help the planner or designer understand the characteristics of the
Belgian environment, Van der Swaelmen proposed to base the growth of the built
environment in “physionomical districts” (Ibid: 101). These districts were copied
from the work of Jean Massart, a geobotanist, ethologist, and professor at the Uni-
versité Libre de Bruxelles. Massart divided the Belgian territory in geobotanical
regions and attached natural and cultural characteristics to these areas. These re-
gions were differentiated by their conditions of climate and soil, the present vegetal
associations, but also by the nature of human interventions in the area (Notteboom
2009: 111).Massart’s social-ecological analysis of these geobotanical regions became
a tool for Van der Swaelmen as he worked towards a new urbanism in the postwar
reconstruction of Belgium (Massart 1910; Notteboom/Uyttenhove 2018).
Both Van der Swaelmen and Massart can be considered part of a broader Bel-
gian reformist movement that consisted of experts and technicians who tried to
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Figure 3: The Geobotanical Map of Belgium (Jean Massart, Esquisse de la géographie
botanique de la Belgique 1910 ).
improve the living conditions of the working-class without rejecting capitalist de-
velopment (Uyttenhove 2011). Van der Swaelmen’s theory illustrated how natura-
listic conceptions of the social realm, which he incorporated into his notion of the
‘ideal city,’ were part of this reformist movement. In his ideal city, for example,
so-called workers’ parks were an integral part of the city. Social classes were to
be neatly separated in the city-organism in much the same way that organs occu-
pied distinct places in a body. The “democratic society of the future” would find its
spatial representation in the newly created balance between city and natural envi-
ronment (Van der Swaelmen 1921). These ideas were quite common in modernist
architectural circles at the time. Van der Swaelmen, for instance, was deeply influ-
enced by the Dutch architect and writer Hendrik P. Berlage (Berlage 1913; Stynen
1979; Berlage/Whyte 1996).
After the war, Van der Swaelmen became active in the rethinking of the Belgian
housing policy by giving lectures on cooperative housing. He had good contacts in
socialist circles that supported a policy of financial subsidies for workers’ housing
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through the formation of cooperatives, culminating in the establishment of diffe-
rent garden cities in Belgium (Van der Swaelmen 1920; Smets 1977; Danneels 2019).
Van der Swaelmen himself designed some of these garden cities where he tried
to combine sociobiological design with the socio-political goals of a cooperative
housing strategy (Danneels 2019). For Van der Swaelmen, such socio-political ideas
were of equal importance to the biological and scientific metaphors when it came
to formulating his design theory.
With his design theory, Van der Swaelmen responded to the crisis he percei-
ved in long-range urban development, but he also addressed the more immediate
concerns following the First World War. He believed that a sociobiological theory
of urbanism and urbanization with its reattachment of environment to the urban
fabric would lead to a new equilibrium in which man and nature, the city, the en-
vironment and society would find a balance within one organic whole. What is
also clear in Van der Swaelmen’s case, and can be observed today in resilient de-
sign theory and practices, is the envisioning of “the social as a product of an all-
encompassing, dominant natural development of systems to a sustainable state
of equilibrium” (De Block 2016: 377).The biological determinism present in Van der
Swaelmen’s work can, in fact, be understood as amobilization of scientific discour-
ses to empower design language and political – in Van Swaelmen’s case socialist –
beliefs. This can be problematic because biological theories have been invoked by
all sides of the political spectrum to underscore their ideological agendas (Daston
2014, 2019; De Bont 2008). Today, similarly, the mobilization of ecological resilience
theory, which infuses “immunology” in resilient and sustainable design practices,
is sometimes criticized for its intrinsic neoliberal agenda (Swyngedouw 2010; Wal-
ker/Cooper 2011; Kaika 2017; Swyngedouw/Ernstson 2018).
The City as an Ecosystem: Ecology and Planning during the Seventies3
More than fifty years later, Paul Duvigneaud developed the concept of the ‘city as
an ecosystem’ in response to the environmental crisis facing Belgian cities in the
1970s. In the post-SecondWorldWar era, Brussels witnessed a period of large-scale
demolition that was spurred by both by the city’s position as a central node in the
national road and railroad infrastructure and its role as the new capital of Euro-
pe (Ryckewaert 2011). Carola Hein captures the situation by stating that: “Brussels,
3 Parts of the content on Duvigneaud in this chapter was previously published as a confer-
ence proceeding (Danneels 2018). Jens Lachmund also studied the ‘Duvigneaud group’ and
analyzed how “urban ecosystem analysis took shape in one particular city,” showing how ur-
ban ecosystem science was appropriated by Duvigneaud in the Brussels context (Lachmund
2017: 141-142). Other recent publications thatmentionDuvigneaud are, among others: Gandy
(2015: 151) and Bortolloti/Ranzato (2016).
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although spared by two world wars, resembled German or Japanese cities rebuilt
after World War II” (Hein 2004: ix). The increasing importance of the city center
as a base for Belgian and European governmental institutions, and the rapid con-
struction of office buildings led to demolition and population decrease in the city
center; but it also enhanced urban sprawl, which in turn eradicated open and na-
tural spaces in and around the city (Sterken 2013). These (urban) problems caused
widespread discontent among citizens. Among other things, citizen initiatives op-
posed governmental plans for high-rise building in the historical inner-city and
spoke out against the destruction of regional green spaces (Demey 1992; Leloutre
2009; Doucet 2015).
This period of radical urbanization plunged both the city center and the out-
skirts of the city into environmental distress. Duvigneaud made extensive use of
data to map these changes in the 1970s (Duvigneaud 1974: 6). The city of Brussels
was the primary place to build a theory of a distinctively urban ecosystem – the éco-
système urbs. Duvigneaud spatialized his data-driven approach derived from plant
ecology and ecosystem theory by grounding it in concrete ecological observations
in Brussels (Lachmund 2017). As Lachmund has argued, Duvigneaud was not only
a scientist concerned with scientific data and publications, but he was also active
in both planning and policy in the Brussels region. He was able to connect the
work of his lab to Brussels’ regional politics through the Agglomeration Bruxelloise, a
new regional governmental agency responsible for metropolitan issues concerning
planning and the environment (Apers 1982: 342).
Duvigneaud was trained at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) as a botanist
and chemist and finished his PhD in botanical sciences in 1940 (Pierart and Duvi-
gneaud 1992). As a professor at the ULB, he was the successor of Van der Swaelmen’s
contemporary Jean Massart. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, Duvigneaud was in-
volved in research in the Belgian Congo where he specialized in plant sociology
and lichenology. He perceived the Congo as a place of untouched nature, where he
could perform research into the “basic principles of plant sociology” (Duvigneaud
1953: 172). Although his work on the Congo continued into the 1950s, he shifted his
attention to European ecology during those years. He became a professor at the
ULB in 1952, and from 1959 onward he focused on fundamental ecology, or systems
ecology. He founded the Centre national d’écologie Générale (CNEG), and in 1963 estab-
lished an experimental station at Virelles-Blaimont, and later another one on the
site of Mirwart in the Belgian Ardennes (Pierart/Duvigneaud 1992). The research
was conducted under the auspices of the International Biological Program (1964-
1974) where Duvigneaud was the director of the Belgian section (Duvigneaud/Kes-
temont 1977). The research center measured all incoming and outgoing biomass
and energy flows on site. Duvigneaud and his colleagues published widely based
on the data collected over a period of several years (Duvigneaud 1971). In his stu-
dies on the site of the Walloon community of Mirwart, however, he did not just
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study the “natural” landscape, but also the ‘rural ecosystem,’ which he treated as a
closed agricultural ecosystem (Duvigneaud et al. 1977). Unlike earlier researchers,
Duvigneaud incorporated human activity and buildings in his analyzes, describ-
ing how heating a farm, for example, made it necessary to import energy from
nearby forest systems. Additionally, some flows were “exported,” in the form of
meat or milk, while others where ”discarded,” like dung or urine (Duvigneaud et
al. 1977: 482). Rhetorically, Duvigneaud remained an ecologist, and even when he
incorporated human activity, his language effectively incorporated the presence
of these cultural activities in his ecological models. Duvigneaud became particu-
larly well known for his visual depictions of the ecosystem, which were based on
earlier drawings by Odum in which energy flows were shown as energy circuits
(Taylor/Blum 1991). By a method of the cross-section, he documented how flows of
energy traveled through the system, effectively constructing a new way of mapping
territorial metabolic relationships. Throughout his career, these drawings grew in
both complexity and graphical quality,making them an excellent reference both for
teaching and popularizing ecological knowledge.
Figure 4: The Ecosystème ‘Urbs’ and its Metabolic Flows (Paul Duvigneaud and Isidore
Goedhuys in L’Écosystème urb: l’Ecosystème urbain Bruxellois 1977 ).
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The Ecosystème urbs: From Science to Policy
From the 1970s onwards, Duvigneaud increasingly turned his attention towards
the city itself (Duvigneaud 1974). Given his continued attention to human activi-
ty in the Ardennes studies of forest ecosystems, his hometown Brussels appeared
like another worthy place for studying the functioning of ecosystems. He called
this the écosystème urbs, opposed to the ecosystème ‘silva’ (forest ecosystem). When
reading his contribution to the study of the urban ecosystem, it becomes apparent
that one of his explicit goals was to influence the city’s urbanization process. In a
time of increasing regionalization, the ecological laboratory of the ULB “could not
ignore the urban ecosystem of Brussels” (Duvigneaud 1974: 7). Therefore, a study
center for the urban environment was created. Duvigneaud insisted that serious
regional planning had to incorporate the work of ecologists. He clearly searched for
a place at the table of planning services, engaging ecologists in the governmental
apparatus of the recently formed Brussels Agglomeration. In addition, the new re-
gional government also proved to be a financial opportunity for Duvigneaud’s lab,
a public client with ample resources that was eager to receive quantitative ecologi-
cal data upon which it could build its new planning policy. Duvigneaud was ideally
placed to bring this ecological expertise into the Brussels Agglomeration given his
expertise as an ecologist, but also his political activities in the FDF (the Democra-
tic Front of Francophones). The Agglomeration council was dominated by the FDF,
and the alderman for the environment, Pierre Havelange, was a party member as
well. Duvigneaud was therefore welcomed both as an expert and political player.4
Duvigneaud and his colleagues published widely on the écosystème urbs. What
made this ecosystem different, in their view, was the predominance of human ac-
tivity, or anthropocénose. But human activity was not the only factor shaping the ur-
ban ecosystem. The biocénoses reliques, or the original biological communities, and
the biocénoses urbanophiles – biological communities for which the urban environ-
ment is beneficial and necessary – were also core elements of the systems upon
which Duvigneaud and his colleagues worked (Duvigneaud 1974: 13). The ‘weight’,
or ‘biomass’ of these different communities was measured in tons and displayed
on a cross-section like that of the forest ecosystem. Additionally, the energy ba-
lance was calculated in both natural energy (e.g., sunlight) and subsidiary energy
(e.g., carbon). Because of the great amount of subsidiary energy imported into the
city, the amount of flows out of the city were high as well. To understand these
flows, Duvigneaud stated that it was important to study the sub-systems of the ci-
ty, outlining a future research agenda. In an early image, Duvigneaud exemplified
these diverse sub-systems by providing a sort of Geddessian Valley Section that
4 Duvigneaud’s extensive political work and network will be the central subject of a future
paper.
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matched energy in- and output (Duvigneaud 1974: 20). The subsystems were in-
habited by different socio-ecological groups of people, parallel to socio-ecological
groups of plants and animals. These ideas had first been investigated by geogra-
pher Bernard Jouret, who had claimed that the link between the population and
its habitat was “analogous to botany, where a vegetal group corresponded with a
particular soil.” Building on categories used in the botanical sciences, a socio-eco-
logical group was defined by its habitat and position, its ethnic composition and its
employment (Jouret 1972: 85). Here, Duvigneaud went quite far with his ecological
take on the city by claiming that cities not only functioned like ecosystems, but
that their inhabitants could also be understood as “socio-ecological” (Duvigneaud,
1974: 19). In other words, he implied that people – much like plants – were bound
to their environment.
Duvigneaud also identified some of the major problems he perceived in the
urbanmetabolism.Most notably, he admonished the extensive use of fossil fuels to
energize the urban system. Contrasting the metabolism of écosystème urbswith the
circular and low-energy consumption of the écosystème ‘silva,’ he criticized the high
levels of urban energy consumption as well as the urban dependence on external
energy imports. Instead, he used his data-driven metabolism models to call for
more circular energy flows.
But there were problems with Duvigneaud’s system approach as well, most
notably with his attitude towards the role of human subjects. Even though peop-
le were an important component of his data-driven research, he did not seem to
treat them as real political stakeholders, a perspective that is frequently criticized
in other resilient urbanism contexts as well (Kaika 2017). Even at the time, citizen
initiatives were one of the main forces that helped to redirect urban planning de-
bates in Brussels (Demey 1992; Doucet 2015). Instead, he mainly looked towards
governmental planning policy as an active agent in urban development.
Ecological Zoning for Brussels
Duvigneaud’s data-driven framework was linked to a variety of strategies that were
designed by the Brussels Agglomeration to help build a more balanced urban land-
scape. Through his active work in the Commission des Espaces Verts (the Commission
for Green Spaces) at the Brussels region, he tried to establish multi-layered strate-
gies to deal with the environmental problems of Brussels.On the building-scale, the
commission advised on the need for green spaces to counterbalance the negative
effects that new (and often large-scale, high-rise) buildings often had on the envi-
ronment of Brussels’ inner-city. On a regional scale, Duvigneaud actively sought to
introduce biological and ecological considerations into the planning apparatus by
providing survey studies. A map showing the occupancy of the soil and the degree
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Figure 5: The Carte écologique de l’occupation du sol et des degrés de verdurisation de l’ag-
glomération Bruxelloise (CIVA).
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of green areas was themost impressive example of this research (Duvigneaud 1977).
The map was ordered by the government of the Brussels region as a tool to be used
in future planning policies. By creating an overview of the problems of the city on
a regional scale, the alderman for the environment, Pierre Havelange, believed that
the map would help the Brussels Agglomeration to reach its goals for more green
space (Ibid.: preface). The map used existing aerial photography, official structural
plans, and photographic images taken from a zeppelin. These photos were essen-
tial because they showed the biological productivity of the green spaces in terms
of biomass volume. The map showed the amount of greenness of certain areas, vi-
sualizing Duvigneaud’s theory of biological productivity onto a spatial plane. The
map was supposed to serve as a planning tool to identify the most ecologically im-
portant areas. It was a tool that could be used to evaluate the potential of further
urbanization areas in the Brussels region while also protecting the green, biomass-
rich areas of the region.
On the sub-regional level, the PlanDirecteur de la Vallée de laWoluwe, (the Directo-
ry Plan for the Woluwe Valley) was the most telling example of Duvigneaud’s quest
to mobilize ecological science for planning policy. The Woluwe valley, located in
the South-Eastern fringe of the city, was rapidly urbanizing during the 1970s. The
Agglomeration commissioned a round table to prepare a zoning plan for the area.
In this round table, Duvigneaud, his collaborator Martin Tanghe, and the architect
Pierre Puttemans played a key role in drawing up the necessary maps and surveys.
Duvigneaud and his collaborators hoped to minimize the impacts of further deve-
lopment by protecting the areas that were most productive in terms of biomass.
In doing so, he was able to balance the claims of local politicians with the need for
new construction advocated by private as well as governmental actors. Duvigneaud
and Tanghe were not only active in the political negotiations, but they also made
an ecological survey of the valley and published it as a scientific paper (Tanghe/Du-
vigneaud 1978). In that paper, Duvigneaud and Tanghe used topographical maps,
aerial photographs, and local observation of the terrain to create a detailed and
comprehensive map of the valley (Ibid: 6).
The lab of Duvigneaud made two survey mappings. First was a map with the
ecological occupancy of the soil that also demarcated forests, vacant land, and
apartment buildings, among others. The second map visualized the biological va-
lue of the area. Here, they indicated which areas were of high ecological value,
and which of lesser ecological value. Duvigneaud and Tanghe drew inspiration for
their mapping work from Herbert Sukopp, the Berlin ecologist who had drawn up
an ecological map of West-Berlin to serve as a government tool in the early 1970s
(Lachmund 2013). Sukopp proposed a mapping system with degrees of hémérobio-
se, the degree of “human modifications to the natural system.” In this system, the
territory did not possess any “true natural areas” anymore. Everything was in some
sense influenced by human activity. Apart from these purely ecological delineati-
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ons, some areas were designated as “of little ecological value, but of great esthetical
and socio-cultural value”, thus adding to a social and cultural evaluation. Although
thesemapswhere clearlymade by ecologists, it is also true that theirmapping prac-
tices were guided by the need to produce a general zoning plan. In other words,
Duvigneaud’smetabolic perspective did not result in a rejection of the conventional
zoning plan.
In the conclusion of their study, Tanghe and Duvigneaud stressed that the pro-
posed maps should orient urban planners in their project of modifying space by
highlighting both bio-ecological and socio-cultural values. The maps established a
distinction between spaces that could be designated for construction without af-
fecting the natural and social benefits of the valley. In their view, construction in
areas designated as “wild” or buffer zones should be deferred or at least pursued
with additional precautions. Semi-natural areas, in particular, had to be protec-
ted completely from urbanization because of their great value in vegetation, soil or
wildlife. In addition, artificial green spaces, like the riverbanks of the small lakes or
the Woluwe, should be upgraded in an ecological and biological way (Tanghe/Du-
vigneaud 1978: 29). Works on public paths in the different parks had to be kept
at a minimum (Ibid: 30). Apart from its significance for ecological planning, the
Plan Directeur clearly documented the capacity of the ecological viewpoint to over-
come existing power relations in the area. The functioning of the river-ecosystem
of the Woluwe, for example, clearly transcended the competing interests of both
the communities and the Agglomeration. By highlighting the shared natural ca-
pacity of the river and its valley, Duvigneaud and the Agglomeration were able to
highlight the need for integrative planning and thwart the political goals of local
politicians. Paradoxically, though, the Plan Directeur actually incorporated both the
urbanization processes and natural protection in the valley through zoning, rather
than refurbishing the development of the built environment in the region in amore
integrated way.
Although Duvigneaud did not use the work of Holling in his écosystème urbs,
many of the theoretical assumptions and governmental tools he developed were in
line with the resilient urbanism approach pioneered by Holling. Firstly, by applying
the medium of the energy scheme – usually the depiction of natural ecosystems in
‘natural’ areas outside the city – he ‘naturalized’ the urban environment. Duvigne-
aud wanted to mobilize his knowledge into the planning apparatus of the Brussels
government by combining society and nature into one framework. However, upon
closer inspection, when transposing these eco-systems notions of the city towards
the regional government’s planning policy and subsequent zoning maps, we see
that in fact it treated urban and natural phenomena as mutually exclusive rather
than as a socio-natural hybrid.
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Conclusion
The past and present search for an answer to ‘crisis’ by urban designers and natural
scientists alike is one that attempts to establish an equilibrium between nature and
the city by incorporating both systems into one model. In Van der Swaelmen’s case,
the city and the socio-natural environment are reconfigured to fit together in an
organic city, or organisme-cité. In the case of Duvigneaud, his metabolic schemes for
the écosystème urbs simultaneously critiques the use of energy in the modern city,
while also bringing nature and city together into one model. His zoning schemes
juxtaposed the built and the natural environment, trying to establish an equilibri-
um between them. Although resilience thinking in ecology moves “away from the
notion that a ‘balance of nature’ exists” (Walker/Cooper 2011: 145), our historical
analysis of resilient urbanism shows that designers have long searched for a ba-
lance – either with regard to the landscape as in Van der Swaelmen’s case or with
regard to natural energy flows as Duvigneaud advocated.
In summary, we propose that the scholarship on resilience should not only con-
sider the past use of the word ‘resilience’ in urbanism, but should also pay tribute
to similar debates and their influences on the development of resilience practices.
Historically, many different experts have used crisis to propose a reconfigurati-
on of the society-nature nexus. Juxtaposing these cases uncovers specific logics at
play in resilient urbanism, both in the past and today, as well as different stances
towards the socio-political. The socio-politics of resilient design theory and prac-
tice underscores how the environmental sciences can be paired with planning and
design. But they also show how the fear of environmental crisis and loss of socio-
natural landscapes might turn out to be a “fear of loss, not of a threatened nature
and its capacity to sustain life, but of the conditions which sustain a threatened
liberal utopia” (Adams 2010: 7). The cases of Van der Swaelmen and Duvigneaud
demonstrated how they tried to mitigate the negative and detrimental side-effects
of capitalist development and unbridled urbanization by finding alternative ways
of reconfiguring the urban landscape through new modes of ecological planning.
But these cases also show how they failed to thoroughly critique the political and
economic bases of these environmental crises. If we want to understand the eco-
logical and resilient urbanisms of the past, a broader emphasis on the historical
interaction between the scientific and planning fields including their ideological
beliefs is necessary.
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Figure 6: The Carte d’evaluation biologique du milieu of the
Woluwe Valley (Paul Duvigneaud, Martin Tanghe and Isidore
Goedhuys 1978 ).
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North of the Arctic Circle
Ralph Erskine’s Mid-20thCentury Urban Planning and Design
Projects in Kiruna and Svappavaara
Ann Maudsley
This chapter examines the imagined Arctic towns of Ralph Erskine (1914-2005), a
British born and educated architect who, in 1939, started his own architectural of-
fice in Sweden. This chapter then explores Erskine’s own theoretical and practical
architectural, design and town planning visions for building communities in the
north in the 1950s and 1960s. Focusing on Erskine’s projects at a town planning sca-
le in Kiruna and in the nearby town of Svappavaara, both in Sweden, the chapter
studies the built environment elements and design of these places; planning and
development processes for each project; and the outcomes in each location, as de-
scribed by Erskine himself and by other sources (e.g. Egelius 1990). It draws upon
evidence from primary and secondary material, much of which is from the collec-
tions of Erskine’s architectural office held at ArkDes, Sweden’s national center for
architecture and design. The chapter asks: ‘What are the fundamental elements of
Erskine’s ideal Arctic town; what factors have challenged the resilience and survival
of built examples of these communities; and what can Erskine’s planning visions
teach us about contemporary resilience discourse and practice?’ This chapter at-
tempts to identify lessons learned from Erskine’s approach to planning and design
in Arctic and subarctic regions, with a particular focus on community and climate.
The Arctic Architect
In 1939, Ralph Erskine, a newly qualified architect with training in urban planning,
left his native England to findwork in Sweden (Egelius 1990: 7-8). As a pacifist, Swe-
den’s neutrality on the brink of the SecondWorldWar was “certainly significant for
his decision to start his career in Sweden” (ibid: 8). Erskine remarked that he “first
came to Sweden at the end of the thirties to escape from English conservatism”
(Erskine 1961: 161). With the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930, Sweden “had confir-
med […its] position at that time as a country that was building extensively using a
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modern architecture” (Collymore 1994: 4). The “links with social questions, and the
Swedish political insistence on creating a novel, less inequitable society, strongly
attracted Erskine” (Egelius 1990: 7). Social and environmental commitment became
a central focus of Erskine’s architecture and urban planning.
After moving to Sweden, Erskine started building a career in architecture and
planning,with several projects being located in the northern parts of Sweden. Early
Erskine buildings in northern Sweden include the wooden Avasjö Chapel in Borgaf-
jäll (1947) with Sören Wimmerström and Uffe Olrik. A year later he also worked on
another project in Borgafjäll, a ski hotel (1948), with Aage Rosenvald, Lennart Berg-
ström and John Staalehoef.This hotel was “designed to integrate into the landscape”
(ibid: 209), with “[l]ong roof slopes [that] doubled as nursery ski slopes, until the
snow built up to transform them into part of the mountain landscape.” (Rowntree
1964) Meanwhile “[i]ndoors, the play of levels and planning of space was so imagi-
native that guests did not much mind when the weather kept them inside.” (ibid)
The hotel was “[b]uilt in material available or prepared locally: rough sawn timber,
stone, brick, telephone poles” (Egelius 1990: 209). Another ‘pioneering’ northern
project of Erskine’s with Henrik Jais Nielsen, Bo Sundberg and Jörgen Andersen,
was the shopping center in Luleå (1954-56). “The first indoor shopping centre in
Sweden”, with a mix of uses this “was intended as a town within a town but differs
from American shopping centres in being planned for the bleak northern climate,
close to the Arctic Circle” (ibid: 46). Here, “[t]he icy outdoor air was excluded by a
curtain of heated air: inside there was an artificially warm oasis in the midst of a
frozen town” and “circulation areas that were given many exterior qualities” (ibid:
46).
In the 1950s Erskine also began developing theoretical design and planning vi-
sions for northern cities and towns. These included a plan for central Kiruna with
Peer-Ove Skånes (1955, unbuilt); and an Arctic Town that is an “ideal, climatically-
suited community” (ibid: 211-212). His early architectural and urban design vision
laid the groundwork for his plans for Arctic and subarctic towns for decades to
come.
Erskine’s focus was on the Arctic, and within it, “the Arctic zone proper con-
sisting of polar sea and the partly glaciated islands […] where snow and ice never
disappear, and the sub-Arctic1 zone, a great circumpolar region stretching from
the polar sea to well south of the tree line where it merges into the cold tempera-
te zone” (Erskine 1960: 216). In the Arctic zone, both the climate and environment
are harsh.There is “isolation, and continuously shifting boundaries between liquid
and solid, between darkness and light” (Jull 2016: 214).Here, extreme cold, snow and
wind dominate winter. In planning for these kinds of conditions, Erskine detailed
1 Although subarctic is now the commonly used spelling, I keep the spelling “sub-Arctic” where
it appears in the original historical text.
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“the exceptional costs of road building, maintenance and snow clearance, of laying
drains and water mains at a depth of 3 m often in rock to protect against frost, as
well as the discomfort of moving in an open windy community in the winter bliz-
zards” (Erskine 1968a: 168). In contrast to winter when “the sun is always fairly low”,
summer is characterized by constant light (Erskine 1961: 162). Writing for CIAM ’59
in Otterlo, Erskine argued that in “[c]orresponding to these light conditions, one
has the task of using buildings to reflect the light in spring and to give shade in the
summer – quite different from the way we think about buildings here.” (ibid:162)
As McGowan notes, Erskine’s “sub-Arctic projects, especially his unrealized utopi-
an projects for an ‘Ideal Town’ north of the Arctic Circle, have been canonized in
architectural discourse as exemplars of an architecture that is truly regional in cha-
racter and, moreover, ideally suited to the unique cultural – especially with regard
to indigenous populations – and environmental habitats of Arctic and sub-Arctic
environments” (2008: 241). Erskine gained the label of “Arctic Architect” (Rowntree
1964: 9; Egelius 1990: 67). This “alias has continued to dominate an understanding
of Erskine and his work” (McGowan 2008: 241).
Resilient Utopias in Extreme (Cold) Climates and Environments
Planning and designing buildings, cities and societies that are resilient to external
shocks and that are tailored to their particular environmental and climatic condi-
tions is a key feature in several utopian projects. As early as 1516, Sir Thomas More
wrote about “streets that are well designed […] for protection against wind” in his
perfect society on the fantastical distant island, Utopia (2009 [1516]: 51). By the ear-
ly 1800s, too, there was a fascination with creating ideal places in the north. For
Charles Fourier, 60 degrees north and beyond represented a place for populating
and cultivating (1996 [1808]). This 19th-century fascination with the north also ali-
gned with the growth of the railway, which saw a boom in mass tourism driven
by intrepid travel writers lured by the dramatic scenery and unfamiliar culture of
the north (Hooker 1837; Lowe 1857; Stanford 1881). Writing approximately 125 years
after Fourier, Le Corbusier suggested that Utopia could be found at 64.4 degrees
parallel north (1967 [1933]). More recent utopian visions include “Rethinking the
Bering Strait”, an ecological and renewable system and structure for life propo-
sed by OFF Architecture for the threshold between the Arctic and Pacific Oceans,
Siberia and Alaska, with an envisaged completion date of 2070 (Klanten/Feireiss
2011). These examples suggest that there has been a fascination with climate and
environment – and specifically the north – for more than five centuries.
A connection to the Arctic north is also characteristic of several 20th and 21st
century domed science fiction type climatic utopias. Dubai Sunny Mountain Ski
Dome is a 21st-century real-world example of a project, where an “Arctic experien-
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ces” effect is emphasized, but within a weather-controlled structure in a climatical-
ly different place (Dubai Ski Dome 2018). While Dubai Sunny Mountain Ski Dome
is yet to be constructed, a much smaller scale snow park, Ski Dubai, has already
been built in the Mall of the Emirates. These visions of domed structures resemble
science fiction type climatic utopias of the mid-20th century set in arid landscapes
(Dorrian 2012). Such projects include Buckminster Fuller’s geodesics, including the
floating globes of his ‘Cloud Nine’ project (ca. 1960) with Shoji Sadao (ibid: 29). Frei
Otto and Kenzō Tange similarly proposed a City in the Arctic (1971) of up to 40.000
inhabitants, with a city completely enclosed under a domed roof. In this example,
a temperate latitude city is decoupled from the outside Arctic climate by means of
mechanical and structural systems (Jull 2016).
The north and Arctic continue to exert a powerful influence on architectural
imaginaries. The Arctic stands for nature “in its most pure, untouched, virginal
and whitest state” (Dorrian 2012: 32). A territory rich in rawmaterials, it has been a
place for exploitation and possibilities. Erskine himself described this space – par-
ticularly the subarctic – as a place of “isolation”, an area that “was at the periphery
of everything happening in the world” (Erskine 1961: 161). It was in this extreme
environment that he proposed to “establish a habitat for a modern sub-arctic life”
(ibid: 161).
Erskine’s Ideal Arctic Town
Like his contemporaries Buckminster Fuller, Shoji Sadao, Frei Otto and Kenzō Tan-
ge, amongst others, Erskine explored the possibility of having northern towns with
interior functions to enhance convenience and comfort in the context of extreme
climatic conditions (Erskine 1961: 166). Erskine himself stated that “earlier it had
seemed to me to be a possible solution for the high arctic”, and had proposed,
for example, indoor “planting with exotic vegetation – such as apple trees” (Erski-
ne: 1960: 217). He later warned against the “science-fiction type solution which has
appealed to many designers and engineers”, that is, “the technical and economic
solution […] to plan all dwellings and other functions within one compact, weather
protected and well heated building […which] can have disastrous social and psy-
chological consequences and [...] become very expensive in the long term” (Erskine
1978: 6). He argued that covering “the whole city with a plastic bubble or something
like that […] is wrong, for it has forgotten one important human factor and that is
the question of the summer, the experience of it, the experience of the air and the
direct sunlight” (Erskine 1961: 167). While planning for integrated indoor functions
may allow for comfort and convenience, especially in the winter, important social
and psychological relationships with nature are degraded. For these reasons, com-
fort and convenience should not be the exclusive target of the architect/planner:
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Urban planning should recognize that a relationship to nature is important for the
emotional, psychological and social well-being of city dwellers.
Erskine argued there should be “a grouping of many different functions under
one roof for common shelter and warmth” (Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes
collections 1967: 127) and “well-heated and lit communications, piazzas and gar-
dens, covered for bad weather” (Erskine 1960: 217). He also, though, advocated for
human connection to the wilderness and outdoors. Erskine argued that “architec-
turemust be adaptable to summer activities” (Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes
collections 1967: 127) and able to “open to spring and sunshine” (Erskine 1963a: 2;
1963c: 7); that formal planting must be complemented “with a view over the sur-
rounding landscape, as there will be many indoor or underground workers”; and
that “nature is the dominant, and the ‘human’ the exception” (Erskine 1960: 217).
Erskine also emphasized the function of buildings as climatic shelter, the im-
portance of avoiding heat loss, allowing access to sunlight and protection from
wind. Erskine argued that houses and towns in the north “should open like flowers
to the sun of spring and summer but, also like flowers, turn their backs on the
shadows and cold northern winds, offering sun-warmth and wind-protection to
their terraces, gardens and streets” (Erskine 1968a: 167). His sketches (such as Fig.
1 below) show communities on slopes facing south surrounded by walled perime-
ters of the highest buildings, providing protection from wind and blizzards, whilst
opening to the sun. Erskine saw perimeter walls and southern slopes as a source of
heat saving during winter, and shade in the summer. He contrasted this orientati-
on with north facing windows that “induce cold during winter and warmth during
the midnight sun” (Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes collections 1967: 130).
Erskine was also aware that the cost of building northern towns was “enor-
mous”, thus “should be based on technical rationalization and standardization”
(1960: 217). His ideas were progressively modernist, using, among other strategies,
industrialized methods in undeveloped areas. In response to climatic conditions,
for example, Erskine argued that, “with modern techniques almost any degree of
protection can be achieved” (1968a: 169). He used designs that wouldmaximize effi-
ciency, for example, modular prefabricated construction techniques; “aerodynamic
forms” to prevent accumulation of snow on buildings; and separation of “pedestri-
an and mechanical traffic” to facilitate different types of snow clearing for these
varying functions (ibid: 169-170).
Erskine’s work also focused on people and communities (Erskine 1960: 217).
Hemmersam remarks that Erskine’s “practice was considered to have a particular
cultural as well as social profile” (2016: 413). He wanted northern communities to
allow for “personal freedom and privacy” (Erskine 1960: 217). Erskine also argued
these communities “should be intensive […] with rich amenities and possibilities for
varied activities” and “should […] be made more attractive and genuine than their
equivalent in more southerly latitudes” (ibid: 217). He thought that one important
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Figure 1: Ralph Erskine, An Ecological Arctic Town, 1958 (ArkDes collections, ARKM.1986-
17-0362).
goal should be to facilitate more concentration, social interaction and human con-
tact in these Arctic towns that were isolated from neighboring settlements by great
distance and severe climatic conditions (ibid: 217).
Erskine also set out to create a new regionalism conditioned by the northern
culture and climate. Regionalism “grew in strength and popularity during the post
war period, often in opposition to what were seen as the homogenizing and globa-
lizing tendencies of the International Style of modernism” (McGowan 2008: 242).
It was “an approach to architecture that seeks to develop built form out of, and in
response to, the traditions, needs and demands of a particular climate, locale, and
culture” (ibid: 242). Northern towns, Erskine stated, “must become free of the ‘co-
lonial’ attitude, and base their own culture on their own way of life” (1960: 217). He
decided that new northern towns must “avoid imitating the ‘home country’s’ cul-
ture” (Rowntree 1964: 9). Unlike the “usual when settlers move to a new country”,
“and attempt to recreate their old homes”, Erskine argued that “in the sub-Arctic
this can never be successful, and modern man […] must use his resources to arrive
by analysis and synthesis at an indigenous culture” (1960: 217). While he “studied
indigenous Inuit and Sámi buildings in the region” (Egelius 1990: 212), the indige-
nous culture Erskine speaks of here is a new “method of life – of modern life” in
what he considered an “untried region” (1961: 162). In his “search for a contemporary
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architectural ‘grammar’ for the Arctic”, Erskine, “overwrites the presence of Arctic
indigenous peoples” (McGowan 2010: 104).
Building in the Arctic
In the 1940s and 1950s Erskine had already designed several buildings in northern
Sweden and by the late 1950s and early 1960s he also had the opportunity to put his
visions for northern towns into actual development plans. These commissions in-
cluded projects in Kiruna (1959-1965) and in the nearby town of Svappavaara (1960s),
both in Sweden. These areas were architectural and planning test cases for the ad-
vancements of the Swedish welfare state, and the bureaucrats and policymakers
who made up the machinery of the welfare state were receptive to the theories for
Arctic planning advocated by Erskine. Erskine noted that “experience in community
planning in remote and northerly climates is by no means superfluous knowledge
[…] as climatic extremes, whether hot or cold, wet or dry, have basically the same
theoretical solution” (Burnett 1975). This idea of Erskine’s aligns to contemporary
resilience thinking. Both suggest, that planning can be adapted across different
settings and build on learnings from other cases. The next section of this chapter
traces Erskine’s ideas for planning and designing in northern climates, and also
interrogates the outcome of these projects in reality.
Kiruna
After working on concept proposals for Arctic town planning; plans for a total re-
construction of Kiruna town center in the 1950s (which remains unbuilt); and a
housing scheme in Kiruna with Yngve Fredriksen (1955, built), Erskine with Peer-
Ove Skånes, won a contract for a new quarter within central Kiruna. Kiruna, a
town in northern Sweden, is built around the extraction of iron ore by the state-
owned mining company Luossavaara-Kiirunavaara Aktiebolag (LKAB). While the
client for the project was Kiruna HSB housing cooperative, it was widely recogni-
zed that LKAB would also play a leading role in decision-making: LKAB “besides
dominating the labour market also in reality decides on the welfare, housing and
service levels of the entire community” (Egelius 1990: 74). Because of LKAB’s influ-
ence on the planning and construction process, Kiruna was inherently tied to the
boom-bust cycle of the extractive industry at this location: As demand for iron ore
ebbed and flowed, funding for town services and facilities followed similar trends.
For Erskine, this whole project, including the preliminary study for Kiruna center,
“was an attempt to create plans and structures which were specifically suited to
meeting the life and needs of the people who live in a subarctic situation” (Erskine
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n.d.b: 3). Here, the people are broadly “Kiruna dwellers” (Erskine 1968: 168). Erski-
ne “suggested a continuous run of buildings, where people could move outdoors in
wind protected sunny streets, or indoors in enclosed and heated walkways”, which
would also house ducts for services and infrastructure, to allow for easier access,
than under streets (Erskine n.d.b: 1).
Only one block of the whole Kiruna scheme – the Kvarteret Ortdrivaren (1959-
1965) with housing, office and community uses (Collymore 1994) –was “so built that
it reminds of the original concept” (Erskine n.d.b: 1). This block, Erskine remarked
“has forme been of great interest to design and execute” (ibid). However, his propo-
sal for Kiruna was amended constantly, following discussions with representatives
of the town (Egelius 1990: 77). Erskine remarked “the unfamiliarity of the vision I
gave” (Erskine 1968: 168) and “the force of tradition and lack of familiarity with new
ideas […] led to the construction of the city along habitual lines” (Erskine n.d.c: 22)
and “on its original street pattern and with a largely ‘traditional’ structure” (Erskine
n.d.b: 1).The local partners were resistant to Erskine’s new architectural and design
strategies, and continual compromises ultimately led to an essentially conventional
plan.
The ensemble of buildings constructed at Ortdrivaren (Fig. 2) were clearly mar-
ked by Erskine’s theoretical ideas, but they also departed from his visions in im-
portant ways. In Architectural Design, in March 1967, it was noted the “Kiruna de-
velopment represents a less doctrinaire interpretation of these ideas” (Anonymous
from the Erskine ArkDes collections 1967: 131). A link to the outdoor environment
was maintained. The site was intensely developed and totally occupied by a series
of buildings containing a mix of uses (Erskine n.d.b; c). These included housing,
offices, shops, car parking, play areas, and a church (Erskine n.d.b; c; 1968b). The
buildings rise above a garage covering the whole block as a series of terraces.These
terraces were provided with winter and summer play space, and sunny, wind pro-
tected balconies and seating space, with a view (Erskine n.d.b; c). A naturally lit and
heated passage was built to connect the playground, shops and apartments (Erski-
ne n.d.c). This and other outdoor stairs were also designed to allow for protection
against snow and blizzards (Erskine n.d.b; c). Meanwhile, rounded corners of the
buildings were designed to reduce cooling effects making them more economical
(Egelius 1990).The church “was built for a very low cost, has the simplest of materi-
als and finishes and a similar construction to that of the flats” (Erskine n.d.b: 3).The
characteristics of Ortdrivaren described here are reflective of Erskine’s theoretical
ideas for building in northern towns. While the highest buildings were placed to
the north, and lowest buildings are to the south, so that “the site becomes a grand-
stand facing the view, the summer warmth, and the return of winter-sun” (Erskine
n.d.b: 2), there was no walled perimeter building facing south, opening up to the
sun like a flower, while protecting the community from winds – an idea that had
been central to Erskine’s vision.
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Figure 2: Börje Rönnberg, Ortdrivaren housing exterior (ArkDes collections, ARKM.1986-
122-2148).
In his accounts of developing Ortdrivaren, Erskine paints an endearing picture
of a warm, active and livable group of buildings (Erskine n.d.b; c; 1968b). Other re-
ports also suggest the development had a positive impact on the community (Ege-
lius 1990). Erskine has been praised for exciting architecture (Wrethagen 1985) and
designing a fine place where people could thrive (Nordmark 1975). Similarly, the
buildings have been described as lively residential places, with careful detailing
and fine formal affiliation to the cityscape (Hård af Segerstad 1969). When inter-
viewed decades after the construction of the project, some residents reported that
living there – particularly in one of the high-rise buildings – was amazing (Rosell
1984).
In his design for Kiruna, Erskine was described as “completely and unpredic-
tably original” (Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes collections 1963: 305). One
newspaper reported that it was perhaps Kiruna’s most debated architecture pro-
ject, a revolutionary artwork, by an architect who had never lived in Kiruna (Anony-
mous from the Erskine ArkDes collections 1972).The buildings were painted yellow,
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red and brown to represent the midnight sun and the earth, and there were also
references to mining in the design details (Nyström 2017). Erskine thought Ortdri-
varen’s “warm tonalities” “pleasurably contrast with a countryside which remains
in winter conditions for so long” (Erskine n.d.c: 22). Erskine also claimed that he
“tried to create a complete formation which might entice children to use their own
fantasy and find their own forms of play, hide and seek and adventures” (Erskine
n.d.b: 2). He used concrete, which he thought was attractive, but also because he
thought children would hurt themselves less on it (Ulvskog 1974).
While many liked Erskine’s design, others thought it looked terrible (Barck
1973). Criticism against Erskine’s design was focused on aesthetics, color andmate-
rial. People found it difficult to accept housing that looked like Erskine’s Ortdriva-
ren buildings (Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes collections 1977). It is unclear
why, but conservatism, stubbornness and the amount of concrete are cited as pos-
sible reasons for the dissatisfaction of some residents (ibid). Ragnar Malmström,
a former leader of municipal politics in Kiruna, felt Ortdrivaren ruined the city-
scape (Wallström 1978). Erskine’s buildings also gained nicknames, initially as a
joke amongst the locals in response to the “strange architect” who designed them
(Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes collections 1977: 34). Some of these names
referenced the color of the buildings, some of which had been painted snus/tob-
acco brown (ibid: 34). The concrete materiality was another point of criticism for
the project. Residents campaigned against the concrete play areas, and for safe
play spaces (Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes collections 1974; Ulvskog 1974).
There was so much concrete used in the balconies of one of the buildings, nick-
named Snusdosan (snuff box), it was joked that there was enough to facilitate the
construction of several other high-rise buildings (Unknown source from the Ark-
Des collections n.d.). Though there was criticism, the area became more accepted
as it developed (Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes collections 1965), though the
nicknames of the buildings remain.
Whatever the competing and shifting perceptions of the Kiruna project have
been over more than six decades, it is also critical to note that Erskine’s planned
visions for Kiruna were only partially realized. Furthermore, Ortdrivaren is set to
be demolished as part of the moving of the town three kilometers to the east to
allow for the expansion of the adjoining iron ore mine (the planning for which be-
gan in 2004). While some buildings and areas in Kiruna have been deemed to have
heritage value worth preserving and moving, Ortdrivaren, a national cultural he-
ritage landmark (Norrbottens län 2010 [1997]), will be lost, though some parts of
the building, such as the balconies, may be able to be relocated (Lövgren 2018).This
is even though it is “an important part of Kiruna’s modern architectural heritage”
(Nyström 2017). By January 2017, the real estate subsidiary of LKAB, LKAB Fasti-
gheter, had expropriated Ortdrivaren from the buildings’ tenant association as part
of the transformation of Kiruna (Lindblad 2017). Arild Storeide, chairman of the
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buildings’ tenant association noted that although over 90 per cent of homeowners
decided to sell, they were not completely satisfied with the agreement (Palmäki
2016). In the coming years, residents from Ortdrivaren will need to relocate. These
processes bring into question the resilience and sustainability of imagined town
plans, urban areas and their communities when these are placed into conflict with
powerful interests, in this case, the mining industry.The ability of Ortdrivaren and
its community to adapt to change has been undermined by the processes surroun-
ding the expanding extraction of iron ore adjoining the town. The current value of
iron ore is so high that the continued extraction of this raw material and the mo-
ving of Kiruna has been warranted economically.This is at the cost of other factors,
including the architectural and historical significance of buildings like Ortdrivaren,
and the community and social networks that exist there.
Svappavaara
Another plan Erskine worked on, again with Peer-Ove Skånes as well as Aage Ro-
senvold, was for new development in Svappavaara, an existing village of 400 re-
sidents, 45 kilometers south east of the central city of Kiruna. Initially, Erskine’s
project for an ideal Arctic town at Svappavaara was simpler than at Kiruna, and
developed out of a limited competition between invited architects (Egelius 1990).
Erskine’s entry, entitled, Ansikte mot söder (Facing the South), shared first prize
with two other proposals, though eventually received the final commission (Ege-
lius 1990; Djärv 1994). The competition was arranged by Kiruna Kommun (Kiruna
City) and LKAB in 1961 to address the proposed expansion of the town as a result
of iron ore exploitation close by. The Svappavaara proposal also represents a more
doctrinaire and straightforward interpretation of Erskine’s Arctic philosophy than
his plan for Kiruna (Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes collections 1967; Egelius
1990).
Erskine’s plan for the Svappavaara ideal Arctic town was in strict accordance
with his theories. Fig. 3 below shows a detailed section of Erskine’s vision for the
center of Svappavaara. A long three-story block of flats would be located on a hill-
top, which would act as a shield against northern winds, and would face south to
maximize exposure to the sun (Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes collections
1969a; Egelius 1977). In front of the building, on the southern slope of the hill and
facing the sun, Erskine sketched clusters of terraced housing, single family dwel-
lings, shops, a hotel, restaurant, sport and leisure facilities, a school, new com-
munity center, and other services, while also allowing room for the original village
(Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes collections n.d.a; 1969b; Erskine 1963b; Ege-
lius 1977). Different uses were to be linked by warmed, wind, rain and snow pro-
tected connections, and a sunlit interior street that would act as a meeting place
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(Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes collections 1969b; Erskine 1968c). Buildings
were to be prefabricated to a large extent (Egelius 1977). Svappavaara was planned
by Erskine to be a warm, protected, friendly, lively and well-connected community
with varied services to mitigate the effects of spatial isolation (Anonymous from
the Erskine ArkDes collections n.d.b).
Figure 3: Ralph Erskine, Svappavaara Centrum (center), 1964, from the ArkDes collections,
ARKM.1986-17-0923-01.
Aswith his plan for Kiruna, Erskine’s proposal for Svappavaarawas only partial-
ly realized. “All that materialized” were some “disconnected bits” (Anonymous from
the Erskine ArkDes collections 1969b). Some colorful, hypermodern owner-occu-
pied housing was placed on the southern terrace, and a 197 meter long housing
complex for LKAB workers, called Ormen Långe (the Long Snake), was also built
(Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes collections 1964a; b;Egelius 1977). The vast
majority of the town was, however, not built according to Erskine’s proposal (Wall
1973; Haugdal 2015). In addition to the residential buildings, one public building –
a school – was built. Not only did the school fail, on its own, to address Erskine’s
goal of creating a richly serviced Arctic town, the school was designed and built by
a local architect who largely ignored Erskine’s goal of creating connections between
different uses (Wettergren/Strömdahl 1970; Egelius 1977a). Ormen Långe is isolated
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from the rest of the town,while the owner-occupied housing is grouped apart from
the existing town. The internal street of Ormen Långe was gravely mismanaged,
had no color, plants or meeting places with seats, only locked doors and concrete
(Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes collections n.d.b; Egelius 1977). Svappavaara
became “bare, cold and desolate” and in reality, Erskine’s ideal community turned
out as a normal suburb, lacking any sort of cultural facilities (ibid). In 2009 a de-
cision was also made to demolish Ormen Långe, and today around only half the
original building remains (Sternlund 2010).
The failure of Erskine’s scheme in Svappavaara, was not solely the responsibility
of the architect. Erskine thought the plan would have worked if the construction
had proceeded along his proposed lines. He himself later voiced discontent in the
housing conditions, which, he argued, would have been more pleasant if Kiruna
City had followed his plan (Rantatalo n.d.). Erskine had hoped to provide a high
service standard and special environmental conditions to compensate for adverse
climate conditions, and social isolation (Wettergren/Strömdahl 1970). Erskine felt
that “the high costs of providing an efficient, well equipped and attractive commu-
nity structure for people […] is […] an equally obvious operational cost” as “building
a long railway in order to transport ore from an isolated mine” which was “ac-
cepted without question as one of the unavoidable operational costs” (Unknown
source from the ArkDes Collections n.d.). LKAB and Kiruna City did not have the
same view though: Due in part to reduced demand for iron ore beginning with the
global oil crisis (Egelius 1977), LKAB no longer needed as many workers, and was
unwilling to fund the project to completion (Wall 1973). With just under 1000 inha-
bitants, the community was too small to support a commercial district and social
or cultural facilities; nor could it be effectively integrated into Kiruna City due to
financial constraints (Egelius 1977).The costs of fulfilling Erskine’s plans for a social
and ecological development were rejected, while those serving profit motive were
paid. By the early 1970s there was a high turnover of residents (Rantatalo n.d.) and
due to the proximity of Kiruna, many mine workers preferred to live there and
commute to their jobs (Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes collections 1970). Er-
skine’s Svappavaara project was the result of growing mining activity in the North
and stood as a strong symbol of industry and boom times in the local community. It
was dramatically impacted by the economic downturn and subsequent shift away
from an extractive economy in the decades that followed (Haugdal 2015). Building a
sustainable livable community that is resilient in the face of the everyday extremes
of Arctic life requires a stable investment stream and an integrated planning vision.
Today Svappavaara’s population is 400 people (SCB (Statistics Sweden) 2019).
Erskine was not solely responsible for the shortcomings of Svappavaara, its fail-
ure to achieve sustainable population growth, or an adequate supply of social and
cultural resources. Contemporaries did, however, rightly consider that Erskine was
responsible for the mishandling of communal facilities and over-dimensioning re-
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lative to the size of the community (Egelius 1977). His plan has been criticized for
being romantic (Wettergren/Strömdahl 1970; Egelius 1977). It is also believed that
he must have known that his imagined plan would never be completed, particular-
ly since the danger of unstable funding streams was highlighted in the statement
concluding the competition statement (ibid). Erskine was aware that some people
might choose to commute fromKirunawhere thereweremore services, rather than
live in modern Svappavaara (1963b). Furthermore, perhaps Erskine should have as-
sumed that people would choose a more established city, which might have led him
to make more conservative projections about the scale of planned construction As
one critic observed, Erskine should have recognized that, with developments in
mining equipment, fewer employees would be required in the future than he pro-
jected (Anonymous from the Erskine ArkDes collections n.d.a.).
Another problem impacting the project was the lack of public consultation.
Though Erskine had suggested open planning meetings and collaboration, these
were never implemented (Unknown source from the ArkDes Collections n.d.). Lo-
cal inhabitants bitterly criticized the alienation of the public in the decision-ma-
king processes (ibid). Workers in particular felt exploited as a result of planning
taking place above them (Egelius 1977).The physical separation of workers’ housing
from the existing town center and other new construction worsened communi-
ty cohesion as well as communication between workers and management (ibid).
Though it is difficult to isolate the influence of Erskine’s scheme, it was thought to
be instrumental in igniting a LKAB strike that took place between 1969 and 1970
(ibid). Learning from his experiences with the Svappavaara project, Erskine made
public participation an important element in his later projects, for example, the
Arctic township at Resolute Bay, Canada (1973). Resilience theory does, in some
cases, talk about learning, evolution, and adaptation as a core part of resilience.
The communities Erskine planned in Kiruna and Svappavaara have largely shown
not to be resilient, impacted by booms and busts in the iron ore extraction indus-
try at these locations. However, principles of planning for extreme climates have
themselves demonstrated resilience; learning from failures, adapting to new envi-
ronmental, economic, social and political arrangements, and surviving setbacks of
various kinds.
Learnings from Erskine
In his vision for the Arctic and subarctic, Erskine imagined vibrant, well-connected
communities that were designed to withstand the extreme climatic and environ-
mental characteristics of this northerly latitude. Some of the thinking introduced
in his theoretical and practical schemes for Arctic cities continue to have broad
relevance for energy conservation in the context of the energy crisis. Erskine, for
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example, used passive building form and function to maximize solar gain and pro-
vide protection from wind, rain and snow (Erskine 1980; Egelius 1977; 1990). While
Erskine’s schemes were designed with regard to the environment, it is worth re-
membering that his Kiruna and Svappavaara projects were ultimately connected to
extraction of resources and development of greenfield land. In part for this reason,
some have criticized Erskine for having a colonial attitude that viewed the north as
an empty space with no culture (Birk 2012; McGowan 2008). Erskine himself speci-
fically wrote that “[i]n the sub-arctic zone there is an enormous quantity of space,
but no established culture” (1961: 161). As McGowan points out, “the underlying lo-
gic of Erskine’s ‘Arctic Architecture’ seems to script the North as a carte blanche
playground for modern architects – as if the native populations of the Arctic va-
nished without a trace” (2010: 103). Furthermore, McGowan notes Erskine, often
worked for the Swedish government at “a time of heightened colonialism in Sáp-
mi” land (2008: 249). Erskine’s own remarks confirm this colonial attitude (Erskine
1961; Unknown source from the ArkDes Collections n.d.). Erskine’s visions for Arc-
tic communities and the practical application of these, raises questions about who
they were supposed to be ideal for.
Erskine’s Arctic proposals reflect historical plans for ideal settlements in extre-
me (cold) climates and environments, as well as contemporary and emerging plans
for growth and development. Erskine may not have used the rhetoric of resilience,
but his plans shared many of the same goals of contemporary resilience discour-
se (see, for example, Walker/Salt 2012). His model cities were designed to build
community cohesion, create a rich institutional reservoir and, most importantly
in extremely cold Arctic environments, allow the system to adapt to the regular
disturbances associated with extreme environments.
Erskine focused on “how to establish andmaintain the presence of ‘new settlers’
in the Arctic regions” (McGowan 2010: 100). His work fits into a line of thinking that
extends more than 100 years. In its beginnings, the settlement of Kiruna (founded
in 1900) by architect Per Olof Hallman “was built to a plan, as a model society”
(Bucht 1997: 63) and was designed “to adapt to the harsh sub-arctic inland climate”
(Keshavarz/Lindstedt/Stenqvist 2013: 57). In the 21st century, the transformation
of Kiruna provides an opportunity to “create a sustainable model city”, and for
Kiruna to “transform itself into a more socially and economically sustainable city”,
as is suggested by White Arkitekter (n.d.), who with Ghilardi + Hellsten Arkitekter,
is responsible for the 2013 masterplan for Kiruna’s phased relocation by 2033 – the
winning entry of an international competition. This latest masterplan for Kiruna
echoes the historical visions for Kiruna including Erskine’s Arctic plans, proposing
a model city – socially and environmentally – that addresses the extreme climate
at this location.
Erskine has been a celebrated ‘Arctic Architect’, and authoritative figure on
planning and designing buildings and cities north of the Arctic Circle, and he con-
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tributed to this discussion throughout his decades long career. His plans for the
ideal Arctic town, in the cases of Kiruna and Svappavaara remain, however, only
partially realized. Furthermore, half of Ormen Långe has been demolished andOrt-
drivaren faces the same fate in coming years. These projects show the complexity
of building resilient communities within isolated extreme climates and environ-
ments in northern regions. The challenge is to be able to provide a high standard
of services for living and connection to nature (to ensure social and psychological
well-being), while also ensuring economically and environmentally efficiency. The
Kiruna and Svappavaara cases also further reflect the challenges of strategic and
master planning. Imagined visions for an ideal future are combined with tangible
ever evolving social, cultural, political, economic and environmental factors. The
UnitedNations, through their SustainableDevelopmentGoals, advocates formulti-
stakeholder and public-private partnerships as a tool for achieving sustainable de-
velopment (2015).The cases presented here in Kiruna and Svappavaara support this
view. They explicitly highlight that extractive industries tied to potentially short-
term boom-bust market cycles are unreliable partners for resilient planning. For
resilient and sustainable planning and development there must be a focus on far-
ther horizons; the interests of community cohesion; and the integrity of human-
non-human relations needs to be placed first.
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Growing Resilient Cities
Urban Community Gardens and Disaster Recovery after
the 2010/11 Canterbury/Christchurch Earthquakes
Andreas Wesener
This study explores the role and value of urban community gardens following a
major crisis: the 2010/11 earthquakes in Christchurch, New Zealand. New Zealand
is located within the ‘Ring of Fire’, a vast horseshoe-shaped area around the Pacific
Ocean, and the world’s most active seismic region accounting for about 80 percent
of the largest earthquakes (USGS 2016). In 2010 and 2011, the Canterbury region
on the South Island of New Zealand was struck by two major earthquakes and a
series of devastating aftershocks. The first earthquake occurred on September 4,
2010 around 40 km away from the center of Christchurch, the country’s second
largest city. Despite having a 7.1 magnitude, it caused mostly minor damage. A se-
cond devastating 6.3 magnitude earthquake occurred on February 22, 2011 at 12:51
pm. Due to its closeness to the city center and destructive upwards vertical ground
movement, it was one of the most devastating natural disasters in the history of
New Zealand. It killed 185 and injured 7000 people, damaged 90 percent of resi-
dential properties, and resulted in the demolition of around 8000 households and
80 percent of the central city. By 2012, Christchurch’s population had shrunk by
about 20,000 people, six per cent of the total population – a significant statistical
anomaly for a city with a steady long-term population growth. It took another five
years to return to pre-earthquake population numbers (Brand et al. 2019).
Urban community gardens, here broadly defined as shared open green spaces
for mainly horticultural uses that are managed by local communities, provide a
broad variety of social, economic, environmental, and cultural benefits (Guitart et
al. 2012).These are created incrementally and simultaneously, for example through
daily (gardening) routines and social interactions, and are often cherished by com-
munity gardeners and local residents (Dubová/Macháč 2019). Several authors have
discussed the benefitting role of urban community gardens in the aftermath of
disasters. Gardens can help mitigate food shortages when supply chains are in-
terrupted. For example, an assessment of the impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita on existing food systems in Southern Louisiana revealed that unconventional
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food sources, including those from community gardens, played an important role
in diminishing food insecurity before and after the hurricanes (Sims-Muhammad
2012). Community gardens also help people withstand and recover from natural
disasters by providing relevant social and mental health services. Following disas-
ters, open spaces are often considered safer than built structures, which may be
damaged, perceived unsafe or unusable (see also the essay by Florian Liedtke in
this volume). Urban community gardens provide safe spatial settings with social
activities that support the physical and mental health of community members in
times of severe stress. For example, when Hurricane Sandy devastated New York
City in 2012, community gardens were considered as safe “multi-purpose commu-
nity refuges which hosted meaningful and restorative greening practices” (Chan et
al. 2015: 625). Okvat and Zautra (2014) made similar observations in their review of
the emotional benefits of gardening activities. They argued that in the wake of na-
tural disasters, gardens provide post-trauma therapy for users and help “alleviate
negative emotions and […] engage in experiences that enhance positive emotions”
(ibid: 81).
In addition, community gardens encourage teamwork, solidarity, and the crea-
tion of social capital. Kato et al. (2014) observed that following Hurricane Katrina,
community gardens encouraged community empowerment and helped counteract
socio-economic injustice in deprived urban areas: “[U]rban gardening activities in
marginalised communities still recovering from the social disruption of Hurricane
Katrina need to be seen both as countering practices to neoliberal abandonment […]
and as attempts to reclaim space and identity.” (ibid: 1845) Others, however, have
been critical regarding ways that gardens allegedly reinforce neoliberal policies on
the local level. Community gardens have been simultaneously regarded as antipode
(Schmelzkopf 2002; Ghose/Pettygrove 2014) and reinforcement of local neoliberal
policies (Rosol 2010, 2012). The discourse around community gardens and neolibe-
ralism has been described as internally and inherently contradictory with regard to
the complexities of multi-facetted places: “Urban agriculture is not simply radical
or neoliberal, but both, operating at multiple scales” (McClintock 2014: 165).
In New Zealand, the indigenous Māori population had a rich tradition of com-
munal gardening when the first European settlers arrived, but this tradition decli-
ned within decades of European settlement (Earle 2011). Early European settlers’
residential subdivisions were large enough to grow a sufficient supply of fruits and
vegetables for their families (Trotman/Spinola 1994). For most of the 19th and 20th
centuries, many New Zealanders grew food in their own gardens. Tenants in subsi-
dized state houses were expected to support their food supply through gardening:
“Growing your own vegetables wasn’t just encouraged – it was little short of amoral
obligation” (Dawson 2010: 232).
In response to growing economic affluence and accompanying lifestyle chan-
ges, the popularity of backyard gardens started to decline in the 1960s (Walker 1995:
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154). The first community gardens started to pop-up in the 1970s and have beco-
me increasingly popular ever since. Growing urban populations, increased urban
densities, attempts to strengthen community networks, and a general revival of lo-
cal food production have been considered as reasons for people to join community
gardens (Trotman/Spinola 1994: 16). The social and health benefits of communi-
ty gardens in New Zealand are various and comparable to those of other countries
(Earle 2011: 150); and community gardens are often supported by local governments
andNGOs (Burtscher 2010). Official statistics about the number and distribution of
urban community gardens do not exist in New Zealand. It has been estimated that
there are about 150 gardens within the three largest cities Auckland, Christchurch,
and Wellington (Shimpo et al. 2019).
In Christchurch, the city council published community garden guidelines based
on a vision “for Christchurch to become the ‘best edible garden city in the world’”
and to “encourage community gardens throughout the city” (CCC 2016: 1). There
are around 30 community gardens in the greater Christchurch metropolitan area;
around half of them were established after the 2010/11 earthquakes (CCGA 2019).
Most gardens are located in suburban locations in both affluent and less affluent
areas. The city features predominantly low suburban residential densities (CCC
2013). Generously sized private backyards are still the standard for many house-
holds. However, higher urban densities and increased house sizes on smaller plots
have generally reduced the potential space for growing food. Presuming the fur-
ther growth of urban densities in Christchurch, community gardens provide an
alternative to private backyard gardening.
The investigation inmy study is two-fold: First, it analyzes experienced benefits
of post-earthquake gardens that unfold through the individual accounts of commu-
nity members, showing that community gardens provide valuable benefits in times
of crisis (e.g. therapeutic, social, and educational). These exceed or add to the kind
of ‘regular’ benefits of community gardens frequently described by the literature.
Second, it discusses findings through the lens of urban and community resilience,
arguing that many ‘add-on’ benefits of community gardens are already present as
part of their inherent structures and processes.They can be easily activated when a
disaster strikes. Such qualities of community gardens correspond to notions of ur-
ban resilience that involve preparedness with regard to ‘silent’ background systems
that come to the fore when needed (Amin 2014).
Resilience and Community Gardens
The scholarly literature on resilience has boomed in recent years, and it is bey-
ond the scope of this study to discuss the growing body of literature extensively.
Resilience, in a general sense, has been understood as “the continued ability of a
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person, group, or system to function during and after any sort of stress” (National
Research Council 2011: 4). Across different disciplines, notions of resilience include
stabilizing a system, bringing it back to a previous state, coping with and adapting
to new conditions, and using opportunities, e.g. related to changing conditions or
system disturbances (Vallance 2012). In the discussion on urban gardens and green
spaces, scholars disagree when it comes to an alleged “historical affinity between
resilience and neoliberalism” (Zebrowski/Sage 2017: 45).
Likewise, urban resilience is a contested (Leitner et al. 2018) and highly politi-
cized concept (Wilson/Jonas 2018). Amin (2014) identified two distinctive narrati-
ves regarding urban resilience. The first narrative focuses on the inhabitants and
communities of cities (‘the people’) who confront disasters not only to survive but
bounce back from adversity. While essentially a bottom-up approach, this narra-
tive has also been critically linked to neoliberal forms of governance that tend to
delegate system-inflicted risks and uncertainties to individuals who are expected
to “show their own initiative as active and reflexive agents capable of adaptive be-
haviour” (Joseph 2013: 39). The second narrative, related to ‘smart city’ concepts,
combines smart governance with big data technology to provide quick and effec-
tive responses in an urban environment perceived to be increasingly risky. Such a
technology-driven governance approach has been criticized for its inherent lack of
data security and socio-spatial connectedness (Colding/Barthel 2017), the lack of
face-to-face governance, and the tendency to embrace corporate control that may
turn a city into a profit-driven living laboratory (Hollands 2014; Duffield 2016).
For all their differences, both urban resilience narratives require a high and con-
tinuous level of preparedness: “The resilient city – depending on local affordance –
is imagined as the city of active citizens, intelligent technologies, and vigilant go-
vernance, a body on full alert. Any failure to mobilize hyper-vigilance in the form
of anticipatory capability, continual surveillance, and entrepreneurial zeal, is seen
as an abrogation of responsibility, an error of judgement.” (Amin 2014: 310) Like-
wise, both narratives keep relying on “the many bureaucracies, supply chains, and
metabolic systems” that work “constantly in the silent background” (ibid: 311).
Relating to Amin’s first, community-centered narrative, (urban) community re-
silience (CR) is a concept that builds upon collaborative action at personal, com-
munity and institutional levels (Daly et al. 2009: 17). CR has been understood as
the procurement and utilization of community resources in order to cope with and
thrive under uncertain, unpredictable, and continuously changing circumstances
(Magis 2010).While calling for equal access to economic, social, and environmental
resources (Wilson 2012), CR also requires a combined engagement of community
resources and community action (Magis 2010). At the institutional level, CR requi-
res governance that accommodates community action (Vallance 2012).This involves
active support from and collaboration with governmental and civic agencies to en-
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courage the empowerment of communities throughmutual trust and respect (Daly
et al. 2009).
Community gardens are places that constitute a relationship between urban
communities and notions of urban and community resilience (Barthel/Isendahl
2013; Colding/Barthel 2013). Community gardens can help prepare cities for times
of crisis by increasing “the resilience of urban social–ecological systems” (Chan et
al. 2015: 632). They may bolster “psychosocial resilience after a disaster, especially
by enhancing cognitive capacity, positive emotions, and community engagement”
(Okvat/Zautra 2014: 85). In addition, they show “signs of supporting adaptation by
fostering ecological, human and social capital, providing the structure and prac-
tices to support social–ecological diversity, learning, and community support net-
works to better respond to future disturbances” (Chan et al. 2015: 633).
Social capital, in particular, has been considered as a driver for disaster recovery
and the development of community resilience (Aldrich 2012; Wilson 2012). Physical
spaces that encourage neighbourhood social interaction help build social capital
– the networks and relationships between people within a society (Aldrich/Meyer
2015). Put into place before a disaster strikes, such social places are able to improve
community recovery following a disaster (Aldrich 2012). Third spaces that are re-
lated neither to work nor home environments provide neutral settings for social
interaction (Oldenburg 1989). Community gardens are accessible open third spaces
withmultiple opportunities for collaborative action (Firth et al. 2011). However, “[…]
resilience research and disaster management practice have yet to fully embrace so-
cial capital as a critical component” (Aldrich/Meyer 2015: 256). Putnam (2000) who
helped popularize Social Capital Theory (SCT) distinguished between ‘bonding’ and
‘bridging’ capitals. Bonding social capital is usually established locally between in-
dividuals, e.g. two gardeners that get to know each other in a community garden
and help each other out. Bridging social capital is inter-local, e.g. between peop-
le of different organizations. It can be created across neighborhoods, connecting
people that pursue common goals but might not otherwise associate with each
other. While these two types of social capital usually work horizontally in terms
of (political) power relationships, a third type – ‘linking’ social capital –describing
“the ability to gain access to resources and influences externally and often to exert
political leverage in some form” (Montgomery et al. 2016: 154) adds a vertical com-
ponent. While bonding social capital tends to be created quickly in post-disaster
situations (Solnit 2009), bridging and linking social capital are needed to create
long-term benefits that strengthen the role of a community within the complexity
of local and regional power relationships: “By expanding their social network and
deepening their extant social ties, community gardens were able to mobilize re-
sources (ranging from grant money to volunteers) to support their garden, their
members, and their neighbourhood.” (Chan et al. 2015: 632)
82 Andreas Wesener
Method and Case Study
In 2015 and 2016 (around five years after the 2010/11 earthquakes), key informant
interviews were conducted in ten community gardens in Greater Christchurch.
They involved seventeen community gardeners or garden coordinators, four infor-
mants involved in establishing a post-earthquake temporary community garden,
and eight community garden experts from governmental and non-governmental
organizations. Three field surveys were carried out in the New Brighton Commu-
nity Garden involving 44 gardeners. In addition, direct and participant observa-
tions were carried out on various community garden sites, often accompanied by
informal forms of communication. While parts of the data and specific cases have
been discussed in previous publications (Münderlein 2015; Montgomery et al. 2016;
Fox-Kämper et al. 2018; Shimpo et al. 2019), this study focuses on interview data
regarding benefits of community gardens as experienced by interviewees in a post-
earthquake context across several cases. Relevant data was found in interview tran-
scripts with key informants from eight community gardens (Figure 1). The study
discusses both pre-earthquake and post-earthquake gardens (Table 1).
Findings
The findings in this section are assembled under three main categories that emer-
ged inductively during content analysis: The community garden as a post-earth-
quake sanctuary and place for social exchange; the community garden as a source
of food; the community garden as a post-disaster learning space. These categories
reflect commonly experienced benefits of community gardens against the backdrop
of the 2010/11 earthquakes, told through the individual voices of the interviewees.
The Community Garden as a Post-Earthquake Sanctuary and Place for
Social Exchange
One of the most frequently mentioned benefits of community gardens following
the Canterbury/Christchurch earthquakes was their role in providing safe acces-
sible places to meet other people, talk about the events, work together in the gar-
den, and, perhaps, escape from the difficult situation – at least for a few hours.
The years 2011 and 2012 were characterized by continuous and often strong after-
shocks.Many people in Christchurch felt scared and unsafe. Community gardeners
and coordinators tried to welcome and accommodate people with small symbolic
acts:
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Figure 1: Greater Christchurch (scale 1 70,000) including the eight com-
munity gardens where relevant information for this study was found. Con-
tains data from OpenStreetMap, licensed under the Open Data Commons
Open Database License (ODbL).
[…] we always have a cup of tea or we sit down together and everybody chats and
certainly through the earthquakes, that was really important for people if they
were going through a really hard time with their house or whatever, it was really
important for them to come here, it’s a safe place, they could talk about and it
was ok. […] it was an important focus for people to come down here and dig and
garden and get away from the chaos at home.
• Kaiapoi community garden
[…] we opened all the time after the earthquakes and there were a lot of people
that …. really just… came to talk and have company.
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Table 1: Overview of the eight community gardens where relevant information for this study
was found.
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• New Brighton community garden
[…] we managed to come back straight away more or less so it was really nice that
we had that. Our sense of having a refuge away from the continual shakes because
you don’t sort of feel stuff… when you’re in a building it’s horrible whereas when
you’re out in the garden you may see a little swaying but you’re quite centred and
I think that helped a lot of people too. […] people would maybe come here to seek
some sanctuary really because of what happened, it was so dramatic for so many
people really because it was continual, non-stop; so anyway, any of the places they
could come to that provided a nice connection away from the craziness that was
the earthquake.
• Smith Street community garden
Simply getting out of their often earthquake-damaged homes to socialize with oth-
ers was a relief formany.This was expressed frequently by the interviewees, includ-
ing this retired gardener:
I needed to meet people and have something to do because in a unit (they’re lit-
tle), and you can’t sit around and do nothing, and I enjoy being able to take veg-
etables home and I love the company and it’s good.
• New Brighton community garden
The aftershocks and widespread physical destruction that interrupted people’s lives
at home, at work and elsewhere in the city, made people long for stability and
(social) places that reflected a sense of continuity:
[…] that’s why the afternoon tea is so important and after the earthquake espe-
cially we found lots of people came back just to check if we were alright and that
the park was still there, people who hadn’t visited for a long time, years, would
drop by on a Thursday just to see that it was still going so there seemed to be
that need in the community for some continuity, especially when we lost all the
churches.
• Packe Street community garden
People did not only seek refuge but spent time actively to construct or extend gar-
dens. They donated building materials, often rescued from the post-quake rubble,
recycled them, and gave them a new meaning. For example, creating commemo-
rative places built from the rubble of the earthquake, was a coping strategy that
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enabled reflections about loss. In that sense, work in the garden becomes part of
an active grieving process following a disaster.
[…] it became the social hub of the area very quickly and then we had huge energy
went into it because people kept bringing their carloads of bricks from their chim-
neys and they would leave it at the entrance and we had one person who spent
her whole time cleaning bricks and then we all learnt how to mix cement and lay
bricks, we’d never done that before we reckoned if you could do a row of knitting
and keep the stiches straight then you could do a row of bricks andwe called it the
celebratory chimneys or something […] commemorative chimneys.
• Packe Street community garden
The willingness, and perhaps need, to contribute, donate and become active was
also evident in the Fitzgerald Avenue community garden, established in 2012 as a
temporary space. Many people and organizations contributed by donating materi-
als, time and workforce to establish the garden.
[…] we had second-hand bricks from the site and also some that the City Council
gave us which were for us to build the brick sided beds […] we got firms to give
us soil and compost and to sell us mulch and other material very cheaply so we
had lots of commercial support. […] Placemakers, who are a construction supply
company […] deserve a mention because they’ve been a really good sponsor […],
they basically donate materials and they donated tools, wheelbarrows, garden
tools, all sorts of stuff was given to us.
• Fitzgerald Avenue community garden
The active involvement in constructing the temporary Fitzgerald Avenue garden
“provided post-trauma recovery and therapeutic with various benefits for commu-
nity members” (Montgomery et al. 2016: 164). These benefits included the activa-
tion of coping, adaptive, and participative capacities and the construction of social
capital (ibid). Community gardens are diverse social places where people from dif-
ferent backgrounds can meet and mingle. In the Fitzgerald Avenue community
garden, for example, members of the New Zealand organization for hearing-im-
paired people (Deaf Aotearoa) actively participated as volunteers and helped es-
tablish the garden. For the spokesperson of the organization, the post-earthquake
garden project echoed the value of “[d]eaf people participating in this community
garden, collaborating with hearing volunteers.” Community gardens are also places
where different nationalities come together:
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I’ve met Australians, Brazilians, I’ve got a friend who comes in and he’s Australian.
There’s a Spanish girl comes here, there’s about five… oh I supposemaybe over the
years probably a dozen different nationalities have been here, well like yourself,
Japanese, Dutch, occasional German, odd French person so that’s normally sum-
mer time when they’re on holiday or they’re students and not at university and
come and wander around so you meet different people.
• New Brighton community garden
For immigrants, community gardens provide opportunities to get in contact with
locals and establish new social networks.This was particularly useful following the
earthquakes, when thousands of construction workers who participated in the re-
build of the city came to Christchurch from overseas:
[…] that’s why we came here, to help with the rebuild after the earthquake. […]
I came in February and around March I was exploring New Brighton and I went
to the library and I saw the pamphlet with these community garden advertising
that they were working Monday, Wednesday, Friday and Saturdays and I say oh
yeah, I didn’t have a job for that time so I said yeah, let’s go there and meet new
people and do something for the community as well. […] I’ve been coming here
every Saturday for a full year, it’s part of my life already. […] they [this community]
make me feel I am part of this place already even if I am foreign, they make me
feel very comfortable and is like my family, my Saturday family.
• New Brighton community garden
Likewise, locally displaced people who had to leave their damaged homes andmove
into a new neighborhood, could find a first point of contact with their new com-
munity.
[…] so I’ve moved to a new suburb, another place now and so it takes a long time
to get to know people whereas if there was something like this and you did have
that interest in gardening or in just wanting to meet people what better way than
to just pop downmeet a few… especially if there’s nothing else in that community,
so that people can connect in.
• New Brighton community garden
Local community gardens may keep on playing an important role for immigrants
after they change neighborhoods. The following anecdote, told by a community
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gardener, exemplifies the symbolic importance of the Packe Street garden for a
Kurdish family after the September 2010 earthquake:
We used to have a Kurdish family who came as refugees and they lived just oppo-
site the park and […] the family got bigger and theymoved away to a bigger house
but we see them from time to time and two days after the September earthquake,
thefirst one, therewas a knock at the door and I opened it and therewas a stranger
on the doorstep, big handsomeman and he said he was a relative of these people
who had lived opposite the park and they felt so grateful that they hadn’t been
killed in the earthquake that they wanted a cutting from the fig tree in the park to
plant in their garden because it connected them with home, the fig tree, it was a
Turkish thing so they came from that part of the world so Vince said it’s not going
to grow from a cutting so he got the big trenching spade and we went up and we
dug in and we got some suckers and wrapped them up and gave them to him to
take home […]
• Packe Street community garden
Interviewees frequently stated that community gardens helped them cope with
stress experienced during and after the earthquakes. For some, sharing difficult
experiences while working in the garden was a way of coping with stress:
I’ve had people in here that have been… they’ve been through so much… one
woman, I haven’t seen her for a wee while but she was coming here a nervous
wreck because she lived on her own and if you were on your own and you went
through what we’ve gone through it would be really terrifying and maybe no-one
close to you either to share it with and she came here […] she spent a few hours
here and she could tell people her problems while she worked so we were trying
to encourage that working and talking […] she’d say to me at the end when she
was leaving […] look at me now, I’m a different person. And she’d calmed down
because she had found a place where people are going to listen […] calming is
what we all needed after the shakes.
• New Brighton community garden
For people with mental health issues, the earthquakes often exacerbated their
symptoms. Working in a community garden was one way of coping:
[…] it was very noticeable in the earthquake for anyone who already had some
anxiety that the earthquakes took that anxiety off the clock, they were the ones
who had the most trouble, so they needed spaces and greens […]
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• Churchill Park community garden
The Community Garden as a Source of Food
In general, there were no major problems to buy food in most of Christchurch
following the earthquakes; many supermarkets re-opened quickly. However, some
suburbs were cut-off and temporarily inaccessible, and general concerns about ear-
thquake-related interruptions in food supply and distribution chains were publicly
expressed, not only in Canterbury but the entire country (Wallace 2011). Following
the February 2011 earthquake, food companies made emergency deliveries and do-
nations to support the food supply in Christchurch (NZ Herald 2011).
Community gardens in Christchurch played a role in contributing to post-
earthquake food supplies. Two interviewees reported about a direct involvement
of their garden with regard to emergency food distributions. The Kaiapoi com-
munity garden collaborated with a helicopter pilot to get food into New Brighton,
a coastal suburb in Christchurch that became temporarily inaccessible after the
February 2011 earthquake:
[…] there was a guy from Rangiora which is the town just up here, he had a heli-
copter and we couldn’t get into New Brighton so we would drop food off and he
would helicopter it into town […]
• Kaiapoi community garden
The participation in the food donation scheme also enabled the garden to attract
funding from the Christchurch City Council:
[…] we actually got funding from the earthquake to get this going so there was
funding through the Council for community initiatives and so we got money for
that to start with and then we got all these fruit trees have been bought bymoney
from the Rangiora Express that flew all the food over to New Brighton […] so there
wasmoney left over from that andwe gotmoney for trees from that so we’ve have
actually benefited from the earthquake I think in an extraordinary way and it also
was a very positive thing happening around the earthquake time.
• Kaiapoi community garden
In New Brighton itself, the local community garden delivered food to those who
needed it most following the February 2011 earthquake:
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Actually the February earthquakewhichwas the one that really hit the city hugely,
we did up a lot because at that time of year we had projects everywhere and lots
of food […] there’s a place down, a church affiliated and we sent lots of food down
to them and there were people on the corner doing up food packages to give to
people because shops were closed so we just got all the food out and tried to get
it around to people.
• New Brighton community garden
Beyond the immediate post-disaster situation, community gardens in Christchurch
contributed to the food supplies of people in need via charitable distribution net-
works or directly:
[…] when I first started there I couldn’t give the vegetables away, I’d take them in
to be given away in food banks and they’d still be there at 3pm in the afternoon
wilted but now when I take them in they’re not even there for 10 minutes.
• Churchill Park community garden
[…] one of the good things for me is that with my two volunteer jobs I have they
both involve getting free fruit and vegetables for helping out and so I don’t now
have to go and buy them, so it takes that off my grocery bill which makes living a
lot easier for me. I save about $20 a week on my grocery bill so I was really strug-
gling before I started coming here.
• New Brighton community garden
The Community Garden as a Post-Disaster Learning Space
Community gardens are not only places where people meet, socialize and grow
food.They are also important for the dissemination and sharing of knowledge and
skills. The scholarly literature has reported widely on different aspects of commu-
nity garden-based education (e.g.D’Abundo/Carden 2008; Surls et al. 2014; Gregory
et al. 2016). In Christchurch, several gardeners confirmed that community gardens
were hubs for learning and teaching:
[…]we have a group starting nextweek and they’re a group of immigrants and they
probably have grown vegetables in their own countries but they’re immigrants
here or maybe refugees so English will be their second language and they might
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have some experience or no experience so then I will show them what to do and
help them, work beside them to encourage them and support them.
• Wai-ora community garden
[…] we started a course called grow your own free lunch which has made all the
difference in our community garden so we have funding for five courses of five
weeks a year and we have two and a half, three hours and we did the first time
on garden growing skills and we harvest and we go in the kitchen and we cook a
lunch and that’s made all the difference in the world.
• Churchill Park community garden
[…] it is about teaching as well; it’s about handing on knowledge and inviting peo-
ple to do something a bit different too because we have cooking classes in the
winter and we just had one recently.
• Kaiapoi community garden
Following the earthquakes, the educational role of community gardens expanded.
Many households had to cope with ongoing water shortages and dysfunctional
infrastructure. Broken water pipes and sewers, and electricity outages required
unusual actions. In response, the New Brighton garden offered workshops on
practical skills that were needed in this post-disaster situation: “We did a lot after
the earthquake in workshops on saving water, composting toilets […].” In addition, the
New Brighton garden coordinator responded to and actively addressed shortages
in their community garden by installing new infrastructure. Such a response
increased the coping capacity of the garden but also the level of preparedness for
future disasters:
[…]we could prettymuch run [following the earthquakes] andwhenwehadpower,
we didn’t have water for a little while… how did wemanage that? Since then we’ve
put rain tanks in. […] But now we have all water coming off the gutters, so we save
all our water now […].
[…] we did talk about getting like a generator in […] we started really looking at
how we could look after the people if anything happened, but the generator was
a wee bit expensive for us.
• New Brighton community garden
92 Andreas Wesener
In the New Brighton case, the earthquakes created a new awareness about the con-
sequences of disasters and triggered concrete actions to be better prepared for fu-
ture disasters: “We’re actually a lot more aware of things, you think ahead, I think
ahead a little bit now because you never know what can happen.”
• New Brighton community garden
Discussion
The above findings reflect the role of community gardens as sanctuaries, places for
social exchange, post-disaster therapeutic, sources of food and learning following
an earthquake. Social resilience concepts, particularly about community resilience,
have been related to adaptive and participative capacities (Vallance 2012: 392). Gar-
deners in Christchurch expressed clearly that participating in a garden’s activities
and socializing with fellow gardeners helped them deal with the difficult situation
following the earthquakes. Bonding social capital was frequently created through
social interactions and shared activities. Activity and related participation levels in
community gardens were high in the immediate post-disaster period, and a signi-
ficant number of new gardens were established. However, there were differences
regarding the durability of participation.
The Fitzgerald Avenue community garden that was established after the earth-
quakes by the community organization ‘Greening the Rubble’, showed high activity
levels following the earthquakes. However, between 2012 and 2016, the level of ac-
tivity had obviously tapered off; participation quickly slowed down and remained
marginal at the time when it was studied (Montgomery 2016). Short-term increa-
sed participation could be interpreted as a mere coping response (Lorenz 2013) that
does not necessarily include adaptation over time – a relevant indicator for resili-
ence. The Fitzgerald Avenue garden – originally designed as a temporary place –
was apparently not able to attract many users beyond the initial coping phase. And
although it is difficult to predict future activities in the garden, its significance as
a (long-term) resource for community resilience has become increasingly passive.
In contrast, in the New Brighton garden, established long before the earth-
quakes, participation also increased a few months after the February 2011 earth-
quake and then normalized in the following years; however, at a high level (Shimpo
et al. 2019). To some extent, findings from theNewBrighton and Fitzgerald Ave gar-
dens support the argument that “post-disaster social networks are likely to tightly
mirror pre-disaster conditions“ (Aldrich 2012: 53) and that therefore pre-existing
social capital is relevant for post-disaster recovery (Vallance 2012). They are also
indicators that community gardens “well established and frequented before a dis-
aster may provide continuous long-term benefits that extend past the immediate
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disaster recovery period” (Shimpo et al. 2019: 130). While the obtained data across
gardens (established both pre- and post-earthquake) confirms increased activities
following the earthquakes, in most cases it does not provide sufficient information
on long-term development, e.g. how participation and activity levels evolved af-
ter the immediate post-disaster recovery period. Follow-up studies, for example in
gardens that were established after the earthquake – or as a result of it – are re-
commended. Longitudinal studies are needed to monitor long-term developments
and to produce more substantial evidence beyond singular cases and snapshots in
time.
With regard to adaptive capacities, two other findings of this study seem rele-
vant: First, community gardens in post-earthquake Christchurch were places whe-
re diverse people met; young and old, local and foreign, able-bodied and disabled,
healthy and ill. Community gardeners’ accounts show that people from different
national, ethnic and religious backgrounds came together in community gardens
following the earthquakes. Local gardeners considered the experience as enriching.
Migrants and gardeners new to the community were able to connect locally. While
integrative aspects of community gardening are generally relevant, e.g. ‘intercul-
tural gardens’ concepts in Germany (Moulin-Doos 2014), such aspects become even
more important in a post-disaster situation where local populations are displaced
(physically and mentally) and new migrants flock in to participate in the rebuild.
The integrative aspect is an adaptive capacitywith potential long-termbenefits. It is
also an indicator for the establishment of bridging social capital. Likewise, the col-
laboration of various organizations, as evident in the Fitzgerald Avenue community
garden (Montgomery et al. 2016), established bridging social capital. Community
diversity and integration can be considered as relevant indicators for community
resilience. More research regarding the (long-term) performance of post-disaster
community gardens with regard to fostering integrative aspects is needed.
Second, while community gardens are generally hubs for learning and tea-
ching, some specific lessons were learned from the Christchurch earthquake expe-
rience that relate to concepts of resilience. Providing workshops on post-disaster
skill development (e.g. building composting toilets) and integrating new infrast-
ructure such as water tanks increases the level of awareness and preparedness. It
also enables networks and connections beyond the community garden and is the-
refore a potential enabler for bridging social capital.
An explicit example of increased awareness and subsequent action in terms
of strategic infrastructural improvements was detected only in the New Brighton
garden. However, such infrastructure improvements could be expanded. Commu-
nity gardens could potentially serve as emergency evacuation points for the local
community when a disaster strikes, as suggested by Florian Liedtke’s chapter in
this volume. Shortages of toilets, water, power, food and shelter could be addres-
sed immediately. With some funding, community gardens could be equipped with
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complementary facilities that serve gardeners during regular operation as well as
the wider community in an emergency. This implies effective governance and ma-
nagement for gardens, for example with the help of paid coordinators. In general,
help from paid professionals including garden coordinators, advisors, tradesmen,
etc. has been identified as a major enabler for the development of community gar-
dens (Fox-Kämper et al. 2018). Such arrangements would likely strengthen the role
of the gardens and their communities and create new vertical collaborations and
linking social capital.TheNew Brighton community garden is an example of a well-
governed garden that has learned from the earthquakes and actively responded to
future threats.
With regard to preparedness as an indicator for urban resilience, community
gardens could be understood as one of Amin’s (2014) “silent background” systems
that get activated when a disaster strikes. The findings indicate that in the con-
text of community gardens, ‘activation’ could be a rather subtle process. Welcom-
ing gestures such as offering tea or extending the opening hours are examples.
Processes of more explicit ‘activation’ include building and construction activities,
workshops on disaster-related topics, and the installation of new infrastructure.
However, many specific benefits do not even need to be ‘activated’. They belong
to a community garden’s DNA and are constructed and expressed through day-
to-day activities. Making diverse people feel comfortable in a new environment,
providing opportunities for social interaction, providing green spaces and healt-
hy (work) activities, providing food, and learning new skills are examples. Such
day-to-day benefits strengthen the potential of community gardens for urban and
community resilience before and after a disaster.
This study shows that some community gardens in Christchurch responded to
food shortages in the immediate aftermath of the earthquakes and supplied food
to local communities. Community gardens have the potential to support local food
supplies (Tahara et al. 2011) and they could have a more significant role following
disasters.TheKaiapoi garden benefited from participating in a food donation sche-
me by establishing new collaborations (bridging and linking social capital) and re-
ceiving funding. Following the 2010/11 Canterbury/Christchurch earthquakes, gro-
wing food locally in urban locations has entered the political agenda. The Christ-
church City Council (CCC) published a “Food Resilience Policy” (2014) that supports
the establishment of urban community gardens amongst other initiatives.
However, the role of community gardens for community resilience beyond a
food perspective has not yet attracted the widespread attention of policy makers.
In Christchurch, funding and land tenure remain critical barriers for the develop-
ment of community gardens (Fox-Kämper et al. 2018). If considered as a source
of, or system for urban and community resilience, community gardens should be
supported by state and non-state actors in order to maximize their potential. Not
in the neoliberal sense of delegating responsibilities down to the individual, but as
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beneficial systems that thrive on “bottom-up dynamics in combination with suc-
cessive institutional support” (Fox-Kämper et al. 2018: 67), and are easy to activate
when a disaster strikes. And while community gardens cannot be the only ‘silent
systems’ that contribute to preparedness for a disaster, they should become – or
are already – an integral part of it.
While additional studies are needed, for example to answer questions about
long-term activation and related benefits, it is safe to say that community gardens
bring people together and provide a safe and nurturing environment after a disas-
ter. This gardener from the Phillipstown Hub community garden got to the heart
of it when she reflectively concluded:
[…] first of all I think it’s about people, it’s about bringing people together, it’s
about learning skills, how to look after yourself and how to feed yourself […] I think
once if you’d asked me that a while ago I might have said food first but no, I’ve
learnt that […] it’s just bringing people together more than anything.
• Phillipstown Hub community garden
Conclusion
The role of urban community gardens in times of crises has remained pertinent
for contemporary cities. However, the wider benefits of gardens beyond notions
of food resilience remain understated. Community gardens are first and foremost
about people. Their inherent ability to create and retain social capital provides va-
luable benefits in both pre- and post-disaster situations. It is the often latent and
subtle power of continuous activities and social interaction that makes commu-
nity gardens a valuable source of community resilience when a disaster strikes.
Amin (2014) persuasively argued that narratives of urban resilience rely on well-
functioning systems that work in the background and come to the fore when nee-
ded. Community gardens can be a part of such lifesaving systems; however, they
need the necessary care and support like any other system. Notions of communi-
ty resilience that break historical ties with neoliberalism are not about delegating
uncertainties to individuals, but about building mutual support, trust and respect
to empower communities.
Considering their potential social benefits before and following disasters, com-
munity gardens should be regarded as long-term assets. They should get the ap-
propriate support in the form of funding, long-term tenure security, and protec-
tive urban planning policies. Policymakers at national, regional and local levels
should provide innovative funding schemes that encourage community gardeners
to rethink infrastructural and governance arrangements (for both pre- and post-
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disaster situations) and apply for the necessary funds to improve them. In additi-
on, more research is needed to analyze the long-term development and outcomes
of gardens and produce substantial evidence. It will support policymakers to make
better choices to support and maximize the benefits of urban community gardens.
Therefore, longitudinal studies on selected gardens thatmonitor their development
over time are recommended.
References
Aldrich, Daniel P. (2012): Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recov-
ery. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Aldrich, Daniel P./Meyer, Michelle A. (2015): ”Social Capital and Community Re-
silience”. In: American Behavioral Scientist, 59/2, pp. 254–269.
Amin, Ash (2014): ”Epilogue: The Machinery of Urban Resilience”. In: Social Sci-
ences, 3/3, pp. 308-313.
Barthel, Stephan/Isendahl, Christian (2013): ”Urban Gardens, agriculture, and Wa-
ter Management: Sources of Resilience for Long-Term Food Security in Cities”.
In: Ecological Economics, 86, pp. 224-234.
Brand, Diane/Nicholson, Hugh/Allen, Natalie (2019): ”The Role of Placemaking as
a Tool for Resilience: Case Studies from Post-Earthquake Christchurch, New
Zealand”. In: Jaime Santos-Reyes (ed.), Earthquakes Impact, Community Vul-
nerability and Resilience, London: IntechOpen Limited, pp. 1-25.
Burtscher, Sonja (2010): ”Management and Leadership in Community Gardens:
Two Initiatives in Greater Christchurch, New Zealand”. Diskussionspapier DP-
47-2010, Vienna: BOKU-Universität für Bodenkultur Wien, Department für
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Institut für nachhaltigeWirtschaftsen-
twicklung. (http://www.boku.ac.at/wpr/wpr_dp/DP-47-2010.pdf).




CCC (2014): ”Christchurch City Council Food Resilience Policy”. Christchurch:
Christchurch City Council,November 29, 2016 (https://www.ccc.govt.nz/assets/
Documents/Environment/Sustainability/FoodResiliencePolicy06-11-2014.pdf).
CCC (2016): ”Christchurch City Council Community Gardens Guidelines”.
Christchurch: Christchurch City Council, November 29, 2016 (https://www.ccc.
govt.nz/assets/Documents/Environment/Sustainability/CouncilCommunity-
GardensGuidelines2016.pdf).
CCGA (2019): ”Garden Directory”, July 24 2019 (http://www.ccga.org.nz/garden-di-
rectory/).
Growing Resilient Cities 97
Chan, Joana/DuBois, Bryce/Tidball, Keith G (2015): ”Refuges of Local Resilience:
Community Gardens in post-SandyNewYorkCity”. In: Urban Forestry&Urban
Greening, 14/3, pp. 625-635.
Colding, Johan/Barthel, Stephan (2013): ”The Potential of ’Urban Green Commons’
in the Resilience Building of Cities”. In: Ecological Economics, 86, pp. 156-166.
Colding, Johan/Barthel, Stephan (2017): ”An Urban Ecology Critique on the “Smart
City” Model”. In: Journal of Cleaner Production, 164, pp. 95-101.
D’Abundo, Michelle L./Carden, Andrea M. (2008): ”“Growing Wellness”: The Possi-
bility of Promoting Collective Wellness through Community Garden Education
Programs”. In: Community Development, 39/4, pp. 83-94.
Daly, Michele/Becker, Julia/Parkes, Bruce/Johnston, David/Paton, Douglas (2009):
”Defining and Measuring Community Resilience to Natural Disasters”. In:
Vince Cholewa, Ljubica Mamula-Seadon & Richard Smith (eds.), TEPHRA Vol-
ume 22. Community Resilience: Research, Planning and Civil Defence Emer-
gency Management, Wellington: New Zealand Government. Ministry of Civil
Defence & Emergency Management, pp. 15-20.
Dawson, Bee (2010): A history of gardening in New Zealand. Auckland: God-
wit/Random House.
Dubová, Lenka/Macháč, Jan (2019): ”Improving the Quality of Life in Cities using
Community Gardens: From Benefits for Members to Benefits for all Local Res-
idents”. In: GeoScape, 13/1, pp. 68-78.
Duffield, Mark (2016): ”The Resilience of the Ruins: Towards a Critique of Digital
Humanitarianism”. In: Resilience, 4/3, pp. 147-165.
Earle, Margaret (2011): Cultivating Health: Community Gardening as a Public
Health Intervention. Wellington: University of Otago, Wellington School of
Medicine and Health Sciences.
Firth, Chris/Maye, Damian/Pearson, David (2011): ”Developing ”Community” in
Community Gardens”. In: Local Environment: The International Journal of Jus-
tice and Sustainability, 16/6, pp. 555-568.
Fox-Kämper, Runrid/Wesener, Andreas/Münderlein, Daniel/Sondermann, Mar-
tin/McWilliam,Wendy/Kirk,Nick (2018): ”Urban Community Gardens: An Eval-
uation of Governance Approaches and Related Enablers and Barriers at Differ-
ent Development Stages”. In: Landscape and Urban Planning, 170/Supplement
C, pp. 59-68.
Ghose, Rina/Pettygrove, Margaret (2014): ”Urban Community Gardens as Spaces of
Citizenship”. In: Antipode, 46/4, pp. 1092-1112.
Gregory, Megan M./Leslie, Timothy W./Drinkwater, Laurie E. (2016): ”Agroecolog-
ical and Social Characteristics of New York City Community Gardens: Contri-
butions to Urban Food Security, Ecosystem Services, and Environmental Edu-
cation”. In: Urban Ecosystems, 19/2, pp. 763-794.
98 Andreas Wesener
Guitart, Daniela/Pickering, Catherine/Byrne, Jason (2012): ”Past Results and Fu-
ture Directions in Urban Community Gardens Research”. In: Urban Forestry &
Urban Greening, 11/4, pp. 364– 373.
Hollands, Robert G. (2014): ”Critical Interventions into the Corporate Smart City”.
In: Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 8/1, pp. 61-77.
Joseph, Jonathan (2013): ”Resilience as Embedded Neoliberalism: A Governmental-
ity Approach”. In: Resilience, 1/1, pp. 38-52.
Kato, Yuki/Passidomo, Catarina/Harvey, Daina (2014): ”Political Gardening in a
Post-disaster City: Lessons from New Orleans”. In: Urban Studies, 51/9, pp.
1833–1849.
Leitner, Helga/Sheppard, Eric/Webber, Sophie/Colven, Emma (2018): ”Globalizing
Urban Resilience”. In: Urban Geography, 39/8, pp. 1276-1284.
Lorenz, Daniel F (2013): ”The Diversity of Resilience: Contributions from a Social
Science Perspective”. In: Natural Hazards, 67/7, pp. 7-24.
Magis, Kristen (2010): ”Community Resilience: An Indicator of Social Sustainabil-
ity”. In: Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal, 23/5, pp. 401-
416.
McClintock, Nathan (2014): ”Radical, Reformist, and Garden-Variety Neoliberal:
Coming to Terms with Urban Agriculture’s Contradictions”. In: Local Environ-
ment, 19/2, pp. 147-171.
Montgomery, Alesia (2016): ”Reappearance of the Public: Placemaking, Minoritiza-
tion and Resistance in Detroit”. In: International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research, 40/4, pp. 776–799.
Montgomery, Roy/Wesener, Andreas/Davies, Fran (2016): ”Bottom-Up Governance
after a Natural Disaster: A Temporary Post-Earthquake Community Garden in
Central Christchurch, New Zealand”. In: Nordic Journal of Architectural Re-
search, 28/3, pp. 143-173.
Moulin-Doos, Clair (2014): ”Intercultural Gardens: The Use of Space by Migrants
and the Practice of Respect”. In: Journal of Urban Affairs, 36/2, pp. 197-206.
Münderlein, Daniel (2015): ”Post-Earthquake Community Gardens in Christchurch
New Zealand.”. Short Scientific Report on the Short Term Scientific Mission,
Dortmund/Kassel: COST ACTION TU 1201: Urban Allotment Gardens in Eu-
ropean Cities. (http://www.urbanallotments.eu/fileadmin/uag/media/STSM/
RSTSM/Post_Earthquake_Community_Gardens_STSM_final_report.pdf).
National Research Council (2011): Building Community Disaster ResilienceThrough
Private-Public Collaboration.Washington, D.C.:TheNational Academies Press.
NZ Herald (2011): ”Christchurch Earthquake: Food Companies Swing in to Deliver
Supplies ”. In: New Zealand Herald, February 25 (https://www.nzherald.co.nz/
food-wine/news/article.cfm?c_id=206&objectid=10708702).
Growing Resilient Cities 99
Okvat, Heather A/Zautra, Alex J (2014): ”Sowing Seeds of Resilience: Community
Gardening in a Post-Disaster Context”. In: Keith G Tidball &Marianne E Krasny
(eds.), Greening in the Red Zone, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 73-90.
Oldenburg, Ray (1989):TheGreat Good Place: Cafes, Coffee Shops, Community Cen-
ters, Beauty Parlors, General Stores, Bars, Hangouts, and How They Get You
Through the Day. New York: Paragon House.
Putnam, Robert D (2000): Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community New York: Simon & Schuster.
Rosol, Marit (2010): ”Public Participation in Post-Fordist Urban Green Space Gov-
ernance: The Case of Community Gardens in Berlin”. In: International Journal
of Urban and Regional Research, 34/3, pp. 548-563.
Rosol, Marit (2012): ”Community Volunteering as Neoliberal Strategy? Green Space
Production in Berlin”. In: Antipode, 44/1, pp. 239-257.
Schmelzkopf, Karen (2002): ”Incommensurability, Land Use, and the Right to
Space: Community Gardens in New York City 1”. In: Urban Geography, 23/4,
pp. 323–343.
Shimpo, Naomi/Wesener, Andreas/McWilliam, Wendy (2019): ”How Community
Gardens may Contribute to Community Resilience Following an Earthquake”.
In: Urban Forestry & Urban Greening, 38, pp. 124-132.
Sims-Muhammad, Toni Y. (2012): ”After the Storms: South Louisiana Sustainable
Food System Assessment in light of Environmental Natural Disasters Hurri-
canes Katrina & Rita”. In: International Journal of Humanities and Social Sci-
ence, 2/3, pp. 129-135.
Solnit, Rebecca (2009): A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities
that Arise in Disaster. New York: Viking Penguin.
Surls, Rachel/Feenstra, Gail/Golden, Sheila/Galt, Ryan/Hardesty, Shermain/Na-
pawan, Claire/Wilen, Cheryl (2014): ”Gearing up to Support Urban Farming in
California: Preliminary Results of a Needs Assessment”. In: Renewable Agricul-
ture and Food Systems, 30/1, pp. 33-42.
Tahara, Shinichi/Shioyama, Sayaka/Kurita, Hideharu/Terada, Toru (2011): ”A Quan-
titative Assessment of Agricultural Production from Allotment Gardens”. In:
Journal of The Japanese Institute of Landscape Architecture, 74/5, pp. 685-688.
Trotman, Rachael/Spinola, Carla (1994): Community Gardening: A Literature Re-
view.Auckland: University of Auckland, Alcohol & Public Health Research Unit.
USGS (2016): ”Historical Earthquakes & Statistics FAQs”, November 25, 2016
(https://www2.usgs.gov/faq/categories/9831/3342).
Vallance, Suzanne (2012): ”Urban Resilience: Bouncing Back, Coping, Thriving”.
Conference paper. Proceedings of EARTH: FIRE AND RAIN Australian & New
Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management Conference, Brisbane,April 16-
18 2012.
100 Andreas Wesener
Walker, Paul (1995): ”Towards the Modern Garden”. In: Matthew Bradbury (ed.),The
Garden in New Zealand, Auckland: Penguin Books (NZ), pp. 153-171.
Wallace, Neal (2011): ”Food Distribution Could be Affected”. In: Otago Daily
Times, February 24 (https://www.odt.co.nz/news/dunedin/food-distribution-
could-be-affected).
Wilson, David/Jonas, Andrew E. G. (2018): ”Urban Resilience: An Urban Political
Movement”. In: Urban Geography, 39/8, pp. 1265-1267.
Wilson, Geoff A (2012): Community Resilience and Environmental Transitions.
Abingdon: Routledge.
Zebrowski, Chris/Sage, Daniel (2017): ”Organising Community Resilience: An Ex-
amination of the Forms of Sociality Promoted in Community Resilience Pro-
grammes”. In: Resilience, 5/1, pp. 44-60.
Before ‘Resilience’
Surviving in Postwar Berlin, 1945-1950
Avi Sharma
Risk analysis and preparedness have long been core aspects of governance practice
across a variety of scales (Giddens 1991; Beck 1992; Bauman 2007), but in recent de-
cades, this discourse has undergone an important shift. As diverse actors recognize
the interconnectedness of risk factors, from pollution and resource use to clima-
te change, the idea of coordinated strategies for managing shared challenges has
gained ground. The internationalization of emergency response has also played a
role in shifting the perceptions of risk beyond territorial boundaries, with local and
regional challenges in distant lands demanding the mobilization of global resour-
ces (Deere-Birbeck 2009; Goldin/Mariathasan 2014). None of this is entirely new.
Colonial powers have, in some cases, responded to drought or famine in subject
territories (Davis 2007; Simonow 2015); central banks were already coordinating
policy to impact global financial crises long before the Great Depression (Polanyi
2001 [1944]); and humanitarian relief was deployed to assist refugees during the
First World War (Anderson 2007; Balakian 2009). All of these were, however, seen
as exceptional situations, rather than everyday events (Gatrell 2013; Ther 2017). In
recent decades, international stakeholders – from the United States National Secu-
rity Council to the leadership of Amnesty International seem increasingly resigned
to the fact of perpetual crisis: somewhere in the world, war, natural disaster, clima-
te catastrophe, epidemic or political instability is happening. Crisis is widely seen
as an everyday phenomenon, rather than an exceptional circumstance (ARUP/Ro-
ckefeller Foundation 2016).
Resilience is a slippery term precisely because it is supposed to enhance the ca-
pacity to flexibly respond to a range of challenges, from ecological disruption and
natural disasters to climate change, financial crisis to violent conflict and its af-
termath (Müller 2011; Taşan-Kok et al. 2013). Resilience thinking can be found in a
wide variety of disciplines, from engineering and ecology to disaster management
and planning. A range of actors, from NGOs to Foundations and National Securi-
ty Agencies argue that resilience is about fostering strong local communities and
institutions. It is, in this view, about preparedness, innovative response, and em-
powering individuals to rebuild (Johnson/Blackburn 2014). All of these things may
102 Avi Sharma
be true from a policy perspective, but on the most fundamental level, resilience
is about surviving profound disruption. It is about survival (Wilson 2014; Wrenn
2014). In my view, it is an extraordinarily pessimistic discourse because it 1) assu-
mes that crisis is the norm and 2) assumes that global actors no longer have the
capacity to simultaneously address multiple crises occurring across geographies
and scales.
Critics reject both of these assumptions. There is, for example, a vast literatu-
re on the cynical ways that ‘crisis’ discourse is used by state and non-state actors
to achieve political and economic ends, and a related critique of TINA ideologies
which use claims about state capacity to weaken regulatory regimes to the advan-
tage of corporate and financial interests. Critics argue that ‘limited capacity’ claims
are a fiction conceived tomask ideological and political economic interests (Ooster-
lynck/González 2013; Mirowski 2014). This critique is powerful, and in many cases,
the suspicion of both the ‘crisis’ and ‘capacity’ arguments has proven to be justified,
as business-interests work to marginalize state and regulatory agencies in pursuit
of allegedly free markets.
Critics and advocates of the concept agree on very little, but they do agree that
resilience discourse is about surviving disruption, whether on the ecological, sys-
tems, individual, community, national, supra-national or species level. So far as
I know, though, none of the literature on resilient social systems adequately de-
scribes, analyzes, or interprets ‘survival’ as a lived experience and social catego-
ry.1 What does it mean for individuals and groups when development consultants,
IGOs or nation state actors ask them to survive a crisis by building resilience or
being resilient (Kaika 2017)? What kinds of disruptions – past, present, and future
– elicit calls for resilience? Are there scenarios when the ‘resilience’ approach is ju-
stified? Answering these questions can help us to better understand what it means
to survive disruption, and to understand how different kinds of disruption affect
individual and social lives (Diefendorf 2009).
Answering these questions can also help to distinguish between cases whe-
re a so-called crisis is being used to achieve cynical political or economic goals
on the one hand (Graham/Marvin 2012; Gotham/Greenberg 2014); and scenarios
where we are encountering radically disruptive events (Hansen 2007; Sharma 2015;
1 Survival and trauma have, obviously, been a focus of the psychological research on resilience,
and it could be argued that this research has a pedigree that stretches at least to Sigmund
Freud (cp. Freud 1965 [1933]). More recent work on trauma also draws attention both to the
phenomenology of suffering and the technologies of survival. Here the work of Judith Her-
man is instructive (cp. Herman 2015 [1992]). For a discussion of more recent approaches to
trauma and survival (cp. Southwick et al. 2014). For an extremely moving and also illumina-
ting discussion of the experience of survival and the psychology of survivors (cp. Levi 1996
[1947]).
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Bell/Green 2016; Hansen et al. 2016). This is worth exploring, because pronounce-
ments of ‘crisis’ are so common that they threaten to desensitize both laypersons
and experts (Hartman/Squires 2006). Climate change is a particularly powerful
example of the kind of intersectional crisis scenario that was produced by human
activity but threatens to escape governmental, managerial, technocratic, or entre-
preneurial initiatives to control it (Barnes/Gilman 2011; Held/Young 2011). It is well
known, for example, that climate change generates natural disasters that are rela-
tively local (wild-fires and tsunamis, e.g.); food shortages and armed conflicts that
are regional; and migrations and species extinctions that are global. Climate chan-
ge in the 21st century is not, however, the first time that humans have experienced
genuine crisis scenarios that cascade across multiple scales. Historical examples
can be productively used to understand these kinds of intersectional crisis scena-
rios. The present article tries to highlight the tensions within resilience discourse
before that discourse was ever systematically articulated.The goal is to understand
what it means when crisis occurs on a genuinely global scale; the ways that the
system – in this case, the complex political ecology of postwar Berlin – reset in
the face of extreme disruption; and, most importantly, what that process looked
like for the people who lived it. In simplest terms, this chapter explores the case
of Postwar Berlin to better understand the past, present, and future of survival in
moments of radical disruption.
For a variety of reasons, the Berlin case is useful for exploring the individual
experience of survival, and the social, political, and economic logics of surviving
that is at the foundation of resilience discourses (Vale/Campanella 2005; Obschon-
ka et al. 2017).2 During the war, hundreds of thousands of housing units were des-
troyed, which made shelter an everyday question of survival; millions of refugees,
displaced persons, returning soldiers and evacuees survived on starvation rations;
theft, rape, and murder were as common as a decent meal. Survival is the baseli-
ne assumption of diverse contemporary discourses about resilience, and postwar
Berlin can help us better understand what it means to survive.The example of post-
war Berlin also highlights tensions within resilience discourse, because none of the
implicit and explicit strategies for resilience building could have possibly been en-
ough. Self-help was important but hardly sufficient. Adapting to hardship meant
extraordinary suffering. Selfless action could mean starvation. Communities were
decimated by demography. In short, massive state intervention to distribute shel-
ter and food was critical: Berlin and the millions of people who lived there on a
temporary or permanent basis would not have survived simply by ‘being resilient’,
and advocates of resilience are wrong to suggest that the Berlin case proves their
argument about self-reliance, creativity, and endurance.
2 Other global examples might be equally instructive, for example, Leningrad, Warsaw, or To-
kyo in the postwar period.
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This does not however mean that critics of resilience discourse are correct in
arguing that crisis and capacity are only political-economic fictions, because mas-
sive state intervention was not nearly enough to guarantee the provision of food
and shelter. In postwar Berlin, administrators were bewildered by the breakdown
of bureaucratic and legal norms. They had no idea how to supply residents and
millions of new arrivals with shelter. International food aid was totally inadequate.
The material fact of a destroyed city overwhelmed the capacity to rebuild. Most of
those who lived in, came to, or transited through Berlin in 1945 survived. But what
did survival entail, what did it look like, how was it experienced? For many of those
millions, survival meant years in temporary housing, years of starvation rations,
years of sexual abuse or transactional sex. In short, the Berlin case gives us some
indication of what it means when we ask people to be resilient. The survivors of
Hurricane Katrina who courageously demanded that the media ‘stop calling them
resilient’ understood all of this, and the Berlin case is written in solidarity with
them (Kaika 2017). At the same time, it is intended as a gentle reminder that ‘bet-
ter policy’ cannot always make the painful task of survival painless; that rebuilding
cities is not simply a matter of will but resources; that politicians do not control the
weather; and that crises often intersect across multiple social, material, ecological,
and political frames. It is a well-established fact of natural, social, and human sci-
ences that shelter and food are two fundamental needs of individual and social
organisms. This article uses the examples of shelter and food in postwar Berlin to
better understand what it means to survive the breakdown of society.
Living in the Rubble. Housing Shortages in Postwar Berlin
Years of aerial warfare devastated German cities to the point that observers could
scarcely imagine, let alone describe, what they saw. They spoke of graveyards,
moonscapes, the apocalypse (Reichardt/Zierenberg 2008: 18; Häusser/Maugg
2009: 20; Evans 2011: 16–18). More than 4 million of a total 19 million pre-war
apartments, for example, had been destroyed. In Cologne, 235.000 of the 252.121
(93 per cent) apartments in the city were uninhabitable. Bochum, Braunschweig,
Bremen, Dortmund, Dresden, Duisburg, Essen, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hannover,
Kassel, Kiel, Nuremberg, and Stuttgart all saw between 50-65 per cent of the
housing stock completely destroyed. Compared to other German cities, Berlin was
in relatively good shape in 1945. Four years of aerial bombardment had reduced
much of the city to rubble, but just 525.000 of the total 1.5 million housing units
in Berlin had been destroyed or badly damaged, amounting to only about 30 per
cent (Schulz 1994; Steininger 2002). Nevertheless, photography, film, maps, and
statistical data all show that the material destruction of the built environment was
astonishing (Rürup 1995; Derenthal 1999; Shandley 2001; Evans 2011).
Before ‘Resilience’ 105
Figure 1: Herbert Hensky “Two boys fishing on the Spree in Berlin-Mitte,” 1947. (Bildarchiv
Preußischer Kulturbesitz). Figure 2: Willy Römer, “Rubble removal: rubble women on Alte-
Jakob Straße,” 1948 (Bildarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz). 
US Commander of Operations Frank Howley famously described Berlin as the
“greatest pile of rubble” the world had ever seen, but as some historians right-
ly point out, the situation was less bad than it initially appeared (ibid: 18). Many
roads were impassable but the grid remained; water and sewage infrastructures
were disrupted but intact; there was limited subway and tram service as early as
May 14th; and most major arteries were cleared of rubble relatively quickly. The
symphony gave its first performance again on May 18th, and the first public soc-
cer match was played on May 20th (Grossmann 2009). For millions of residents,
though, symphonies and soccer games would have been little consolation. Allied
and German administrators estimated that the city contained 75 million cubic me-
ters of rubble (Dept. of Building andHousing 1949). 75 million cubic meters is more
than 2.6 billion cubic feet. It is enough rubble to build a mountain more than 300
meters high, though Berliners chose to build several smaller hills instead (Dept. of
Building and Housing 1986). Experts estimated that ten freight trains a day, each
with 50 wagons, would be able to remove the rubble in 16 years (Steininger 2002).
In fact, it took 27 years before all of the rubble was removed (Dept. of Building
and Housing 1986). In 1945, Berliners returning home could scarcely navigate the
city: the landmarks were gone, the streets in many cases impassable. Housing was
a critical problem.
Housing was, naturally, one of the most pressing issues for many Berliners.
Between 1945 and 1955, it was not at all unusual to live in an apartment or house
that would, in normal times, be considered unlivable: walking down the streets of
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Berlin, a gaping hole in an exterior wall often gave a clear view into the private lives
of one’s neighbors.
Figure 3: Unknown, “A destroyed apartment in a badly damaged building serves as a bal-
cony in the summer,” 1946 (Bildarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz)
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The private sphere was opened to the public; intimacies were exposed. One
Berliner explained how transformative this was. He joked that it was difficult to
remain on formal terms with one’s neighbors after waving to them from the street
through a missing wall (Reichardt/Zierenberg 2008: 16).
While some were clearly exposed to their neighbors and the elements, others
had a different problem. Across Germany, millions lived in basements and cellars,
which were more likely to survive aerial bombing than above-ground structures.
This might explain why some observers described Berlin as a city of troglodytes
who climbed out of the earth each day (Sebald 2004 [1999]). Enforced intimacies,
dark, cold, and damp shelters, the loss of home – all of these shaped the lives of
short and long-term residents in enduring ways (Borneman/Peck 1995). As of the
writing of this text, the UNHCR estimates that displaced persons spend, on average,
27 years in refugee camps, but even in the postwar period, millions of people spent
years in emergency shelters and temporary housing.
In extraordinary times, though, city residents took shelter where they could
find it. The well-known journalist Ursula von Kardorff claimed to have moved on
seven occasions between 1942 and 1945, always remaining one step ahead of the
British and American bombers (Hartl/Kardorff 1997 [1962]). If resilience is, as this
chapter suggests, essentially about surviving, the experience of life in the rubble
is quite telling: in Germany and other places across east and central Europe in the
1940s and indeed the 1950s, resilience meant flight and displacement; uncomfor-
table and potentially dangerous cohabitation; fear and a perpetual encounter with
mortality (Sebald 2004 [1999]: 36).
The destruction of housing stock presented a huge problem for von Kardorff
and millions of others, but before the end of the war, population outflows and high
mortality rates stabilized the situation. Evacuation to the countryside and war-re-
lated deaths, for example, had reduced Berlin’s population by roughly 30 per cent
from 4.3 million to roughly 2.8 million.The end of the war destabilized this morbid
equilibrium between population and housing, with at least 1.5 million people arri-
ving in Berlin in the summer of 1945. Observers around the world were stunned.
Newspapers in Chicago and London reported “floods” of humanity “overwhelming”
Berlin. One observer reported that in July and August, 15-18.000 persons were ar-
riving in Berlin each day, most of them “Eastern European” (Chicago Tribune 1945).
Official reports were higher, claiming the numbers were on average, roughly 30.000
per day between May and October. In 1945, there were an estimated seven million
Displaced Persons in Germany, and an additional twelve million ethnic German ex-
pellees from across Eastern Europe.3 7.738.000 of those people – more than 30 per
3 The distinction between Displaced Persons and Expellees is critically important, though it
is beyond the scope of the present article. Most important, for present purposes, is that the
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cent of all DPs and Expellees – transited through or settled in Berlin between July
1945 and March 1946 (Königseder 1998: 30).4 This was one of the largest population
transfers in modern history. On a city-scale, this contributed to a population den-
sity 230 times the national average (Berlin Senate 1952).5 So where did people live
in Berlin’s ruined cityscape? How did they survive the postwar? What did it mean
to “be resilient”?
Rebuilding Berlin? The Postwar Housing Crisis
When cities are destroyed by conflict or natural disaster, actors at a variety of sca-
les typically talk about rebuilding, and indeed, rebuilding is a critical part of sur-
viving. In some perspectives, the simple fact of urban rebuilding is an indication
of the ‘resilience’ of urban forms (Ladd 2005; Vale/Campanella 2005). In the after-
math of disaster, state and some civil society actors regularly call on individuals
and local communities to “be resilient”. Critics typically demand that the state do
more to help people who have lost their homes and livelihoods. These calls for the
state to support extremely vulnerable persons to the greatest possible degree is, in
my view, entirely justified. The postwar case, though, shows that neither the resi-
lience demanded by some, nor the state assistance called for by others, is enough
to insulate people from intersectional crises that occur on a genuinely global scale.
There are, in other words, very real crises that outstrip the capacity of the state
to intervene, and the abilities of the individual or local community to survive on
their own. In Germany, but indeed in cities across central and Eastern Europe, the
challenges were staggering, and Berlin offers important insights into what rebuil-
ding a city from the ground up actually entails. As we have seen, rubble was part
of the problem. Architect Max Taut was just one of many experts who projected
that rubble clearance would take decades, and indeed, in 1971, ten million cubic
meters of rubble remained in West Berlin alone (Taut 1946; Dept. of Building and
expellees did not fall under the UNRRA mandate (cp. Holian 2018). Historians have shown
that, while population spiked in the divided Germany directly after the war, the UNRRA did
an extraordinary job in repatriating the millions of displaced persons to their countries of
origin (cp. Eder 2002; Holian 2012). In part because they did not fall under the UNRRAman-
date, though, ethnic Germans expellees remained a large and stable percentage of the total
German population from 1945 onwards.
4 In July 1945, the housing office in Reinickendorf inNorthwest Berlin reported asmany as 1000
people arriving per day in their district alone. This figure is surely exaggerated (cp. District
Office Reinickendorf 1945). Historian Rolf Steininger estimates an average 30.000 per day
betweenMay and October (cp. Steininger 2002: 67; Echternkamp 2003: 63). This is consistent
with Angelika Königseder’s figures.
5 This is roughly 20 per cent higher than the population in density in Berlin, 2015, a fact com-
pounded by the intense contraction of housing stock during the war years.
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Housing 1986). Rubble was literally a barrier to rebuilding, blocking roads, occupy-
ing potential construction sites, consuming human resources and machinery, but
it was hardly the only factor that accounts for the glacial pace of renovation and
new construction.
Building materials were in short supply because the industrial capacity to pro-
duce them was badly damaged. This meant, for example, that when winterizing
damaged housing, district building offices were only using roofing paper to cover
damaged windows, roofs and walls in preparation for the cold weather. In 1945, ad-
ministrators in the American sector district of Tempelhof secured 220 apartment
buildings in this way, providing winterized housing for nearly 4500 district resi-
dents by November.This amounted to less than five per cent of the total population
of the district (District Office Tempelhof 1946). In the Soviet Sector, the situation
was far worse. Of a total 89.000 apartments requiring winterization, building of-
fices reported repairing just 50 units in the span of amonth (Häusser/Maugg 2009).
During the so-calledHungerWinter of 1946-47, the city halted all constructionwork
on residential properties, diverting roofing paper, concrete, and glass to winteri-
ze emergency shelters in schools, hospitals, and other public buildings. Builders
were directed to ensure that one of every six rooms in these facilities was adequa-
tely winterized, which meant closing holes in exterior walls and covering windows
(Dept. of Building and Housing 1945b). In practical terms, this meant that resi-
dents of already overcrowded apartments and shelters were diverted to even more
overcrowded warming rooms.
State actors were unable to build the hundreds of thousands of housing units
because financing, skilled labor, and rawmaterials were extremely scarce. Scramb-
ling to find solutions to the housing crunch, the central office for housing directed
district offices to appropriate and redistribute damaged housing to anyone with
the financial resources or the construction skills to repair the property (Dept. of
Building and Housing 1945c). Neither the city, the allies, nor the private sector had
the resources to build Berlin, which meant that city residents would have to do
the best they could to make temporary and damaged housing livable. In the early
1950s, the city was still tearing down more buildings than it was constructing, and
in 1952, there was still a critical housing shortage of 120.000 units in Berlin alone.
The situation was so extreme that the central housing office put a moratorium on
the use of concrete for all non-housing related construction. They promised to de-
liver a total 11.500 units by the end of the year, addressing slightly less than 10 per
cent of the critical shortage (Dept. of Building and Housing 1952).
The supply of new construction, whether privately or publicly financed, took
decades to approach demand, and neither city residents nor officials could do very
much to change that. In other parts of Germany, the situation was better, but by
1950, there were still more than 900.000 refugees living in emergency shelters,
and in 1955, there were still more than 1900 camps providing emergency shelter
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in the Western parts of Germany alone. If one includes expellees and evacuees,
the numbers of those living in temporary or billeted housing was far higher (Ech-
ternkamp 2003). Rebuilding a city is obviously a challenge, no matter what caused
its destruction. These challenges are amplified when recovery takes place against
the backdrop of genuinely global pressures on resources.6 After all, it was not only
Berlin that needed to be built from the ground up: cities across Europe were de-
manding and, indeed, competing for raw materials to rebuild. If new construction
was not a realistic option for providing housing, how then did Berlin house more
than a million people who desperately needed shelter?
Temporary Housing and Durable Camps
In the months after the cessation of hostilities in Europe, roughly 100.000 peop-
le were arriving in Berlin each week, and the scale of in-migration – returnees,
displaced persons, refugees, allied personnel – exceeded resource and adminis-
trative capacity across all sectors. Allied and city administrators were responsible
not just for housing, but rations, bathrooms, medical attention, security, legal ser-
vices, clothing, bedding, pots, pans, translation services, and logistics (Berger/Mül-
ler 1983). Despite the challenges, Allied and municipal authorities did find a ran-
ge of temporary solutions. Housing of Nazi party members, for example, could
be confiscated and placed in a pool for selected displaced persons. Workshops in
primarily residential areas were repurposed to provide shelter. Military barracks,
warehouses, schools, sport facilities and air raid shelters were catalogued and ma-
de available (Dept. of Building andHousing 1945a). Ironically, some 400.000 people
were housed either in army barracks or facilities that had earlier been used as pri-
sons and labor camps. (Dept. of Building and Housing 1951; Lanz 2007).
Emergency and temporary housing was one critical strategy for managing the
postwar population spike, but “billeting” was another strategy used to manage the
unmanageable population flows. Billeting is, of course, a centuries old practice ty-
pically employed by occupying armies, but in WWII, it became relatively common
to billet urban evacuees in the countryside in order to minimize the risk of casual-
ties during air raids. After the war it was, if anything, even more critical to mana-
ging the housing situation, and between May and December 1945, nearly 400.000
persons were billeted in apartments across Berlin. Like other so-called temporary
6 It is now generally assumed that the Marshall Plan was responsible for rebuilding Europe,
and indeed, the 1948 initiative was an important factor in restoring industrial capacity, criti-
cal infrastructure, and injecting cash into economy. It is worth noting, though, that the Mar-
shall Plan was directed at public and other high priority infrastructure projects and did not
substantially fund or finance the construction of residential real estate (cp. Diefendorf 2009:
377–78).
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housing arrangements, billeting often became semi-permanent (Harlander/Kuhn
2012: 78–79). The prime targets of billeting were housing units that were unde-
rutilized, and to this end, each of the allied sectors determined how much living
space should be allocated per individual, with a range between 6.2 square meters
in the British sector to 9.4 in the French sector. This meant that a 100 square me-
ter apartment might house between 10 and 15 people. While this situation was by
no means typical, neither was it uncommon, particularly in those districts iden-
tified as “hotspots” for housing shortage (Dept. of Building and Housing 1945a;
Berger/Müller 1983: 23; Häusser/Maugg 2009: 54). Surviving meant finding shelter,
and in postwar Berlin, the space, material, and structures that qualified as shelter
would hardly have done so before the war. Resilience quite literally meant living in
ways that just years before would have been unimaginable to most people. And in
hundreds of thousands of cases in Berlin, and millions of cases across Europe and
Asia, these emergency arrangements were not “temporary” but “durable”.
Living together, oftentimes in overcrowded apartments where space, food, hea-
ting materials, and everyday supplies were in short supply, could be extremely dif-
ficult, and the relationships between older and newer residents could be acrimo-
nious. Physical space and contests over supplies were, of course, important sources
of tension. The war itself was also a point of contention. One man recalled living
in a household with 16 people, including an unrepentant Nazi and his two child-
ren (ibid: 57). Across Germany, refugees and displaced persons were disgusted to
find that, after years of forced labor, imprisonment, and murder, they were still
being treated as inferiors. Many hosts also felt angry, complaining about the lack
of “gratitude” on the part of billeted persons who were consuming already scar-
ce resources (Antons 2014). Looking around the city, or waiting in lines at district
housing offices, most city residents – ‘natives’ and new-comers – recognized that
there was no quick solution to their problems. Housing was a matter of life and
death, and would remain a critical issue for more than 15 years. Equally important,
though, was access to food. Here too, a range of factors confounded efforts to nor-
malize food supply. Here too, state actors and individuals used multiple strategies
to ensure survival. Here, too, neither individual resilience nor state intervention
was enough to stave off hunger and malnutrition. Here too, the work of surviving
was miserable.
Surviving Scarcity. The Hunger Years, 1945-1950
In the first years of the postwar, food supply and distribution were catastrophic.
The war interrupted harvests, depleted agricultural labor reserves, closed the tra-
ding routes that supplied vital foodstuffs to Europe. France, Belgium, England,
the USSR, Poland – all of these countries were starved for resources (Trentmann
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2006). Nor was the problem confined to Europe. The Bengal famine of 1943 was a
clear product of British wartime policy, but the consequences for land distribution
and food production lasted well into the postwar period and, indeed, after inde-
pendence in 1947 (Sen 1980; De 2006). In China’s Henan province, more than two
million died starvation related deaths in 1942-43, disrupting social relations and
food production well after 1945 (Wou 2007). Between 1943 and 1948, starvation was
an everyday fact of life for more than a hundredmillion people spanningmore than
5000 miles (Katkoff 1950; Ganson 2009). Berlin was just one of dozens of cities and
town requiring food aid across Europe. Food imports were stretched thin in the
face of the vast demand across the continent.
The weather compounded the challenges of restoring local food production to
prewar levels. Winter 1946/7 was the coldest in decades, destroying late autumn
crops, killing millions of livestock across the continent and British Isles, and ma-
king waterways impassable (Model 1948; Häusser/Maugg 2009: 69). The contem-
porary debate about resilience often turns on the question of whether nation-state
and international actors have the capacity to solve post-crisis challenges, but the
global food crisis in the mid-1940s suggests that there are indeed situations which
outstrip the capacities of large-scale actors.These were not just questions of policy
or political will, although those did play a role. Food shortages in Europe were also
a product of durable limits on global food production, supply, and distribution.
And even the weather.
Food was a critical issue for much of the world for much of the war, but in early
1945, the situation in Germany was far better than it was formany of the other com-
batants. For years, Germany had stolen resources from occupied territories, and
millions of forced laborers worked German farms. Although some products we-
re rationed as early as 1936, the food situation remained relatively steady through
much of 1944. In fact, when Soviet and British soldiers arrived in Berlin in summer
1945, many noted how well fed the locals appeared to be. The end of food transfers
and the liberation of forced laborers changed the situation dramatically, and in the
immediate postwar period, food supply was reduced dramatically, in many cases,
by as much as 40 per cent (District Office Tempelhof 1945b; Reichardt/Zierenberg
2008: 70). Even when food was available – through local production, imports, or
food aid – the roads, bridges, and railways essential for the transport were bad-
ly damaged, making distribution extremely difficult. In Germany, roughly 40 per
cent of motorized vehicles were unusable; and nearly 2400 train bridges, 10.000
locomotives, and 112.000 freight cars had been destroyed (ibid: 71). Food insecurity
was ubiquitous, so where did food come from, and how did individuals make sure
that they had enough to survive?
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Surviving the Peace. Formal and Informal Strategies.
Germans could not have survived the postwar peace if not for food aid from the
allies, and in May and June of 1945, the Allies authorized Berlin districts to issue
roughly 1.5 million ration cards. Between August 15 and September 15, 1945, Joint
Allied Commands delivered 71.000 metric tons of food aid, much of it imported
from the Americas (Allied Kommandatura 1945).7 In spite of the Allied Food Aid
program, extreme hunger was widespread and in the first two years after the war,
the situation got worse, not better. An average ration set at 1550 calories in sum-
mer 1945, for example, was reduced by nearly 30 per cent in just a few months. In
the British zone this amounted to two slices of bread with margarine, two small
potatoes, and a “ladle” of milk per person per day (Steininger 2002: 67). District
administrators across Berlin agreed that this was their most pressing challenge.
In a May 1946 report to district residents, for example, Tempelhof administrators
expressed regret that some 80.000 individuals were not receiving rations, and as-
ked for patience (District Office Tempelhof 1946). Just six months later, in winter
1946/7, total average rations were reduced to an average 700-800 calories across Al-
lied zones (Häusser/Maugg 2009: 50). These calories were absolutely essential for
survival, but they were not nearly enough to survive.8
Not everyone was happy about the rationing system. During the war, tens of
millions of Russian civilians and soldiers suffered from extreme food insecurity,
and many wondered why they were now responsible for supporting the Germans
whowere the cause of somuch suffering. British public opinionwas also suspicious
of German demands for food aid. After all, Britons had been living on rations for
years, leaving many to wonder why Germans deserved food aid while British ci-
tizens experienced continual shortages on the home front. One British MP noted
that it was perhaps “the greatest joke in history. We defeat an enemy, and then
call on tax payers to pay 80-100 million pounds a year to put them on their feet
again” (ibid: 51). Despite the objections of some allied administrative and civilian
populations, the rationing system survived until 1950.
Some in the ranks of former combatant nations were hostile to the rationing
regime, but recipients also recognized that the system was unfair, if for different
reasons. The rationing system was divided into five tiers, with those at the top in
Tier I receiving more than double the ration of those in Tier V. Tier V was made up
7 Berlin, like Germany as a whole, was split into Allied occupation zones. Unlike Germany,
though, Berlin was administered by a Joint Allied Command until 1948, which meant that
matters like rationing were, at least in theory, administered according to a common policy.
8 Official data indicates that the death rate in Berlin jumped from 13.5 per thousand in the
period 1937-39 to 53.5 per thousand in the secondhalf of 1945. Based on a population estimate
of 3.5million, thiswould amount to 187.250 deaths for 1945 as compared to an average annual
47.250 deaths between 1937-39 (cp. Black 2010: 147).
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of people working in non-essential professions, people who were not employed (the
unemployed, for example, but also retirees and the disabled), and members of the
Nazi Party. The Tier V ration card was jokingly referred to as the “Himmelfahrts-
karte” – a play on the German term for the Christian holiday marking “Ascension.”
The pun was a good one, because the Tier V entitlement to between 500-800 ca-
lories per day was, on its own, a sure-fired “ticket to heaven”. Women, many of
whom were involved in professions deemed “non-essential” – like child, elder or
family care – were particularly likely to fall in Tier V. (Reichardt/Zierenberg 2008:
76; Häusser/Maugg 2009: 47).
A ration card was an entitlement but not a guarantee. If trains and trucks failed
to deliver flour, there was no bread. In March 1946, for example, the monthly bread
ration for Hamburg ran out in the second week of the month (Steininger 2002:
67). If storms destroyed crops, fruits and vegetables became even more difficult to
find. Wolfgang Herchner, who was 17 when the war ended, remembers queuing
at 5am for his daily rations – typically a pot of broth (Häusser/Maugg 2009: 49).
In memoirs and oral histories, these hardships take on a particular tone – they
represent suffering survived. Contemporary accounts show, though, how difficult
this act of surviving really was. In July 1945, Klara J., the widowed mother of four
children, reported that it had been weeks since she had been able to provide her
children with any meat. Her youngest son had a ration card entitling him to a milk
supplement, but had only been issued ½ of a liter over a period of 25 days (District
Office Tempelhof 1945a). Here, the problem was not just the ration card, but the
absolute shortages. In the context of extreme scarcity, how did people like Klara
and her children survive? A complex of formal and informal strategies emerged
that aimed at supplementing allied food aid. The following highlights some of the
difficult choices individuals made in their efforts to feed themselves and their loved
ones.
Partially because of the structure of the rationing regime, women were particu-
larly impacted by food scarcity, and transactional sex was one of the survival stra-
tegies that was used to combat extreme precarity. (Grossmann 2009; Evans 2011).
Transactional sex can take many forms, and not all, or perhaps even most of the-
se exchanges would qualify as prostitution. Fraternization between allied person-
nel and women in Berlin might, for example, entail gift exchanges, intimacy, and
even affection. Whatever the nature of these relationships, though, it is essential
to remember that they were typically characterized by extreme power differentials
between allied soldiers who had surplus food, money and fungible commodities
like cigarettes; and women and girls who were trying to simply survive in despera-
te times. Sex and other forms of intimacy were, in the postwar years, key survival
strategies for many vulnerable women (and some men).This, too, was a kind of re-
silience – away to stabilize everyday life in exceptional times (Reichardt/Zierenberg
2008).
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Sex was one kind of transaction, but informal trade could take a range of forms,
and here, the unevenness of rationing system sometimes played an important role.
In shared housing situations, for example, cohabitants frequently made implicit or
explicit exchanges, trading rationed goods like cigarettes and food for more space,
better living quarters, cooking utensils, bedding and so on (Prosser-Schell 2011;
Antons 2014). These often complex negotiations within the household were hid-
den from view, but exchanges of space, food and other resources were important
to postwar survival. If these kinds of exchanges were relatively hidden, the black
market was everywhere visible. In illegal markets across Germany, people traded
all sorts of goods – paintings and rings, baby clothes and bedding, food, medicine,
licit and illicit drugs – in an effort to survive (Zierenberg, 2008). In an environment
where paper currency was unstable, it was common to trade in other kinds of ex-
change products, and cigarettes became a preferred instrument of trade. (Steinin-
ger 2002: 26; Echternkamp 2003). Black markets were demonized by authorities,
but they did give individuals increased flexibility in addressing food insecurity.
While secondary circuits helped to secure essential goods, there were times
when food and fuel was simply impossible to find in cities. This led to a different
but related strategy called ‘hamstering’, so-called because the hamsters were stuck
in an endless back-and-forth circuit in the hunt for food (Häusser/Maugg 2009:
26).9 On crowded platforms across Berlin and other German cities, the “hamsters”
waited for trains to take them to the countryside - anywhere there was a chance
to trade for food. The hamsters waited for hours for space in overcrowded trains.
After disembarking, they would traverse the countryside, moving from village to
village, farm to farm, searching for a willing exchange partner. They traded pri-
zed possessions for a few days of food and risked police controls where precious
supplies would be confiscated. A young woman recounts trading her grandfather’s
gold watch for a sack of potatoes and a pair of apples. Hamsters, she said, never
really thought about whether the time and resources were worth the return. “We
had nothing to eat, so we had to trade” (ibid: 69).
9 An employee of the German Railways reported that more than 1000 people a day were de-
parting the Stettiner Train Station for farming villages in Mecklenburg to the North. They
brought with them table lamps, linens, porcelain, radios – whatever they had available – to
trade for potatoes, milk, vegetables and other food stuffs.
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Figure 4: Friedrich Seidenstücker, “The ‘Potato-Express’ at the Potsdam train station,” 1946
(Bildarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz).
Hamstering, transactional sex, informal arrangements in the household, and
black markets were all tactics that individuals used to survive in the immediate
postwar period, but none of these did anything to solve the fundamental problem,
which was the material scarcity of food and other essential supplies. Berliners may
have been resilient, but rations were not enough to survive, and informal strategies
did nothing to increase overall supply. In an effort to address the root-problem,
cities across Germany undertook ambitious initiatives to foster urban agriculture.
Urban gardening has long been a strategy for enhancing food security in both
peacetime and war, so it is unsurprising that urban green spaces across Europe we-
re repurposed to stabilize food supply (Helphand 2008). During the war, Berliners
were already planting vegetables on balconies, in courtyards and other small spaces,
but in September 1945, the Berlin City Council passed an ordinance calling for a ci-
ty survey to catalogue potential food production sites. This was an enormous task.
They proposed to bring every possible corner of the city under cultivation. Some
sites were obvious targets for urban agriculture. City parks and squares, undevelo-
ped land and abandoned property were quickly put to use. In other cases, though,
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dangerous buildings needed to be demolished and rubble removed to ensure the
most productive use of precious seeds and fertilizers. The survey itself took more
than two years, but the results were promising. The Central Office for Green Plan-
ning and Agriculture catalogued more than 115.000 small garden parcels totaling
5087 Hectares and an additional 49.243 parcels of undeveloped or underutilized
land in Berlin (Dept. of Building and Housing 1947).10
Figure 5: Willy Römer, “Potato harvest in the Tiergarten,” 1945 (Bildarchiv Preußischer
Kulturbesitz).
District offices did not, of course, wait for the completed survey, and by spring
1946 local officials were distributing available gardens plots and allocating space in
parks and squares. In Spring 1946, Tempelhof distributed roughly 4.5 hectares of
uncultivated land to district residents, and in Wilmersdorf, the public parks and
squares (e.g., Olivaerplatz and Preußenpark) were shared out among district resi-
dents. In addition to the small plots, the city provided 165.000 vegetable sproutlings
to residents who were trying to supplement rations (District Office Tempelhof 1946;
10 This space - roughly 69 square kilometers – was fairly substantial. By way of comparison, it
amounts to more than 75 per cent of the total area of, for example, Copenhagen.
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District Office Wilmersdorf 1946; Schmidt 2008). Districts would take a portion of
the harvest to be collected at a central distribution center. The scheme was hardly
without problems. Urban gardeners no doubt diverted parts of their harvest in-
to their personal stores or used them for trade on the black market. And as the
city council office of nutrition warned, some districts – particularly those in the
North and East of the city – were withholding the assembled harvest from central
distribution points. Nevertheless, by the end of the summer harvest 1946, local pro-
duction accounted for a substantial proportion of total food supply, approaching as
much as 30 per cent (Häusser/Maugg 2009: 66). While this is an impressive achie-
vement, it speaks more to the limited supply than to overall production. As histo-
rian Jürgen Schmidt points out, most of those given garden plots had little or no
experience farming, the soil quality was poor, and fertilizer and seed was scarce
(Schmidt 2008). Having access to a plot of land and seed certainly did not make
urban gardeners self-sufficient.
The image above – gardening in the Tiergarten with the Reichstag and Russian
Memorial in the back-ground – encodes what ‘resilience’ means to so many people
in the 21st century. One can see the cause of the disruption and some of its visible
effects; the hardworking people trying to draw sustenance from the soil; the re-
purposing of unfamiliar tools to scrape a living; a child helping mother or father.
There is much that is not visible, though. The degraded soil, for one; the trades
and exchanges to ensure that growing children have clothing; waiting in line and
registering for a plot to garden; the insecurity of crop-yield and the threat of pil-
ferage. If we admire people for their resilience, and I certainly do, it is essential to
visibilize what it means to survive. This is even more important if we plan to call
on others to be resilient.
The effort to survive extreme scarcity in the postwar combined a range of formal
and informal strategies ranging from rationing and urban gardening to transac-
tional sex and ‘hamstering’. None of strategies, individually or taken together, were
enough to ensure food security, and indeed, many remember the period 1945-1950
primarily in terms of persistent hunger. The postwar offers insights into a global
food crisis – one where the issue is total capacity and not the lack of interest from
donor nations (Trentmann 2006; Häusser/Maugg 2009: 50).The historical example
of a food crisis that is simultaneously local, regional, and global may offer insights
to those concerned with food security in a time of accelerating climate change.
Conclusion: Never Cry Crisis?
Postwar Berlin is, in a variety of ways, an extraordinary case. The legacies of geno-
cidal violence and emerging geopolitical conflicts; the scale of physical destruction;
the scarcity of food and buildingmaterials; the formal and informal survival strate-
Before ‘Resilience’ 119
gies – all of these are part of an historical record that still resonates in Berlin’s urban
everyday.The Berlin case is also useful for exploring questions about crisis and resi-
lience more generally, offering potential insights into cases in different parts of the
world and different time periods. It is, in fact, surprising that the postwar period
has not already been comprehensively mined by resilience researchers and practi-
tioners to generate insights into the challenges of surviving and rebuilding after
catastrophe (Ladd 2005; Obschonka et al. 2017). For one thing, the postwar period
is in the DNA of the debate between “regulationists” and neoliberals, informing the
ways that each of these camps imagines the state’s role in managing crisis and re-
building after disaster (Mirowski 2014). The present case does not pretend to settle
this debate, or the debate between advocates of resilience and their critics that was
briefly sketched out in the introduction. It does show, however, that there are in-
deed instances in which state actors across scales lack the capacity to address life-
threatening challenges like widespread homelessness or food-scarcity, as some ad-
vocates of resilience have argued. It also shows, and this is more important in my
view, what resilience means for the people who live through profound disruptions.
Berlin is an extreme example of the kinds of challenge that resilience claims to ad-
dress, and in part because it is an extreme case, it illuminates the way that global
disruptions differ from local or regional ones, creating different kinds of challenges
for individual, state, and non-state actors.
This article attempted simultaneously to do several things. It showed the scale
and scope of disruption to housing and provisioning; it explored some of the for-
mal and informal strategies for addressing those disruptions; and it highlighted
reasons why these disruptions were so difficult to solve, and so painful to survi-
ve. Most importantly, though, the article attempted to draw our attention to the
particular challenges that arise when addressing intersectional crises that cascade
across scales and geographies. The Berlin case, for example, shows that postwar
housing and food crises were caused not just by aerial bombing and damage to the
agricultural sector, but also by the regional pressures on building materials, ma-
chinery and human resources; population displacements occurring on regional and
global scales; and food scarcity and weather events that were global in nature. This
article suggests that, when talking about resilience in particular, and rebuilding in
general, it is extremely important to distinguish between local, regional, and global
disruptions (Held/Young 2011). As Diefendorf (2009) has argued, for example, re-
building NewOrleans in 2005 demands a different approach than rebuilding Berlin
in 1945: in 2005, the resources and capacity to rebuild were available, while in 1945,
they were not. New Orleans residents were right to demand that the media, state,
and civil society actors stop applauding resilience and get to work supporting ci-
tizens in need. Berlin residents had no real hope that state intervention, whether
local, federal, or international, could address shortages and material destruction
in a timely way.
120 Avi Sharma
One troubling implication of this article is that there are global crises that ex-
ceed the capacity of state and other large-scale actors to effectively intervene.There
were, of course, policy choices and geopolitical conflicts which retarded the process
of rebuilding Berlin, stabilizing food supply, and addressing population displace-
ment. But the entanglement of multiple disruptions across different scales meant
that many people in Berlin would live in temporary shelters, cellars, and homes wi-
thout walls for years; that many people would suffer from malnutrition for years;
and that the best intentions in the world could not resolve the situation.This was a
matter of capacity, and not political will or policy failure (although those, too, we-
re abundant). The Berlin case suggests that there are instances when the terrible
burden of surviving catastrophe has and will fall disproportionately on individu-
als. It also suggests that stakeholders should be extremely cautious in their calls
for resilience, because the work of surviving is miserable work. All of this is worth
considering for those who rightly argue that imminent challenges – most notably,
climate change – are likely to overwhelm global capacity across a variety of crisis
categories, geographies, and scales.
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No Easy Solutions
Global Cities, Natural Disasters, Development, and the
Intellectual History of Resilience Thinking, 1960s to 1990s
Sönke Kunkel
A new promise is haunting the global development community today – the promi-
se of resilience. The United States Agency for International Development carries it
along in its portfolio. The United Nations has it on its list of top priorities, and so
does the World Bank, which claims that climate change has made resilience “es-
sential to eliminating extreme poverty and achieving shared prosperity by 2030”
in developing countries (World Bank, 2013: vi). Fed by the human tragedy of ma-
jor disasters such as the 2004 Asian tsunami and 2005 Hurricane Katrina, new
resilience programs have also emerged in the global NGO sector where the Rocke-
feller Foundation now leads the way with its 100 Resilient Cities program. Under
the scheme, the foundation offers funding for up to $ 1 million per city to allow
for the hiring of a Chief Resilience Officer, and provides technical support to help
cities develop comprehensive resilience strategies. “City resilience,” the Rockefel-
ler Foundation explains, is not alone geared towards strengthening the “capacity
of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, and systems within a city to
survive, adapt, and grow, nomatter what kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks
they experience.” It is also “about making a city better, in both good times and bad,
for the benefit of all its citizens, particularly the poor and vulnerable” (Rockefeller
Foundation 2019).
As development institutions have begun to redefine their missions, resilien-
ce thinking now also increasingly extends into academia. Social scientists, often
working closely with development institutions, have put resilience onto their rese-
arch agendas and explore ways and means to strengthen structures and resources
in local communities. Environmental scientists, long at the forefront of resilien-
ce thinking, too, advance their models and point to the insights that the study of
ecosystem-resilience may offer in building a sustainable world. Think tanks, uni-
versities, and research centers now increasingly make resilience the focus of their
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work, operating on the premise that building resilience is the key to master the
challenges of cities in a world of rapid urbanization.1
Offering a new framework for thinking about development, the promise of re-
silience has led to an important reappraisal of the environmental threats faced by
global cities and now increasingly shapes new research on disaster risk reduction
and urban emergency response systems.What is often lacking in current research,
however, is a decidedly historical perspective on the very concept and idea of resili-
ence itself – where notions and practices of resilience came from, in what contexts
they arose, and what meanings they carried over time. Current scholarship takes
much interest in theorizing resilience and working out practical solutions, but it
has paid little attention to the specific historical circumstances that have made re-
silience part of the social and political imaginary of societies from past to present.
Two exceptions are the edited volume by Laurence Vale and Thomas Campanella
(2005) and Peter Rogers Resilience and the City (2012).
Against this backdrop, this essay has three goals: to historicize the origins and
intellectual underpinnings of urban resilience thinking, to situate them in the con-
text of international urban development policies between the 1960s and 1980s, and
to invite critical reflection about the idea of resilience by drawing attention to the
dead ends and technopolitical blinders that have been part of its history for some
sixty years now. Resilience, I argue, may be a new buzzword in global development
policy these days, but it is not a new way of thinking, and should rather be seen
as the newest variation of an influential episteme that emerged between the 1960s
and 1980s. In those years, as I will show, international development institutions
increasingly began to turn their attention to the environmental dangers facing ci-
ties around the globe, and, in response, developed models and solutions for urban
disaster mitigation whose impacts still linger on in resilience discourses today.
Existing genealogies of resilience thinking often attribute its origins to two
landmark works. The first is Crawford Holling’s 1973 essay on “Resilience and Sta-
bility of Ecological Systems”, which for the first time introduced the idea of re-
silience as an analytical concept, defining it as “the persistence of relationships
within a system” and the “ability of these systems to absorb changes of state va-
riables, driving variables, and parameters, and still persist” (Holling 1973: 17). The
other landmark work, many genealogies claim, was Aaron Wildavsky’s “Searching
for Safety,” which extended the concept of resilience into the realm of public po-
licymaking and administration (Wildavsky 1988). In contrast, this essay will show
1 Historians, too, have opened up to the concept and now address interconnections between
social transformations and resilience, going back as far as the 13th to 16th centuries. See the
research group “Resilienz – Gesellschaftliche Umbruchphasen imDialog zwischenMediävis-
tik und Soziologie,“ based at the University of Trier: https://www.uni-trier.de/index.php?id=
60045 [accessed July 10, 2018].
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that resilience thinking has much broader origins that include 1970s ecologists and
1980s sociologists as much as seismologists, geographers, disaster experts, and in-
ternational development institutions of the 1960s and 1970s. To understand the
rise and the logics of urban resilience policies in the 21st century, this essay claims,
urban studies scholars and practitioners therefore also have to draw connections
to the trajectories of global development policies, a field of inquiry global urban
historians have only recently opened up to (see for background on the history of
development: Macekura/Manela 2018; Unger 2018; Frey/Kunkel/Unger 2014).
This chapter traces the development origins of resilience thinking through an
intellectual history of ideas that focuses mainly on international organizations and
experts. My interest, above all, is to understand the shifting paradigms in the thin-
king of those actors. Accordingly, part one lays out a short outline of the 1960s
historical context in which new approaches to urban disaster mitigation were for-
mulated. Section two then explains why researchers and international organiza-
tions shifted attention to new approaches in the 1970s. Section three explores the
new 1990s talk about ‘resilience’ and shows how it turned into a powerful label
for practices that had already been formulated in the decades before. Section four
concludes with a few broader observations on what a historical perspective can
contribute to the study of resilience.
Origins: International Organizations and Urban Disaster Prevention in
the 1960s
Cities in Africa, Latin America, and Asia that are located along the seismological
fault lines of the world have shared a history of urban natural disasters for a long
time. From the earthquake of Santiago de Chile in 1906 through the 1960 earthqua-
ke of Agadir to the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City, the experience of natural cala-
mities has been a hallmark of urban life in many regions across the ‘global South.’
Initial efforts to develop mechanisms of urban disaster prevention and mitigati-
on evolved only slowly beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, however, and became a
more pronounced concern of states and international institutions only after World
War II (see Hannig 2019 for the general history of natural disasters, though with
a focus on Europe). Beginning with the 1949 Ambato earthquake in Ecuador, the
United Nations began to assist regularly and systematically in the reconstruction
of areas that had been struck by natural disasters, including aid to cities in El Sal-
vador (1951), Pakistan (1953), Lebanon (1956), Iran (1957), Chile (1960), Indonesia,
and Libya (1963) (see Wolffhardt 2019 on the general evolution of the UN’s urban
development policies). By the 1960s, as an interim report of the UN Secretariat
noted, “emergency assistance of this kind [had] become a continuing activity of
the Secretariat (Housing, Building and Planning Branch), and one which, owing to
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the increased number of catastrophes, demands more attention and a more sys-
tematic approach” (United Nations 1964: 246). U.S. involvement in foreign disaster
assistance for cities, too, grew in line with UN efforts. Especially in regions that
were of geopolitical concern for the United States, U.S. assistance frequently sur-
passed the contributions of other countries. Following two major earthquakes in
Agadir/Morocco and Chile in early 1960, the Eisenhower administration immedia-
tely authorized a $ 20 million grant to assist in the rebuilding of Chilean cities
and sent its chairman of the National U.S. Capital Planning Commission, Harlan
Bartholomew, to Agadir to assist in rebuilding that city. One year later, the Kenne-
dy administration followed up with another $ 100 million grant for Chile, making
the reconstruction of the Chilean port city Valdivia one of the showcase projects
of the newly proclaimed Alliance for Progress. Under the program, the United States
funded a significant degree of Valdivia’s reconstruction efforts, which included the
building of new residential districts, new regional roads, a levee for the harbor,
and a number of modern buildings around Valdivia’s main market. American aid
underlined in concrete terms the United States’ commitment to aid cities affected
by disasters (New York Times 1963: 38).
In the immediate wake of the 1960 earthquakes of Agadir and Valdivia, the is-
sue was not only rebuilding, however. The high number of earthquake victims in
those cities and the sheer scale of urban destruction also raised more imminent
questions: why had buildings collapsed so easily in those cities in the first place?
Were other cities outside of Chile and Morocco facing similar dangers? What could
cities do to protect themselves against earthquakes and how could they mitigate
and diminish their impacts? Answers were not easy to find, but as the bulldozers
set to work clearing out the rubble in the streets of Agadir and Valdivia, many de-
velopment institutions began to refocus their attention from short-term questions
of post-disaster relief to the more long-term issues of urban approaches to disas-
ter prevention. Giving those concerns a global voice, the UN’s Economic and Social
Council during its thirtiethmeeting inMay 1960 drew attention to “the urgent need
of further promoting international co-operation in order to provide the population
of the world with sufficient safeguards” against natural disasters. It also charged
the UN’s General Secretary with conducting a “detailed and comprehensive stu-
dy of the ways and means of reducing to a minimum the damage resulting from
earthquakes and seismic sea waves” (United Nations 1960: 24).
In the following years, the UN General Secretariat and UNESCO greatly ex-
panded their program in disaster prevention and began to reach out to countries
that were seen to be facing elevated earthquake and tsunami risks. Survey missi-
ons sent abroad in 1961 visited dozens of countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle
East, and South America, and investigated local conditions pertaining to seismolo-
gical research and disaster prevention. At the same time, those missions also had
the purpose of bringing “home to the governments and to the public in general
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that something can be done to protect people and buildings against earthquakes”
(UNESCO 1961: 3). Much to their concern, however, the survey missions noted fun-
damental gaps and obstacles in local disaster prevention. Inmost countries, experts
noted, there was a depressing shortage of seismological stations, and few cities
had actual building codes. There was also a perceived political problem in that “ci-
vil authorities governing some extremely seismic regions seemed virtually unaware
of the existence of earthquake danger in their territory” (U.S. Department of State
1961/United Nations 1962). When, in 1962, UN General Secretary U Thant presen-
ted his report on “Seismology and Earthquake Engineering” to the UN’s Economic
and Social Council, an important segment of the report dealt with the practice
of “seismic zoning” and “seismo-tectonic” mapping. Such maps, U Thant stressed,
would be a crucial tool to get a complete picture of the earthquake risks faced by
regions throughout the world. At the same time, they were “essential in planning
the protection of populations against the effects of earthquakes” since they would
indicate “in which areas protective measures should be applied.” Earthquakes, the
report claimed, drew their destructiveness mainly from expanding cities and poor
building structures that could all too easy “be shattered or shaken down” by seismic
activity. Earthquake protection, in turn, would therefore also have to include “de-
signing and constructing buildings and public works able to withstand the forces
imposed on them by impulsive or oscillatory movements of the soil or the rock
on which they stand.” The report further recommended that: “codes and regulati-
ons for the earthquake-resistant design of engineering structures” as well as “strict
inspection and supervision” of existing building regulations (United Nations 1962:
2-4, 33).
Calling for a new focus on seismic risk mapping and new efforts in earthquake
engineering, the General-Secretary’s report pushed disaster mitigation onto the
agenda of UN institutions (for an illuminating account of the idea and practice of
seismic mapping at the time see Williford 2017). Within a few months, UNESCO
cleared the way for a new International Institute of Seismology and Earthquake En-
gineering, to be set up in Tokyo. It soon began to train engineers and experts from
developing countries. Back in Paris, UNESCO also started to organize field studies
of earthquakes; to set up a number of working groups covering issues such as seis-
micmapping and the principles of earthquake-resistant design; and it convened an
intergovernmental meeting to coordinate a concerted effort to study earthquakes
and identify better ways to protect cities and rural areas against them. Taking place
in 1964, the meeting agreed on far-reaching measures. It stressed the “importan-
ce of proper detailed town and country planning in seismic areas,” recommended
closer cooperation between architects and structural engineers, and called for new
research into the “use of local building materials and on anti-seismic measures in
housing construction.” More important, it also spoke out in favor of more forceful
measures, above all the investigation of all “existing houses and other buildings in
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towns and cities in each seismic country” in order to “evaluate their earthquake
resistant capacity.” In case of a lack of such capacity, the meeting envisioned that
“proper measures be taken to improve the situation” (Fournier d’Albe 1965: 79-83).
The importance that both the UN General-Secretary and UNESCO ascribed to
seismological research and new directions in earthquake engineering had a signi-
ficant consequence: it meant that the expertise of seismologists and earthquake
engineers would play a leading role in urban disaster aid from now on. In other
words, these experts became the leading voices of an international “earthquake es-
tablishment” (Stallings 1995, 35-37). For seismologists and earthquake engineers,
this did not come by accident. Like other “action intellectuals” in the 1960s (White
1967), those scientists had confidence in the practical importance of their research,
believing that natural disasters were techno-scientific problems that could be ad-
dressed through technical solutions (Rinne 1965). As Charles Francis Richter – the
inventor of the Richter scale – put it, “earthquake losses” were “largely unnecessa-
ry and preventable” and it was easy to explain why. He argued that: “In the whole
of past history, something like 90 percent of the loss of life in earthquakes, and a
major fraction of the destruction and economic loss, has been due to the failure
of weak structures, such as would never be erected under any modern system of
building regulation and inspection” (Richter 1972: 50). Global cities, thinkers like
Richter claimed, could not prevent disasters from happening, but it was possible
to minimize their negative impacts through adopting the right kind of engineering
knowledge.
The risk maps and engineering solutions seismologists generated helped to
make disaster prevention a central feature of urban development policies but, for
the time being, they also placed technocratic top-down solutions at the center of
global disaster policies. The emphasis on such solutions was most evident in Tur-
key where the government introduced a policy of forced resettlements. Under the
program, populations living in earthquake- and landslide-prone areas were resett-
led in small towns where the government constructed some 10.000 earthquake
resistant houses (U.S. AID 1971). Authoritarian approaches like these, however, we-
re an exception not the rule. For most countries living under earthquake risks, the
standard way was to step up funding for seismic risk mapping and engineering re-
search. In Chile, American earthquake engineers trained future engineers through
collaborative teaching projects and assisted in working out a new building code
for the entire nation (Arias/Husid/Monge 1969). In Peru, the government, on the
urging of seismologists, joined forces with UNESCO and set up a Regional Center
for Seismology in 1966 to study earthquake patterns and match those with urban
planning strategies.The same year, UNESCO also set up an “International Fund for
the Development of Seismology and Earthquake Engineering” and began to finan-
ce a network of seismological stations in Southeast Asia, while the United Nations
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Development Program also began to fund a number of seismic mapping studies in
the Balkans.
By the late 1960s evenNATO entered the fray, conducting a series of pilot projec-
ts on urban earthquake security in Turkey and Italy and holding a global conference
in 1971. Organized by NATO’s Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, the
conference brought together seismologists, engineers, urban planners, and public
officials from countries around the world to discuss findings and “formulate prac-
tical recommendations for reducing earthquake hazards and for mitigating the
effects of major earthquakes” (NATO 1972). As Assistant Secretary General for Sci-
entific Affairs of NATO Gunnar Randers told the conference, earthquakes were as
old as mankind, but “the development of modern technology and big city commu-
nities affect the problem in two ways: first, the greater congregation of people and
property, and the complex network of all amenities needed for life in big cities,
make a modern society more vulnerable than before. Second, the possibilities of
science and technology for preventive undertakings and for planning mitigation
and relief in case of disaster, are infinitely greater today than they were before.”
There were “modern methods and possibilities,” Randers emphasized, that had not
“been systematically exploited,” and would now have to be made available for those
living under the earthquake threat (Randers 1972: 48-49).
Towards ‘Systems Thinking’: International Aid Strategies in the 1970s
and 1980s
Roughly ten years after the 1960 earthquakes in Morocco and Chile, the results of
those technoscientific strategies were mixed, however. Surveys done in the 1970s
uncovered that a great number of cities and countries throughout Latin America
still lacked building codes, while local authorities in other regions showed great
restraint in enforcing existing ones. Another problem was land use planning in ci-
ties where commercial property interests often trumped environmental concerns.
According to the findings of NATO’s experts, “uncontrolled construction” was also
a burden on cities since it was often “instituted on sites, which, because of their
geological hazards, are unduly high risks.” Finally, the costs involved in making “al-
ready existing structures in densely populated regions” earthquake-resistant were
often prohibitive (NATO 1972: 9). Cities usually shied away from these investments,
in part because there were so many complicated legal issues.
Such problems pointed to one important weakness of technoscientific approa-
ches: they seldom took into account the social dynamics of rapid urbanization, a
process that was most dramatically visible in the emerging Megacities of the glo-
bal South. In those cities, building codes and zoning practices based on seismic
risk maps were useful in theory, but hardly worked in practice. By the 1970s, in-
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ternational institutions and researchers therefore increasingly began to look for
alternative ways of dealing with disasters. Often, they refocused their attention on
a new paradigm – disaster mitigation and preparedness. Cities and communities,
those institutions argued, could hardly prevent natural disasters from happening.
On the other hand, what they could do was to mitigate the damage and the dest-
ruction through better planning, training, and organizing in advance. If properly
prepared, communities and international institutions would thus be able to mini-
mize the losses accruing from disasters.
In the early 1970s, a series of international studies revealed a rather problematic
state of disaster preparedness in many countries. Disaster preparedness schemes,
a global analysis done by the United Nations Disaster Relief Office and the League
of Red Cross Societies showed, existed only in a few countries, and hardly matched
the scale of hazards many regions were facing. Making matters worse, disasters
such as the 1970 Bay of Bengal cyclone or the 1972 Peruvian earthquake also expo-
sed the limits of international relief operations themselves, laying bare the lack of
coordination between humanitarian organizations on the ground and providing
much publicized examples of aid gone wrong. X-Ray machines dispatched to the
far-away countryside without a trained staff and container loads carrying phar-
maceutical drugs marked ‘discard after 1934’ raised not only ethical questions, but
also exposed problems how humanitarian organizations and governments appro-
priated their aid funds (D’Souza 1984: 496-497).
In response, researchers in the UK and the U.S. now began to focus more and
more on evaluating relief operations themselves, gathering data, calculating esti-
mates of projected relief needs, and developing models of how to structure relief
measures. As Frances D’Souza, founding director of the International Disaster In-
stitute, put it, those disaster studies addressed “how the right kind of relief can be
distributed to the right people at the right time” in order to make relief operations
more effective (ibid.). Meanwhile, aid donors such as the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development also began to offer training seminars on disaster preparedness
for public officials from Asia and Latin America (U.S. AID 1971). Those seminars
often focused on the right techniques for planning, organizing, and formulating
national emergency plans. They also addressed more practical questions as to how
countries and regions could improve their warning systems, what could be done
to raise community awareness for disaster threats, and what kinds of stockpiles
regions would need, where those could be stored, and how useful pre-fabricated
emergency shelters might be (U.S. AID 1979).
The new emphasis on disaster preparedness owed much to the new insights
of social scientists, particularly those of U.S. geographer Gilbert F. White (see on
White Hinshaw 2006; Lübken 2012; on the broader context of disaster research in
the social sciences see Stehrenberger 2014). One of the most influential voices wi-
thin the academic community in the 1970s, White had launched his career with
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a study on settlement patterns in the floodplains of the Mississippi in the 1950s,
and had then turned into one of the leading figures in the emerging field of dis-
aster studies. By the late 1960s, his works and his reputation earned him a seat on
the International Geographical Union’s “Commission on Man and Environment,”
a position he used to orchestrate a comprehensive research program on the ways
communities around the world coped with natural hazards. Involving studies in a
dozen countries fromCosta Rica to Kenya and Bangladesh, the program paid parti-
cular attention to social patterns of prevention and hazard awareness. Accordingly,
researchers were equipped with the same basic questionnaire and then set out to
map settlement patterns in hazard regions, but also determined “the range of pos-
sible adjustments by social groups” to hazards (White 1974: 4). Moreover, studies
also inquired into individual hazard perceptions and examined the adjustments
people made to reduce potential hazard damages.
Published in two volumes in 1974 and 1977, the results of White’s research pro-
ject reflected a major shift in international thinking on disaster mitigation. Natu-
ral hazards, White claimed, were not acts of god, but resulted “from interactions
between social, biological and physical systems in which people exercise[d] choice
among a large number of options subject to social constraints” (White 1978: 229).
Hazards, in other words, were social problems that were shaped by patterns of so-
cial behavior and the ways populations coped with nature’s challenges. Knowing
how people responded to hazards, in White’s eyes, therefore also provided the key
to “enabling individuals to take intelligent action or governments to design and
carry out effective programs of assisting individuals“ (White 1974: 3).
The problem, however, was that governments paid little attention to the
workings of those social systems. Even worse, their heavy focus on technological
fixes often exacerbated the vulnerabilities of local communities since technologies
of protection like dams, levees, and earthquake-resistant building narrowed the
range of choices and actually encouraged settlement in hazard-prone areas – in
consequence leading to higher death rates if those technologies failed. Parado-
xically, White warned that the “present public policy emphasis in many regions
upon technical and narrow adjustments” entailed the danger that societies would
“become still less resilient and still more susceptible to catastrophes” (White 1978:
230).
Significantly, White’s studies for the first time explicitly used the language of
resilience. More important, they also introduced an alternative approach to dis-
aster mitigation: systems thinking. If technological solutions alone would not do,
and if, on the other hand, social coping mechanisms and the right kind of know-
ledge about them carried the promise of more effective mitigation strategies, the
answer was obviously to connect those with one another. In White’s view, a “cruci-
al aspect of any long-term accommodation to the human environment” had to be
“the skillful, sensitive use of a wide range of adjustments” (White 1974: 13). Those
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would have to include “engineering devices, land management, and social regula-
tion” (ibid), but also ‘modern’ warning systems, better communication structures,
disaster preparedness plans, disaster insurance, and a stop on development pro-
jects that furthered the vulnerabilities of communities. In the end, White claimed,
it was the interrelatedness andmixture of those tools that would make populations
more resilient (see also Burton/Kates/White 1978).
Charging that White’s research findings had only limited value, critics at first
remained skeptical (see Waddell, 1977). But, over time, development institutions
more and more caught on to White’s ideas. A 1982 study by U.S. AID on “Natu-
ral Disasters and the Development Process” (U.S. AID 1982) quoted widely from
White’s works, arguing that development institutions had to strengthen the abi-
lities of societies to cope with disasters through “analyses of hazard risk, public
awareness campaigns, development of emergency plans and warning systems, and
contingency planning for post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction” (ibid: 3).
Putting such ideas into practice, U.S. AID also joined forces with international in-
stitutions, including the Pan American Health Organization and the League of Red
Cross Societies, to set up a Caribbean Disaster Preparedness Team. Pooling re-
sources and experts, the team trained officials throughout the Caribbean in pre-
paredness planning, working out new ideas for warning systems, and initiating
public awareness campaigns. In Haiti, meanwhile, U.S. AID funded a major dis-
aster simulation exercise in 1983, while in Jamaica U.S. AID experts worked out a
comprehensive Natural Hazards Management Plan (US AID 1985).
Enter Resilience: The 1990s and After
The introduction of the United Nations’ “International Decade of Natural Disaster
Reduction” in 1990 pushed those approaches another step forward (see Schemper
2019 on origins of the UN’s Decade). The international “Yokohama Strategy for a
Safe World,” adopted in 1994 at the World Conference on the Reduction of Natural
Disasters, noted that: “a global culture of prevention” had to be based on integra-
ted approaches that combined technological measures such as risk maps or better
construction with social strategies to reduce vulnerabilities. The strategy also ex-
plicitly called for local community participation, claiming that “involvement and
active participation of the people in disaster reduction, prevention and prepared-
ness”would lead to “improved riskmanagement.” Strengthening the “resilience and
self-confidence of local communities,” the United Nations acknowledged, would
therefore also require “recognition and propagation of their traditional knowledge,
practices and values as part of development activities” (United Nations 1994: 11-12).
Focusing international attention on the global drama of natural disasters, the
UN Decade created new commitments towards strategies that took account of the
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interdependencies between technical, social, economic, infrastructural, institutio-
nal, and political sub-systems. More importantly, it also introduced a more syste-
matic focus on urban systems management. Leading the way with a new initiative
in 1995, US AID and the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center launched the “Asian
Urban Disaster Mitigation Program” to reduce the vulnerabilities of urban lifeline
networks such as roads, critical infrastructures, hospitals, and shelters. Notably,
the program put much emphasis on urban cross-sector cooperation and governan-
ce.Working with municipalities and local NGOs in eight Asian cities, development
experts helped to set up local disaster management committees, organized city-
wide disaster days involving schools and local communities, but also constructed
model houses and conducted evacuation drills and trainings. The program, U.S.
AID and the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center claimed, focused attention on
“indigenous practices” and “community empowerment,” opening a “new chapter
in urban risk management” through a “multi-stakeholder, multi-sector, multi-di-
sciplinary approach” (US AID 2005: 8).
The centrality of systems thinking drew much inspiration from the emerging
strand of vulnerability studies that argued widely for the need of reducing social
vulnerabilities and “changing the processes that put people at risk” (Blaikie/Can-
non/Davies/Wisner 1994: 219; see also Oliver-Smith 1994; Pelling 1999). By the mid-
1990s, however, researchers and policymakers also increasingly began to link the
notion of systems management to another idea: the idea of resilience. In 1998, U.S.
AID passed a new strategy titled “Making Cities Work,” claiming that integrating
disaster mitigation into urban governance processes would help to “enhance the
resiliency, recovery, and self-reliance of cities” (U.S. AID 1998: 14). Similar ideas
were also voiced at the United Nations where key documents now frequently clai-
med that disaster assistance was about enabling “societies to be resilient to natural
hazards” (United Nations 2001). In 2004, UN General-Secretary Kofi Annan, too,
argued that disaster assistance was about building “resilient communities and na-
tions” on a “hazard-filled planet” (Annan 2004).
By the late 1990s, talk of resilience also increasingly permeated international
policy papers on sustainable development, not least since ecologist C.S. Holling
and a “Resilience Alliance” openly campaigned for it (World Commission on En-
vironment and Development 1987; Folke 2002). The new rhetoric of resilience was
thus not exclusive to the field of international disaster aid. But, contrary to com-
mon wisdom, it was not the exclusive brainchild of Holling either. Writing in 1996,
researchers John Handmers and Stephen Dovers identified resilience as an “im-
portant concept in both ecology and risk research” that shared “the attention paid
to systems approaches to the problems.” Much like ecologists, Handmers and Do-
vers claimed, disaster researchers had developed their own tradition of thinking
resilience since the 1970s, and there was much to learn from them about the pat-
terns of interactions between social and natural systems or about the “creation of
140 Sönke Kunkel
decision-making and management approaches that possess an ability to operate
in the face of …uncertainty” (Handmers/Dovers 1996: 482-483, 485, 487, 490-491).
Within the disaster study community, resilience was now widely recognized as a
critical concept that informed debates about disasters and how to promote coping
strategies that would strengthening a society’s ability to recover from disaster los-
ses through new forms of adaptability and institutional arrangements (ibid.)
In the following years, resilience became a powerful theme in international de-
velopment policies. Building on the established intellectual trajectories of systems
thinking, researchers began to work out systematic principles of how to create
resilient cities, arguing that such principles would have to connect technical mea-
sures of hazard mitigation with “vulnerability reduction,” assistance to poor and
threatened neighborhoods or the building of “networked communications” (God-
schalk 2003: 140). Meanwhile, the United Nations, too, made the strengthening of
urban resilience a top priority with its “Hyogo Framework for Action,” passed on the
heels of the 2005 Kobe World Conference on Disaster Reduction (United Nations
2005). This framework titled “Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities
to Disasters” had a notable impact. In 2007, the UN Human Settlements Program-
me passed its new “Strategic Policy on Human Settlements in Crisis” program,
putting new emphasis on urban disaster mitigation and local capacity-building in
flood- and earthquake-prone areas (UN-HABITAT 2007). Three years later, under
the wings of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, the United Nations also
launched a “Making Cities Resilient” Campaign to promote local awareness for ur-
ban environmental hazards and organizing local network-building and trainings.
Around the same time, theWorld Bank, too, refocused its attention towards ur-
ban resilience, linking its urban development policies more and more to issues like
climate change and urban risk governance. Drawing from the work of the African
Urban Risk Analysis Network (Satterthwaite 2006), the World Bank in 2009 funded
a “Mayor’s Task Force on Climate Change, Disaster Risk, and the Urban Poor” that
brought together the mayors of Dar es Salaam, Jakarta, Mexico City, and São Pau-
lo. Assisted by a research team at the World Bank, the mayors headed case studies
on specific cities, reviewed best practice models of coping with disaster risks, and
eventually came up with recommendations for urban resilience strategies over the
next couple of years. Climate change and global urbanization, the mayors claimed,
increasingly put the “urban poor […] on the front line,” making it imperative for ci-
ties to “build resilience by mainstreaming risk reduction into urban management”
(World Bank 2012: 2). Twenty years after the launch of the international decade of
natural disaster reduction, the promise of more resilient cities thus had come full
circle, putting the world’s cities at the center of global development policies.
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Conclusion
The historical perspective offered in this essay raises a number of important ques-
tions and implications for the ways we think of and conceptualize resilience today.
First, it reminds us that not all that is being sold as a new promise in development
policy these days is in fact new. Current understandings of resilience, this essay
has shown, build on patterns of thinking that emerged decades ago, and widely
carry along the assumptions, norms, and premises that shaped historical under-
standings of resilience.These assumptions have changed and broadened into more
systemic views of resilience, to be sure, but they have also created historical path
dependencies that favor a limited set of interventions into urban systems. Today,
major policy documents and initiatives – from the UN through the World Bank to
the Rockefeller Foundation – still largely dwell on solutions worked out between
the 1960s and 1990s, including the call for better disaster preparedness, better risk
assessments, better building regulation and land-use planning, more investments
in critical infrastructures, and strategies of local social empowerment that streng-
then the development of local disaster response systems. Meanwhile, the fact that
development institutions still largely dwell on the same basic solutions in their re-
silience strategies underscored not only a certain lack of ideas within the global
development community, it also points to the limits and failures of those approa-
ches. This, in turn, raises important questions: if measures like land-use planning
and building regulation have not worked in the past, why should they work in the
present or the future? Could more of the same really make the difference? Are there
no new or alternative ways of thinking about resilience that move beyond conven-
tional notions and historical path dependencies? Many essays in this volume point
to such alternative ways of building resilient cities, providing a line of inquiry that
generates new ideas for development practitioners.
A historical perspective also opens a critical perspective on resilience: as the his-
torical record shows, promoting urban resilience worked out well in some cases.
Chile, for example, began to implement new building codes after the 1960 earth-
quake, a move that largely paid off when Chile was hit again by earthquakes in
the following decades. On the other hand, however, there is also a more shadowy
history of resilience: one that includes forced resettlements and removals of popu-
lations in 1960s Turkey. Or that also saw the fostering of new urban inequalities in
post-earthquake Agadir where zoning was based on seismic risk maps, meaning
that middle- and upper-class residential areas were relocated to safer areas than
low-income housing quarters. Seen this way, one can also think of resilience as
a strategy to mask global and national inequalities: historically, international ap-
proaches to resilience have always favored instrumental solutions – be they top-
down or bottom-up – but they have hardly addressed the structural socio-econo-
mic framework conditions that put the global poor in hazardous areas in the first
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place. Thinking about resilience in historical terms, in other words, also forces us
to rethink the relationships between resilience thinking and global inequalities: do
practices and strategies of resilience address North-South inequalities? Are they
effective in reducing them? Or are they merely a type of tranquilizer given every
time amajor disaster exposes those inequalities? Asmuch as historical perspectives
provide us with insights about the ways in which institutions seek to strengthen
urban systems, then, they also prompt us not to lose sight of the very conditions
that have constituted the cleavages and disparities within those systems.
Above all, however, a historical perspective on resilience warns against the be-
lief that resilience strategies can offer easy solutions. Creating resilient cities, the
historical record shows, was a challenging affair, involving reluctant city adminis-
trations, builders and estate agents who are keener about profit than protection
(Solnit 2010). Often there are also social complexities on the ground that are diffi-
cult to master. One of the most important insights history may provide is therefore
that practices of resilience only work if they link up with local communities and
encourage their engagement through bottom-up processes. How to organize such
processes, this essay has shown, has long been in dispute, and will likely remain so.
But, in the end, the building of resilient cities will only succeed if city administra-
tions and local communities realize that it is a shared responsibility in which both
have their role to play.
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Building Resilience through Commercial Relations
The Formalization of Carwash Sites in Medellín
Marcela López
The term resilience has been adopted by different international organizations
as a way to guide the future development of cities. The Rockefeller Foundation,
for example, has become one of the major promoters of resilience as a concept.
Through its 100 Resilient Cities (100RC) Program, the foundation has built a net-
work of cities to exchange experiences, assessment tools and norms to deal with
the challenges posed by urbanization, globalization and climate change (Leitner
et al. 2018). Medellín, the second largest city in Colombia with a population of 2.5
million people, was one of the Latin American cities invited in 2013 to be part of
the 100RC network. The city was selected as a model city of urban resilience for its
urban innovation projects to address social inequalities and violence. These pro-
jects, largely driven by local elites, introduced conventional infrastructures such as
an aerial cable-car lines and an electric escalator in order to improve accessibility
and mobility in the most violent and marginalized areas. Additionally, the city
invited renowned international and national architects to transform water storage
facilities located in economically and spatially marginal areas into public parks. By
transforming hydraulic infrastructures that have been historically managed and
controlled by the water utility company into public spaces for the enjoyment of
the most vulnerable population, these aesthetic and technical works have become
main attractions for tourists as well as exemplary models for many cities around
the world.
Although infrastructure projects were highlighted as good models of urban re-
silience, the 100 Resilient Cities Program also cited Medellín residents and their
capacity to overcome periods of severe urban violence and high rates of homici-
des, and to respond and adapt to devastating natural disasters. Resilience in the
face of natural disasters is particularly important in the city, where approximate-
ly 30.000 houses are located in areas characterized as ‘high-risk zones’ that are
extremely vulnerable to floods and landslides (López 2016; Medellín Como Vamos
2018). According to the Mayor of Medellín (2012-2015) a ‘resilient society’ has been
a key to the transformation of Medellín, from a city known for widespread violence
into a global model for resilience and innovative urban planning and design. Simi-
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larly, the Chief Resilience Officer for Medellín claimed that the city was selected
to be part of the 100RC Network because of the capacity of its citizens to overco-
me common problems and learn from past tragedies to envision a positive future
(Rockefeller Foundation/Alcaldía de Medellín 2016).
These acts of individual and collective heroism portray residents of Medellín as
subjects who are able to creatively deal with adversity and cope with environmental
threats. By locating social inequalities and violence in the past, though, resilience
discourse has also served to obscure the existing political and economic circums-
tances that are responsible for high rates of criminality. In effect, such discourses
have served to maintain the status of Medellín as the most unequal city in Colom-
bia. According to a study conducted by the Antioquia University,Medellín is ranked
as the most dangerous city in Colombia, with rates of homicide skyrocketing since
2016, despite substantial economic investments in security (Núñez González/Quin-
tero Herrera 2019). The high levels of criminality and persistent social inequalities
have raised critical questions about the impact of Medellín’s innovation model and
its ‘resilient’ infrastructures (Brand 2012; González Escobar 2016; Franz 2017; An-
guelovski et al. 2018; Garcia-Ferrari et al. 2018).
Indeed, the kinds of questions about urban resilience in Medellín echo criti-
ques of resilience more generally. Critics argue that resilience discourse and prac-
tice ignore power relations and injustices (Fainstein 2014; Allen et al. 2017), socio-
spatial inequalities (Leitner et al. 2018), the political economy of urbanization (Béné
et al. 2017) as well as the role of the state (Amin 2013). Meerow, Newell and others
stress the importance of asking: resilience for whom, where and why (Watts 2015;
Meerow/Newell 2016). To date, much of the discussion concerning resilience tends
to represent local communities as key agents responsible for overcoming adversi-
ty by building innovative and resilient solutions (Solnit 2009; Kuecker/Hall 2011).
The urban poor are often portrayed as resilient subjects who are able to adapt and
survive in the absence of state intervention. In this discourse, the urban poor are
celebrated for their capacity to withstand natural disasters, cope with economic
risks, and endure long periods of violence.This perspective emphasizes the impor-
tance of self-organization, flexibility and individual responsibility as corner-stones
of urban resilience.
The intention of this chapter is not to dismiss or ignore the existing critical
literature on resilience, but rather to explore the diverse ways in which the term is
being interpreted and applied beyond mainstream definitions provided by inter-
national organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation. Therefore, this chapter
focuses on how resilience is mobilized on the ground to facilitate a particular kind
of intervention: the formalization of carwash sites. But, in what way does formali-
zation create resilience? This chapter shows that the political and legal recognition
of a precarious economic activity by means of formalization creates opportunities
to help the most vulnerable to deal with an uncertain future. By providing a close
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reading of the efforts of water utilities to mobilize resources, build new alliances,
provide functioning infrastructures andmediate conflicts, this chapter attempts to
better understand how informal carwashes can be consolidated as resilient spaces.
In 2010, Medellín’s public utility company, Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM)
launched a Carwash Program to reduce commercial losses and recover revenues.
As informal carwashes are highly dependent on the water that flows through the
already-existing centralized network, they became a primary target for EPM not
only because they disturb the management and operation of the hydraulic system
(for example, inadequate pressure, intermittent supply, pipe breakdowns), but al-
so contribute to excessive water waste without paying for it. The utility company
estimated that in 2018 there were 310 informal carwash sites, which register water
losses of approximately 34.400 m3 per month.
While much attention has been given to howwater is extended, distributed and
contested in informal settlements (Graham/Dessai/McFarlane 2013; Meehan 2013;
Ranganathan 2014; Anand 2017), little is known about how water is secured and
negotiated in informal carwash sites. In particular, the ways that utility companies
adjust and adapt their structures to engage with informal carwashes and their as-
sociated technologies, practices and dynamics remains relatively unexplored. This
chapter contributes to addressing this gap by drawing attention to the manner
in which utility companies attempt at formalizing carwash sites by incorporating
them into the existing centralized water network. I argue that what makes carwash
workers resilient is not just their day-to-day survival strategies, but their capacity
to make political claims on the state, which is granted by their formal recognition
as consumers.
Carwashes are commonly represented as sites that consume high amounts of
water (Al-Odwani/Ahmed/Bou-hamad 2007; Zaneti/Etchepare/Rubio 2012), as pla-
ces of labor exploitation (Clark and Colling 2016, 2017) or as sites of conflict over
public space (Carcedo 2017). However, the way in which different spatial practices,
modes of using and valuing water, alternative infrastructures and possibilities for
collaboration emerge in these underprivileged sites has received less scholarly at-
tention. The aim of this chapter is to show how carwashes offer a critical opportu-
nity to explore how they “reclaim the urban space, develop their own specific form
of urbanism and infuse the city with their own praxis, values, moralities and tem-
poral dynamics” (De Boeck 2011: 267) as well as provide possibilities to generate
alternative forms of water supply provision that are more equitable, safe and af-
fordable. Given that commercial water consumption ismediated by different power
relations, market structures, ethical concerns and socio-material practices in rela-
tion to domestic water consumption, scrutinizing carwashes may shed new light
on urban water studies.
By drawing upon science and technology studies (STS) and debates on urban
informality, this chapter examines how resilience is being facilitated through a col-
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laborative process between human and non-human actors to support the formali-
zation of carwash sites. From this perspective, I view the resilience of carwashes as
a practice mediated by complex and dynamic assemblages of human actors inclu-
ding the staff of the utility company, municipal authorities and carwash workers;
and non-human entities such as water, meters, bills and laws. By incorporating
non-humans, not as background but as active entities (Winner 1980; Bennett2005;
Braun/Whatmore 2010;Meehan 2013; Anand/Gupta/Appel 2018) into the study of
resilience, this chapter draws attention to two key points. First, to the ways in
which complex interactions between notions of water scarcity and socio-technical
systems that combine physical, commercial and juridical interventions come toge-
ther to facilitate the formalization of carwash sites. Second, to the political capacity
of ordinary objects to challenge conventional distinctions between legal/illegal, for-
mal/informal and authorized/unauthorized (Roy 2011; McFarlane 2012; Cheng 2014;
Acuto et al. 2019; Banks et al. 2020).
This study draws on fieldwork conducted in 2014, 2017 and 2018. The data used
in this chapter emerges from visits to 30 carwash sites located in different neigh-
borhoods in Medellín. In-depth interviews were conducted with both workers and
owners of carwash sites as well as staff of the utility company, police officers,muni-
cipal employees and members of local NGOs.This information was complemented
with participation in events organized by the Car Wash Roundtable as well as of-
ficial documentation produced by EPM, municipal meetings’ minutes, and review
of local newspaper articles.
(S)car-City?
Many international institutions and governments around the world tend to assume
that techno-managerial solutions are necessary to prevent a potential water crisis.
Recent work in Cape Town (Scheba/Millington 2018), for example, demonstrates
that city authorities responded to actual water scarcity by proposing the implemen-
tation of technologies based on desalination projects and water-saving devices. As
Scheba and Millington argue, however, these technocratic solutions, which include
incremental water tariff increases, could aggravate existing economic inequalities
and produce new forms of water scarcity. Other scholars have shown how the con-
struction of large-scale hydraulic infrastructures (for example, dam projects) and
the increase in water prices amidst periods of extreme water shortages have beco-
me a major source of political struggles (Kaika 2003; Giglioli/Swyngedouw 2008).
Another strategy commonly used to address water crises is the control and eli-
mination of informal connections to the city’s centralized water system. In main-
stream discourses, there is the tendency to perceive informal water practices as
something criminal, chaotic, wasteful and inefficient, and therefore, punitive acts
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are justified to prevent a potential water crisis and to avoid the collapse of the water
infrastructure. In their study of the water wars inMumbai, Graham/Dessai/McFar-
lane (2013) examined how police officers strategically mobilize water scarcity deba-
tes for the purpose of persecuting inhabitants of informal settlements and pena-
lizing illegal water connections. In Mumbai, as in other cities around the world,
water scarcity has become a common discursive tool to penalize and marginalize
informal settlements and their associated water practices.
In Medellín, the proliferation of informal connections has also become increa-
singly associated with future water shortages. In 2013, for example, a campaign
was launched by EPM in local newspapers, radio and television not only to portray
water scarcity as an imminent threat, but also to criminalize informal water prac-
tices. At the center of the campaign was an image of a dried-up reservoir that is
losing around 18 million m3 of water every year as a consequence of illegal water
connections. Ironically, the image of an empty reservoir stands in sharp contrast
to the 300 million m3 of water that the city draws from three distant reservoirs to
supply its estimated 1 million consumers with a 24 hours service through a centra-
lized network (EPM 2019). In absolute terms, this total volume is easily enough to
guarantee water supply services to all urban residents. However, the prospective of
catastrophicwater shortages has been sociallymanufactured by the utility company
to criminalize informal connections. As a response to a perceived environmental
catastrophe, EPM is granted the power under Colombian Criminal Code (Article
256) to send people that connect illegally to the formal water network to prison for
up to six years.
Yet if portraying a catastrophic scenario has served to penalize informal con-
nections, it has also enabled EPM to tolerate and legitimize certain informal water
practices. Since 2010, for example, the utility company has used the prospect of a
future water crisis to justify the implementation of a program to reduce water los-
ses in informal carwash sites. Informal carwash sites obtain water by connecting
informally to the city’s network or by manipulating the valves that regulate pres-
sure. However, attempts at controlling and eliminating informal connections in
carwashes have become an increasingly difficult and time-consuming task. Efforts
to intervene and repair these complex socio-technical configurations are constantly
subverted as devices installed by EPM to reduce or obstruct the flows of water are
easily altered or modified. In this case, the inability to fully control the flows of wa-
ter creates an opportunity for the utility company to reform water supply provision
by legitimizing carwash sites, while at the same time intervening in their informal
logics and practices (see also Furlong/Carré/Guerrero 2017). This kind of flexibili-
ty is only possible because EPM is able to effectively claim that working with the
informal carwash sector is the best way both to protect an allegedly scarce natural
resource, and partially recapture revenue lost through informal connections.
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Informal Carwash Sites, a Waste of Water
The growing number of vehicles in many cities around the world has created a
continually increasing demand for carwash facilities, but many cities are unable to
provide adequate urban infrastructure to fill the increased demand. The explosion
of informal carwash activities in Medellín and other fast-growing cities is filling
this high demand in the market. Carwash activities constitute an important part
of the informal urban economy, which contributes to 44 per cent of Medellín’s eco-
nomy (DANE 2019). According to EPM, asmany as 70 per cent of automobiles in the
city are washed in unauthorized facilities. The proliferation of unauthorized car-
washes has been facilitated not only by the abundance of water in the city, and the
integrated water network (Graham/Marvin 2001), but also by the high standards
of cleanliness and hygiene around the car culture. Here, the convergence between
water, technology and cultural habits helps to explain the proliferation of carwash
sites around the city, particularly in poor and disadvantaged neighborhoods. Ad-
ditionally, because informal carwashes are able to obtain water free of charge, they
can provide low-costs relative to their formalized competitors – something which
has contributed to constant demand for their services.
In the last couple of years, informal car washing activities have become high-
ly controversial not only because of the unsanctioned use of public space, noise
pollution and discharge of dangerous substances, but also for the constant waste
of potable water. The main local newspapers commonly argue that informal car-
wash sites expose large parts of the population to water insecurity because of their
wasteful use of a scarce natural resource (El Colombiano 2016). Historically, the
informal work of car washing has been socially stigmatized due to its association
with poverty, drugs and aesthetic impropriety. In some cases, this informal activity
has been criminalized, as is the case with the Colombian Criminal Code, article 256
mentioned above. Carwash workers, commonly referred to as alistadores, are usual-
ly young men who, for a variety of reasons, are marginalized in the formal market
sector. For many of these young men, work in carwash sites is seen not only as an
economic survival strategy, but also as a way to stay away from criminal activities.
It is estimated that some 10.000 people in Medellín derive their income from the
volatile economy of washing cars.
In recent months, this economy has become an alternative source of employ-
ment for refugees from Venezuela (Álvarez Correa 2019). As is true in other sectors
of the informal economy across the world, though, the unsanctioned, unregula-
ted nature of such activity makes them subject to constant conflicts with public
authorities. The police commonly enforce legal actions to confiscate car washing
equipment, to close down carwash facilities or to issue fines to car owners. Such
measures are justified on the grounds that informal carwashes violate a number
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of city ordinances, threaten public interests, and disturb the social order and the
aesthetics of the city.
The utility company has also increasingly targeted informal water connections
in an effort to reduce the levels of unaccounted-for-water, which amounts to 30.51
per cent of the water supplied (EPM 2019). For EPM, informal connections are hard
to ignore as they are seen as a major threat not only to the water availability per
se, but also to the company’s revenues. Despite techno-managerial efforts to secu-
re the efficient functioning of the hydraulic system, though, the company is con-
stantly being challenged by the ‘unruly’ nature of water.Water is a fluid andmobile
resource that is difficult to control and regulate. As water is distributed in the city
through kilometers of pipes, it leaks and disappears (Anand 2015). Water also me-
ans different things to different actors. While for carwash workers water is part of
a larger economic survival strategy and a way to secure a viable place in the city,
for EPM it is a scarce commodity in need of protection, and consumers have the
moral responsibility to pay for it.
Because informal connections are difficult to regulate, discourses of water scar-
city provide an opportunity to extend and reinforce control over water consump-
tion in carwash sites and to mobilize state support. The discursive construction of
water scarcity has been supported by the figure that nearly 34.400 m3 of water is
lost every month by informal carwash activities.The need to control this water loss
plays an important role in calling for formalization. Rather than blame carwashes
for future crises, the notion of water scarcity provides new possibilities for (re)or-
ganizing carwashes and (re)imaging carwash workers as consumers who are able
to pay bills on time and to adapt to a water saving culture.
Building Resilience Through Commercial Relations
Engineers of EPM tend to promote techno-managerial approaches as the main
strategy to control informal connections and to secure the proper functioning of the
water infrastructure system. Implementing sanctions, inserting valves to restrict
the flows of water, removing improvised pipes and confiscating equipment are
common mechanisms to eliminate, punish, ban and blame carwashes for the il-
legal and unsustainable use of water. However, neither technical nor managerial
solutions have been able to fully control water losses and recover revenues. Ack-
nowledging that informal connections are deeply embedded in complex socio-eco-
nomic and material conditions, the Commercial Department of EPM introduced
the Carwash Program in 2010 to facilitate the establishment of a culture of lega-
lity and the habit of saving water. What has been interesting is that the logics of
economic efficiency of EPM have pressed the company to create alternative arran-
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gements to cooperate with carwashes in order to prevent commercial losses.There
are 250 carwash sites that are currently part of the program aimed at formalization.
Informal carwash facilities have been operating in public space for more than
20 years and are frequently either family businesses or cooperatives ranging in
size between 2 and 20 members. Services are provided to a wide variety of vehi-
cles, including buses, taxis, private cars and motorbikes, with hand washing being
the most common method (figure 1). Informal carwashes offer a range of different
services, including exterior washing, waxing and interior cleaning.Workers are re-
gularly exposed to hazardous chemicals and dangerously uncomfortable working
conditions, and in most cases, they lack basic technical equipment or protective
uniforms.
Figure 1: Carwash site specialized in washing buses (Marcela López 2017 ).
The formal integration into the centralized water network has had the effect
of legitimizing informal carwashes, and this has a number of attendant advanta-
ges, including the improvement of their working conditions, stability in terms of
income, providing educational training, adequate working spaces, health insuran-
ce, uniforms, basic equipment as well as all required licenses. This is why carwash
workers see their official recognition as consumers as a key strategy to guarantee
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their permanence in the long-term.While conducting fieldwork, workers reported
that the main reason for joining the Carwash Program is to facilitate their formali-
zation.Here, the formal recognition by EPM that the carwashes – and by extension,
their workers – are a legal, tariff-paying consumer becomes a powerful tool to de-
mand better access to different goods and services. Formalization as a consumer
has an immediate effect on the social and economic resilience of carwash workers.
The following section explores how resilience in carwash sites is increasingly exer-
cised through a socio-technical system made of complex physical, commercial and
juridical interventions facilitated by the utility company.
Physical Infrastructures
Informal carwash sites are typically places that lack themost basic infrastructure in
terms of water, sewage, electricity and solid waste collection. To facilitate the for-
malization process, the utility company has physically intervened in carwash sites
with a wide range of simple technologies and minimal investments. One of the
main technical devices installed by EPM is a water meter. In carwash sites, a meter
basically operates as a device that assigns economic value to water by measuring
consumption in cubic meters. However, meters not only operate as mundane ob-
jects that control andmeasure the quantity of water being consumed, but also have
political capacities that shift according to specific geographical and socio-political
contexts. In some places, meters can become objects of political struggle while in
others they are perceived as tools of possible collaboration. For example, Antina
von Schnitzler (2016) shows how prepaid meters in South Africa became objects of
massive resistance during the apartheid struggle because of their association with
racial differentiation and discrimination. In a similar vein, Rohracher and Köh-
ler (2019) discuss how the installation of new metering devices for hot water in a
Swedish city became a political terrain in which issues such as high costs, uneven
distribution and segregation were contested.
Meter also have the potential to create new opportunities for cooperation and
recognition, while reflecting aspirations of modernity, progress, development and
proper behavior (Harvey/Knox 2012; Larkin 2013; Anand/Gupta/Appel 2017). In Ma-
puto,Mozambique, Baptista (2016) has drawn attention to the growing demand for
prepaid systems as a way to secure access to electricity in a city that never achieved
universal service provision. She shows how prepaid meters became surprisingly
popular because customers could save money, avoid debts, control electricity con-
sumption and reduce bureaucratic procedures associated with inaccurate bills. In
Medellín, water meters have been deployed in carwash sites to produce particular
environmental, ethical and commercial effects. Ameter, for instance, has facilitated
the active engagement of carwashes in resource management (for example, avoi-
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ding water-waste); preventing disruptions (for example, performing regular repair
and maintenance); and social responsibility (for example, paying bills on time).
For the utility company, therefore, water meters have been instrumental in en-
couraging carwashes to use less water, while also controlling leakages and damages
in the infrastructure network.Thanks to these material devices, EPM delegates ad-
ditional tasks to carwashes, including basic repair and maintenance functions that
facilitate the functioning of the centralized water network (Graham 2010; Schwen-
kel 2015; Baptista 2019). Itineraries that were traditionally part of EPM’s respon-
sibility – e.g., leak detection, maintenance of equipment, checking faulty meters
and cleaning of oil and grease traps – are now integrated in the daily routines of
carwashworkers in order to preventwater supply interruptions, high bills and envi-
ronmental problems. Rather than reducing carwashes to passive consumers,meter
technologies recognize them as ethical and political subjects involved in practices
of repair and maintenance.
Figure 2: Technical interventions in carwash sites implemented by EPM: Installment of
water meters, construction of drainage systems and provision of hoses. (Marcela López 2017).
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Water meters are only part of a more comprehensive set of socio-technical in-
terventions deployed by EPM and municipal authorities to manage and reorder
carwashes. The utility company has also installed, free of charge, basic hydrau-
lic infrastructure such as drainage systems, sewage connections as well as oil and
grease traps to avoid the direct discharge of wastewater and hazardous chemicals
into the storm drain system. These small-scale technical interventions introduced
new norms for urban aesthetics in which carwashes become active in controlling
wastewater disposal in order to prevent problems of pollution, smells and disor-
der. Additionally, the company has equipped facilities withwater saving devices (for
example, pressure washers and hosepipes) to avoid the constant waste of water (fi-
gure 2). According to EPM, the introduction of new equipment has contributed to
a steady decrease of water consumption from 400-500 m3 per month to 80-100 m3
per month.
EPM has also pushed for interventions by the municipality, focusing on in-
vesting in and upgrading streets and public spaces around carwash facilities by
greening parks, setting up benches and tables, and installing containers for the
disposal of rubbish and chemical waste. Additionally, the utility company has sup-
ported the work of carwash workers who, together with local artists, have painted
murals portraying their work on the facades of houses and local business (figure
3). All these small-scale interventions aim at creating a new social order and ur-
ban ‘aesthetic’ in carwash sites by transforming them into places that comply with
minimum planning standards to avoid potential conflicts with public authorities,
residents and consumers.
The utility company has also brought the work of carwashes into the city dis-
course by sponsoring exhibitions at the Antioquia Museum, one of the most im-
portant cultural institutions in Medellín. Exhibitions displaying the everyday labor
of carwash workers and the importance of this activity for the economic deve-
lopment of the city has served to bring political recognition and mobilize state
support. Additionally, these cultural events became important not only to crea-
te awareness among a general public, but also to educate the staff of EPM and
the municipality about the daily practices and collective expectations of this infor-
mal economy. The shaping of public discourse around carwashes has given more
power to the EPM Commercial Department to justify lower water tariffs, greater
investments in technical infrastructures. It has also facilitated negotiations with
municipal authorities and other EPM departments.
The Water Bill
As part of the formalization process, EPM issues carwashes a monthly bill. Rather
than resisting the payment for water, carwash workers agreed to pay because a
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Figure 3: Artistic interventions in houses and local business to visibilize the work of carwash
workers. (Deúniti 2018 )
bill enables them to actively negotiate their citizenship and to demand basic rights
from the state.More specifically, a water bill acts as an object that allows workers to
negotiate and strengthen their political claims to certain rights: the right to work,
to legally occupy public space and to build new relations with the water company
and other municipal authorities. The proof of payment of a water bill confers on
workers legitimacy and improves their ability to consolidate carwashes as legiti-
mate spaces of economic activity.
To facilitate the payment of monthly bills and prevent a “culture of non-pay-
ment”, EPM has established a financial incentive in the form of a “transitional ta-
riff”. Over the course of six months, EPM charges only 30 per cent of the total
consumption costs, and afterwards carwashes experience incremental increases of
2.5 per cent per month until reaching the full cost of a regular commercial tariff.
Paying a bill not only grants carwash sites with certain rights (for example, safe
and reliable water service, technical support, receiving a bill every month), but al-
so assigns responsibilities and obligations (for example, sustainable use of water,
avoidance of informal connections, leak detection and timely payment). Despite
EPM’s efforts to integrate carwashes as consumers, the material properties of wa-
ter continue to pose significant challenges to the formalization process. One of the
major issues of disagreements between EPM departments is the introduction of
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a lower water tariff for carwash sites. As water and solid waste collection services
are included in the same bill, negotiations to set up a lower tariff has put pressure
on both water and solid waste collection departments to reach an agreement. In
a meeting I had with different public authorities involved in the formalization of
carwash sites, ENVARIAS (a company acquired by EPM in 2014) refused to imple-
ment a social tariff because carwash activities produce hazardous materials that
need to be transported and disposed in designated sites thereby incurring higher
costs. The staff of the water department reminded ENVARIAS personnel that their
company was now part of EPM, and that their operating assumptions needed to be
synchronized with the larger corporate social responsibility strategy of the compa-
ny. This meant supporting the carwash program by offering a lower tariff for solid
waste collection.
The project leader of the Carwash Program initiative at EPM insisted on the
need to adjust the formula that calculates the prices to guarantee access to af-
fordable tariffs and avoid the accumulation of debts. He claimed: “Compañeros, the
formalization of carwashes is a social program and we should not forget to adapt
our structures to provide affordable water and solid waste tariffs as part of our cor-
porate social responsibility program.” In Medellín, affordability concerns are par-
ticularly important: as the city reported in 2014, 36.560 households disconnected
from water services for non-payment of bills (López 2016). Because of precarious
and volatile economic conditions, carwashes constitute a group that is particularly
likely to be disconnected for non-payment, which may pose significant challenges
to the sustainability of formalization as a resilience practice over time.The issue of
disconnection for non-payment could explain the reasons why some carwashes re-
main reluctant to be formalized, with incremental tariff increases rendering their
activities economically unviable.
With the introduction of a water bill, EPM aims at providing opportunities
to consolidate carwashes as sites of economic, ethical and environmental value.
Receiving a monthly bill has been an important incentive not only to actively mon-
itor and reduce water consumption, but also to make carwashes a commercially
efficient activity. A bill, which carwash owners calculate as part of their monthly
operating costs, helps the utility company to determine whether or not a particu-
lar carwash site can become economically and environmentally sustainable. In one
of my visits in February 2017 to the Carwash Trinidad, one of the first carwashes
impacted by the EPM initiative, the manager explained the broad motivation to
participate in the program in the following way:
Being part of the carwashprogramhas helpedus to bemore organized, to savewa-
ter and to bettermanage our finances. Now,we are able to offer ourworkers better
working conditions by providing them with appropriate uniforms and health in-
surances. Also, the program has helped us to professionalize, as we are able to
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deliver better quality services, build reputation and save money to invest in car
care products and maintenance of shared spaces.
A water bill has also empowered carwash workers to initiate negotiations with dif-
ferent municipal authorities. For example, a police officer mentioned that carwash
sites are using the EPM bill to avoid any kind of confrontation and punishment. He
also complained that it had become more difficult to penalize these sites because
workers often mobilize the bill as a way to prove that their activities are legally aut-
horized. In this way, the water bill becomes a quasi-legal instrument that workers
use to avoid having their equipment decommissioned and activities penalized with
fines. A water bill has been used to disrupt the clear boundaries between informal
and formal as it proves that carwashes have authorized access to water, even though
they do not have a license to appropriate public space.
As McFarlane (2012) argues, the relations between informal and formal are
never fixed, but instead are constantly negotiated and changeable over time. For
carwashes, crossing formal-informal boundaries provides diverse opportunities to
(re)negotiate their rights, and for this reason, confronts police officers with a di-
lemma: on the one hand, they have a duty to respond to citizen complaints about
disturbances generated by carwash activities in residential areas. On the other,
they cannot intervene in these sites because they are formally serviced by a pu-
blic institution. When police officers organize inspections at carwashes, workers
immediately get in contact with the staff of EPM, who feels obliged to mediate
conflicts in order to protect the formalization process. By paying a water bill, car-
wash sites increase their ability to frustrate police actions and actively mobilize the
utility company to validate their claims of citizenship. An examination of the way
in which a water bill challenges the artificial division between formal and informal
can provide new perspectives to think about informality.
The Law
Besides the investments in technical infrastructures and the implementation of
commercial mechanisms, legal instruments have also become strategic tools to
guarantee the resilience of carwash sites. Since 2010, the utility company has me-
diated and facilitated the establishment of a Car Wash Roundtable (Mesa Interin-
stitucional de Lavadores de Autos) to represent the interests of carwashes and to dis-
cuss concrete solutions to the problem of informal car washing. This roundtable
operates as a platform that brings together different municipal authorities, in-
cluding representatives from the offices of public space, mobility, police, human
rights, security, environment, economic development, and urban planning. This
alliance, whose members meet on a regular basis, provides opportunities to form
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new solidarities, articulate programs, assign responsibilities and manage common
budgets. Challenges can arise, though, when it comes to synchronizing the many
objectives of the representative agencies.
In November 2018, for example, I participated in a series of meetings organi-
zed by the roundtable to identify potential conflicts arising from the construction
of a bike lane adjacent to the airport and parallel to a street where multiple car-
washes have been consolidated. The EDU (Urban Development Cooperation), the
Department of Public Space and ENVARIAS (which is responsible for solid waste
collection) came together to discuss possible ways to address multiple challenges -
reducing traffic congestion, improving access to public space, and increasing the
supply of rubbish containers - without adversely impacting the daily operations of
the carwash sites.
EPM has also been working together with the Municipality of Medellín and
carwash workers to adapt existing legal mechanisms to support the formalization
process by changing water policies, redefining the use of public space and impro-
ving labor conditions. One of themain outcomes of this coalition was the issuing of
the Municipal Accord 85/2013, which is currently actively debated in the City Coun-
cil. This accord is the result of three-years of collective bargaining agreement, in
which carwash workers agreed to comply with the following set of rules to facilitate
their own legal status:
• Forbid the parking of cars that are not using carwash services.
• Restrict the hours of operation: From 6:00 am to 6:00 pm
• Avoid traffic congestions
• Forbid the parking of commercial trucks
• Use adequate carwash equipment
• Avoid obstructing pedestrian zones
• Keep equipment in good condition (for example, control of leakages)
• Maintain correct behavior (for example, use of adequate vocabulary)
• Forbid the sale and consumption of drugs and alcohol
• Forbid child labor
• Avoid high levels of noise
• Carry personal identification
By failing to comply with any or all of these guidelines, municipal authorities are
granted with the right to intervene at carwash facilities and issue fines.The creati-
on of this accord demonstrates the willingness of carwash workers to adopt certain
rules and regulations that would substantially restructure their social and econo-
mic behaviors. In exchange for these commitments, though, carwash workers will
be officially recognized as consumers, which will enable them to claim the right to
work, and to legitimize their position in further negotiations with public authori-
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ties. As such, the municipal accord becomes the first legal attempt to organize the
carwash sector, to address their needs and to protect their interests. The ultimate
goal is to transform this legal mechanism into a public policy that can be integrated
in future Municipal Development Plans, so that the assignation of public resources
can be allocated to secure the further development, consolidation and protection
of carwashes as a resilient activity.
Conclusion
This chapter provided a detailed empirical study of how resilience is operationali-
zed on the ground by examining the attempts to formalize carwashes in a city in
Latin America. I have demonstrated how EPM’s strong commercial logic - aimed
at reducing water losses and consolidating revenues - played a critical role in its
engagement with informal carwash activities. I have also shown that, because of
difficulties in controlling and regulating informal connections, a utility company
opted for finding alternative solutions that allowed carwashes to be formally inser-
ted into the centralized infrastructure network. Instead of disrupting or restricting
the flows of water by removing tubes and pipes, issuing fines and decommissioning
equipment, EPM recognized the necessity to cooperate with carwashes by formally
integrating them as consumers in the already-existing centralized network.
Drawing on STS and debates on urban informality, this chapter explored how
resilience is produced out of and mediated by discursive and material strategies
based on complex assemblages between human actors (staff of the utility compa-
ny, municipal authorities, carwash workers) and non-human entities (water, me-
ters, bills, laws). Firstly, EPM discursively constructed water as a scarce resource to
justify the formalization of carwash sites as consumers. Rather than blaming car-
wash facilities for the constant waste of water, notions of water scarcity opened up
new opportunities to position carwashes as political and ethical subjects actively
involved in practices such as water-saving, payment of bills, the repair of leaks and
maintenance of the infrastructure network.
Secondly, the Carwash Program implemented by EPMhas largely relied on a set
of socio-technical arrangements to make water formally accessible to carwash faci-
lities.The program centered on providing carwash sites with basic physical techno-
logies such as water meters to facilitate the measurement of water consumption,
as well as drainage systems and oil and grease traps to reduce the environmental
impacts and improve the aesthetic appearance. Additionally, the issuing of a water
bill and the establishment of a legal mechanism (Accord 85/2013) increase the abili-
ty of carwashes to access better water services from EPM and to demand from the
state recognition of their right to work and to access public space.The program has
so far received broad support from carwash workers, with 250 out of 310 informal
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carwash sites taking part in the program. A critical understanding of how carwa-
shes are motivated to be part of the program and their aspirations to be officially
recognized as consumers demands a greater appreciation of the political effects
of mundane objects and the possibilities they offer to build new solidarities and
forms of cooperation with the utility company and municipal authorities.
If the purpose of resilience is to help vulnerable population to adapt to and
survive socio-natural disruption, it is important to go beyond the alleged innova-
tion and creativity of low-income population and demand the intervention of the
state and utility companies. As I have shown, socio-technical configurations that
combine diverse physical, commercial and juridical interventions have been ac-
tively implicated in reducing the exposure of carwashes to conditions of precarity
and uncertainty. Although these socio-technical configurations have created new
capacities for building resilience, if the aim is to prevent more exclusion and mar-
ginalization, they need to be adjusted according to the heterogeneity of carwashes.
The contribution of this chapter therefore lies in its attempt to situate carwashes,
whether in Latin America or elsewhere, not only as spaces that report high wa-
ter losses, but also as critical sites for understanding how resilient solutionscan be
mobilized and implemented.
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Enhancing Urban Resilience After the 1995
Kobe Earthquake
Parks and Open Spaces as a Multi-Functional Resource 
Florian Hendrik Liedtke
Changing ecological and socio-economic circumstances ranging from global war-
ming, economic decline or shifts in social compositions can pose risks to the via-
bility and livability of the built environment. Urban Resilience describes the ability
of a city’s social and physical elements to withstand and recover from such distur-
bances (Meerow et al. 2016: 39). It is critically important in the face of the diverse
risks posed by natural disasters. In cases like the Kobe earthquake of 1995, resilien-
ce in the sense of a return to normalcy, was only possible after an extended period
of extreme social-spatial dislocation. In order to better understand this process of
recovery and rebuilding, this chapter argues that space is one important, but little
studied, resource for the creation of urban resilience. This study elaborates on the
work of Carlow (2016), which treats space as a valuable resource for sustainable de-
velopment. Carlow argues that space, like other natural resources, needs to be con-
sciously planned for in urban development and needs to be shared equally between
current and future generations (Carlow 2016: 153-157). The present study suggests
that space plays a similarly crucial role as a resource in urban resilience. Space is,
by its very nature, decentralized, and multifunctional. It is a latent resource that
can be activated for different purposes. Space, in this analysis, is understood in
its morphological sense as a three-dimensional entity which is bound to land and
includes characteristic physical qualities such as topography, vegetation, and built
structures. In this perspective, space should be viewed as a resource that is similar
to building material, financing, and labor. In order to explore the significance of
space as a resource, this study examines the case of Kobe’s recovery from the Great
Hanshin Earthquake in 1995, where the disaster impact was exceptionally high and
available space was strictly limited by the surrounding topography.
This chapter specifically focuses on the way that parks and open spaces can
contribute to urban resilience in the wake of natural disaster. It suggests that the-
se spaces ought to be protected not just for their high value for urban life in normal
times, but also because their intrinsic qualities can significantly enhance urban re-
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silience in post-catastrophic scenarios. Parks and open spaces canmitigate disaster
impacts and contribute to a wide spectrum of recovery tasks through their multi-
functionality, their dispersal across cities, and their high integration into urban
daily life. To be clear, space does not in itself create urban resilience. Rather, it is
one of the resources that can be activated to mitigate the challenges – and enhance
the efficiency of – emergency relief, recovery, and rebuilding.
Methodology
This case study uses a broad range of material such as reports, census data, and
research conducted to a large part by the city of Kobe and Hyogo Prefecture. The
current analysis builds on the theory of resourcing for recovery developed by Chang
et al. (2010) and focuses on early and intermediate tasks in disaster recovery –
tasks which correspond to the emergency and restoration recovery cycle phases
described by Kates and Pijawka (1977: 1-2). According to Chang et al. (2010: 65-83),
“resourcing” refers to the acquisition and activation of resources in order to fulfill
key tasks in disaster recovery including sheltering, establishing support bases, and
reconstructing the built environment. The problems in disaster recovery are often
caused by resource shortages or bottlenecks in the resourcing process - shortages
that are determined, in large part, by the scale of the disaster impact and attendant
demand for relief and recovery services (Chang et al. 2010: 67). Chang et al. conclu-
de that pre-disaster resourcing strategies and resource availability are decisive for
recovery. They further argue that cooperation between stakeholders to make bet-
ter use of existing resources – or to identify alternatives – are essential elements
of disaster recovery (Chang et al. 2010: 77-78). Building on Chang et al.’s findings
(2010: 73-76), the present study analyzes space as a resource in four distinct ways:
• Identifying the characteristics of different types of spaces and determining
their suitability for discrete recovery tasks.
• Determining the accessibility of space, which is crucial for victims and sup-
porting actors who are involved in tasks like sheltering, debris removal, and
essential construction work.
• Understanding the legal frameworks that regulate the acquisition and use of
space through legislation and policy.
• Analyzing the exchange of user rights and properties, which might impact re-
covery timelines.
.
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Kobe’s Recovery from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake 1995
The city of Kobe, as part of Hyogo Prefecture, is located southwest of Osaka on
Honshu, Japan’s main island. Kobe is flanked to the south by Osaka Bay and to
the north by the Rokko Mountains. This topography naturally limits the expansi-
on of the city and contains the central urban area in a band between the sea and
mountains that is roughly 2 to 4 km wide and 30 km long (Umesao et al. 1999: 78).
The earthquake struck Kobe on January 17, 1995 at 5:46 in the morning with a
magnitude of 7.3 (City of Kobe 2014a: 1), originating from the epicenter near Awaji
Island 30 km southwest of central Kobe. The most severe damage was caused on
a small strip of land measuring roughly 5 by 20 km in the central city (EQE 1995:
1). The damage inflicted by the disaster was exceptional and constituted the most
severe catastrophe in Japan since the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake in Tokyo (City
of Kobe 2000: 10). Damage to the inner city was caused both by the impact of the
earthquake and by fires. To this day, unprotected gas storage tanks and heaters
in urban areas that are densely built with wooden buildings pose a major fire risk
in many Japanese cities (EQE 1995: 73). In total, 15 per cent of Kobe’s houses were
destroyed (City of Kobe 2010: 34) and traffic infrastructure, public facilities, and
economic functionality were badly damaged (City of Kobe 2000: 10).The earthquake
and the fires resulted in 4571 fatalities (City of Kobe 2014a: 4) and 230.000 people
were forced to find accommodation in shelters (City of Kobe 1995: 212).
After the disaster, a diverse set of recovery tasks had to be accomplished. They
included repairing the heavily damaged traffic and lifeline infrastructure, caring
for the victims’ mental health, providing emergency relief and shelter, and recon-
structing housing (Yamori 1997: 119). However, a lack of funding hampered recon-
struction, welfare provision, and the remediation of existing vulnerabilities in so-
me parts of the damaged areas. Instead, recovery efforts were concentrated on
prioritized public reconstruction areas (cf. City of Kobe 2011; City of Kobe 2014b).
As a result, some of the most impacted areas lacked the resources necessary for
adequate and timely reconstruction.
The Intrinsic Qualities of Open Space for Resilience: The Case of
Evacuation Shelters
Parks and open spaces possess intrinsic qualities that can greatly mitigate disaster
impacts, and that can be used to support a broad variety of recovery tasks. Plan-
ners and other stakeholders clearly recognize the value of green space as an urban
amenity. However, the following case of emergency sheltering for disaster victims
shows that open spaces need also to be recognized for their value as a flexible and
spatially accessible resource for urban disaster resilience. They should be seen as
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multifunctional resources that fulfill disaster recovery needs that dedicated shel-
ters – purpose-built, spatially fixed, and limited in supply – are sometimes unable
to do.
Immediately after the earthquake, many of Kobe’s citizens escaped their de-
stroyed or collapsing homes in order to seek refuge. On January 26, the number
of evacuees had grown to about 230.000 citizens (City of Kobe 1995: 212) shelte-
ring in 599 evacuation sites throughout the city (City of Kobe 2000: 10). Formally,
the disaster prevention plan of Kobe indicated 364 evacuation sites comprised of
public facilities and city owned schools. However, some of the designated evacua-
tion sites were themselves damaged or destroyed. Most of the intact sites quickly
became overcrowded, and others were inaccessible due to road blockages.The limi-
ted capacity of designated spaces for sheltering forced evacuees to use alternative
spaces. This included public facilities like schools and assembly halls, as well as
parks and open spaces (City of Kobe 1995: 212).
Designated shelters were designed as temporary facilities and did not have the
sanitary facilities, electricity, or privacy to function as a long-term shelter for such
a great number of users. Until 1995, evacuation sites in Japan were designed prima-
rily to meet immediate survival needs, as can be seen from the fact that emergency
shelters were provisioned with food and blankets adequate just for one or two days
(Yamori 1997: 119-120). However, in the case of the 1995 earthquake, many evacuees
were forced to live in shelters until water, electricity and infrastructure lifelines had
been restored, transitional housing built, and homes restored or rebuilt (Horiki-
ri/Odani 2000: 842-825). This resulted in an average accommodation time in shel-
ters of 8.5 months (ibid: 25), making long-term recovery support necessary (Yamori
1997: 119-120).
The adequacy of shelters is, to some extent, a subjective matter that depends on
the needs of users – in particular, their individual vulnerabilities and the duration
of their displacement. Elderly people proved to be particularly vulnerable to the
impact of the disaster, since they were typically less mobile and less equipped to
rebuild their homes. Consequently, elderly people made up a large part of the long-
term shelter inhabitants (Horikiri/Odani 2000: 821).They were also more impacted
by the deficient sanitary facilities and insufficient heating of designated shelters.
For the elderly and other vulnerable populations, upgrading of emergency facilities
was vital inmaking their long-term use bearable. Ongoing spatial improvements of
designated shelters included measures against the cold (e.g., the provision of sto-
ves and insulatedmats); the improvement of electric capacity of schools tomeet the
requirements of a high number of washing machines and fridges; and upgrading
of inadequate sanitary facilities in schools through the installation of additional
capacity.The lack of privacy in the crowded shelters was another major concern for
many residents. Due to a lack of resources, this hardship could only be addressed
at a very basic level, for example, by distributing cardboard room dividers to shel-
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ters in schools (City of Kobe 1995: 213-214). Neither the capacity nor the design of
designated evacuation sites was appropriate for use as mid to long-term shelter.
Designated shelters in the vicinity of residential areas could not accommodate
all nearby evacuees and often proved difficult to access due to blocked roads and
disrupted traffic infrastructure (City of Kobe 1995: 212). Faced with the spatial and
material design failures of designated facilities, evacuees used a variety of alterna-
tive spaces. The 364 designated shelters were thus complemented by another 235
sites, many of them improvised by evacuees in parks and other open spaces. (City
of Kobe 1995: 224). Because Kobe’s parks and open spaces are spread throughout
the city, they were easily accessible to residents of impacted areas, typically within
ten minutes walking distance of victim’s residences (Horikiri/Odani 2000: 823).
Compared to designated shelters, these spaces offered a wider spread of locations
in closer proximity to residential areas. Because of their distribution across cities,
parks and open spaces are particularly well suited for evacuation sites and shelters.1
The high number of evacuees in parks can also be linked to their proximity to pu-
blic institutions such as schools, temples, churches, or ward offices (Ikeguchi 1995:
107). All of these sites are well-known to local residents, and typically offer basic
sanitary and infrastructural capacity like bathrooms and running water.This again
highlights a beneficial quality of parks and open spaces for emergency: their visi-
bility in normal urban life is another feature which recommends their deployment
during and after emergencies. Because local residents can easily plot their course
to nearby parks and other well-known open spaces, they do not need emergency
managers to direct them to evacuation or emergency sheltering sites.
The right to use these spaces for the purposes of emergency sheltering and
support services was already well regulated through the disaster prevention plan
mentioned earlier. The establishment of shelters also did not require any trade of
user rights or land ownership, asmost of these spaces were already publicly owned.
All of this suggests why parks are such a rich latent resource. In times of crisis, these
spaces are spatially available to be used as shelter, and because they are public lands,
there are no legal barriers to their usage for evacuation and emergency relief.
There are however smaller physical barriers – for example fences and bushes –
which impede easy access to parks (ibid: 110). While these elements of landscape
architecture are important in peaceful times, they pose obstacles in the early and
intermediate phases of a crisis. If parks are to be efficiently used as evacuation
sites or spaces for temporary shelter, then physical barriers to access need to be
limited and easily removable (ibid: 113-114).
1 The spatial distribution of parks throughout cities is, of course, fairly typical, even in urban
environments where access to green space mirrors larger urban inequalities. One might ar-
gue that it is in the spatialized nature of urban parks to be decentralized.
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In general, three types of shelter organizations can be identified in Kobe’s parks:
1) an orderly, dense camping formation of cars and tents regulated by the muni-
cipality and supported by the Self Defense Forces; 2) unstructured and sparse for-
mations of cars and tents with less public regulation and support and 3) an agglo-
meration of tents or cars without any organization in formation. Evacuees based
their selection of parks on a variety of factors, including individual preferences for
supporting facilities, differences in density and resulting degree of privacy, and
proximity to family or place of former residence (ibid: 113-114). This diversity of
parks offered choices between different spatial qualities such as location, size, and
degree of organization.This was a range of choices that was missing in designated
shelters. Parks offer a way to address the individual needs of victims during the
demanding post-disaster period.
Although parks provided sufficient capacity for sheltering, other characteris-
tics (e.g., exposure to the weather and access to electricity and sanitary facilities)
limited their usefulness for the purposes of long-term shelter. To mitigate these
shortcomings, preexisting park features were adapted to meet essential needs for
sheltering: fences, pergolas, and playgrounds, for example, were used as storage
space for household goods and property (City of Kobe 1995: 107). Other structures
like soccer goals, huts, and playground slides were used to build shelter-alterna-
tives to tents (JILA 1995: 251), while sandboxes could serve as fire-pits. Evacuees
mitigated the effects of rainfall and cold by constructing tents on top of wooden
boards (Ikeguchi 1995: 113-114) and insulated and waterproof sheets (City of Kobe
1995: 214). Existing sanitary installations provided drinking water (Ikeguchi 1995:
107) until more extensive and efficient temporary sanitary facilities were construc-
ted (Hyogo Prefecture 1997: 2).The essential qualities of parks, namely their decen-
tralization, openness, and their integration into people’s daily life proved to be a
valuable resource for the task of sheltering in the days, weeks, and months after
the earthquake. As easily accessible, multi-functional spaces that offered evacuees
choices about their temporary homes, these spaces enhanced urban resilience by
easing the transition between disaster and recovery. The substitution of undesi-
gnated parks and open spaces for designated shelters fulfilled an essential function
during the initial phase of post-disaster recovery.
Open Space as a Flexible Resource for Diverse Recovery Tasks
Not only did parks provide valuable resources for emergency sheltering, but many
of their intrinsic qualities proved to be useful for a broad range of recovery tasks.
Just two weeks after the earthquake, the use of parks was expanded by the adminis-
tration, volunteer groups, and the Self Defense Forces. Parks were used: 1) as sites
of shelter; 2) staging grounds for recovery organizations providing medical goods,
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water supply, bathing facilities or registration for temporary housing; 3) construc-
tion sites for temporary houses; 4) spaces for the storage of either rubble or relief
goods (JILA 1995: 251). Moreover, the openness of parks provided a multi-functio-
nality that could accommodate multiple recovery tasks simultaneously, as can be
seen in figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1: Parallel uses of Susano-Park (0,4ha) clearly zoned into temporary housing > shel-
tering/ support > parking (Adapted from Nakase et al. 1996: 108). Figure 2: Parallel uses
of Minato-Chou-Park (0,7ha) with merging functional zones (Adapted from Nakase et al.
1996: 108 ).
The use of parks and open spaces as sites for the disposal and treatment of
huge amounts of disaster debris was important in the early disaster response and
throughout the city’s intermediate restoration. Since open spaces and parks pro-
vided storage space in close proximity to damaged areas, debris could be (more)
efficiently moved from blocked roads to be prepared for further treatment. This
was important to restore traffic infrastructure and prepare plots for reconstruc-
tion (Yamanaka/Nishimura 1999: 508). Parks and open spaces were a key site for
the transition from immediate disaster response to the longer-term restoration
of the built environment and everyday urban life. A whole range of park sizes ac-
commodated the various uses, ranging from small parks under 1000 m² to bigger
neighborhood and district parks (Ishikawa 2002: 837). Throughout the duration of
emergency response and the following phase of restoration these different park
sizes supplied space for sheltering, supporting activities, and temporary housing.
The fact that parks simultaneously supported these different tasks (Nakase et al.
1996: 108) highlights their multifunctional value for disaster resilience.
Parks and other green or open spaces also played an important role in mitiga-
ting earthquake and fire damage. Various examples in Kobe show how tree lines
in parks, along roads, or in front of buildings prevented fire from spreading (JILA
1995: 259). An example of this effective fire containment is the Sugaharadouri-Park
in the heavily impacted ward of Nagata (Yamamoto et al. 1997: 18). The fire approa-
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ching the Sugaharadouri-Park was stopped by fire-resistant plants which slowed
the spread of fire, and further retarded by the open space in the middle of the
park which functioned as a buffer zone. These green and open spaces effectively
reduced the impact of post-earthquake fires and protected dense residential areas
on the other side of the park (Yamamoto et al. 1997: 19). Green spaces in general,
and trees in particular, also helped to stabilize collapsing buildings. Along major
streets, roadside trees prevented collapsing buildings from falling on to street and
thus helped to ensure the integrity of essential infrastructure (JILA 1995: 251).These
examples show that green and open spaces functioned as barrier and buffer against
fire and a shield against collapsing buildings. Because green spaces and trees are
already existing features of the urban ecology, they proved to be ready and effective
resources in increasing the city’s resilience to the impact of the disaster.
Open Space as a Resource during the Restoration Phase:
Temporary Housing
Given the inadequacy of shelters as a long-term living environment, the provisi-
on of long-term temporary housing for disaster victims became a main priority
for the Kobe government (City of Kobe 1995: 300). In part because of their distri-
bution throughout the inner city, parks were widely used for this important task.
The availability of parks and other open spaces facilitated the rapid construction
of temporary housing in extremely challenging circumstances (Baumann 1998: 15):
just two months after the earthquake more than 20.000 units had been delivered,
which were supplemented by an additional 8.800 units by the end of May. Various
locations throughout the city were eventually used, comprising a total of 230 hec-
tares and nearly 30.000units of different types and sizes (City of Kobe 1996: 20).
Despite the rapid installation of temporary housing, difficulties in reconstruc-
tion, and especially the timely provision of public housing forced victims to endure
life in temporary facilities for as many as four years. By 1998, three years after
the earthquake, approximately half of the evacuees were still living in temporary
housing (Baumann 1998: 15-16).The last facilities were closed onDecember 20, 1999,
five years after the earthquake (City of Kobe 2010: 74).
Japan’s “Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act” formed the legal framework for
the use of land by the city administration. The Basic Act stipulated that any plot,
building or other structure could be used on a temporary basis to implement emer-
gency measures, independent of ownership (National Land Agency 1997: 37). In
theory, this created broad powers for the municipality to acquire land deemed ne-
cessary for rapid recovery. In practice, though, the acquisition of private property
could be both costly and time-consuming: while the city could take land, they had
to compensate property owners, and address potentially lengthy legal challenges.
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The situation with parks and open spaces was different. While the involved public
administrations had to pay for privately held property, publicly owned parks and
open spaces were readily available and did not require additional funding (Hyogo
Prefecture 2000: 17). The rapid construction of temporary housing and other es-
sential construction was made possible in part by access to parks and open space
that presented low legal or financial barriers.
By the time this construction phase concluded, the open spaces of parks and
school grounds containedmore than 30 per cent of Kobe’s temporary housing units
distributed across the city (City of Kobe 2000: 141). Four different types of tempora-
ry housing units were constructed in Kobe: 1) A two-room standard unit (JPA 1995:
33); 2) A smaller variation with one room (ibid: 37); 3) A special shared housing ty-
pe for elderly residents or those with disabilities (ibid: 45-46) as well as 4) Another
shared housing type for all residents (City of Kobe 1995: 275–276).The varying sizes
and locations of temporary housing compounds offered a diverse range of spatial
qualities, enhancing the capacity to match user-preferences for either smaller or
larger temporary housing complexes.
Initially, the Hyogo Prefecture administration constructed one-story standard
units of 26 m² in Kobe. As the limitations on available land became clear, the 26
m2 designwas soon replaced by 20m² single-story constructions. In order to quick-
ly supply housing for themost vulnerable evacuees, and tomeet the needs of elderly
and disabled residents, larger two-story units were constructed in 21 parks in the
inner-city, allowing residents to stay in their old neighborhoods (ibid: 275–276). La-
ter, and again in response to the limited availability of space and the large number
of evacuees, the city deployed another two-story shared type construction (City of
Kobe 1996: 21). In the ”Comprehensive Strategy for Recovery, 2010”, the City of Kobe
advised a more extensive use of shared-use type units for future recovery actions,
noting that they could be rapidly deployed at low cost in relatively small spaces.
As an added benefit, the Comprehensive Strategy noted that this type of housing
promotes daily interactions between the residents, creating the conditions for the
development of new communities (City of Kobe 2010: 72). While the standardized
26 m² units can be viewed as an effective way to quickly provide temporary housing
space, the smaller 20 m² units and the two-story type were a more resource-con-
scious reaction to the depletion of suitable urban space in Kobe.The variety of unit
types represents different approaches to the acquisition and improvement of space
– approaches that focused either on quick supply or space saving construction.
The variations in unit types, compound sizes, and locations might have given
evacuees greater choice between different kinds of communities and/or proximity
to former neighborhoods, and this could have enhanced a feeling of normalcy and
continuity for victims. However, the city missed the chance to take advantage of
the spatial diversity of parks and open spaces when it launched a rehousing sche-
me that allotted residents to sites and units via a lottery (City of Kobe 1995: 298).
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This reduced the potential for building solidarity whichmight result from choosing
homes near places of former residency.
To summarize, Kobe’s intense and diverse use of parks and open spaces is a
sign of their value as a versatile resource for urban disaster resilience.These spaces
are already socially and spatially well integrated into the urban system and their
use is legally sanctioned. Parks and open spaces also have inherent qualities that
allow for multi-functional usages; and a spatial flexibility that makes them well-
suited to meet the individual needs of victims during disaster recovery.
Conclusion: Parks and Open Spaces as Effective and
Multifunctional Resource
Open spaces in general, and parks in particular, proved to be a very useful resource
for immediate and intermediate recovery tasks in Kobe.The fact that parks are va-
luable for urban resilience is already recognized in Japan and has been documented
in technical manuals such as “Technical Notes and Guideline Proposal on Planning
and Implementation of Disaster Prevention Parks” (Ministry of Construction 1999).
This case study, however, uncovers the reasons for their usefulness by viewing space
as a resource. It concludes that the resource-conscious use of open space can lead
to a higher disaster resilience and an improved recovery process.
Figure 3: Use of open spaces around residential areas for different recovery tasks. (Author’s
Rendering).
Parks and open spaces are important resources for urban disaster resilience,
particularly for temporary uses during the phases of emergency and restoration.
Because their acquisition and use by public actors and victims alike is legally uncon-
tested, and because these spaces are familiar, well integrated elements of the urban
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form, they are easily accessible from endangered residential areas. Their openness
makes them well-suited to new construction or the adaptation of temporary struc-
tures to aid different tasks. In combination with the high number and variety of
parks in Kobe, their multi-functional quality helped to mitigate limited space and
changing circumstances through a highly flexible network of recovery actions, as
depicted in figure 3. This included different forms of sheltering, supporting bases,
temporary housing, and debris storage.
The findings of this study show that planners and policy makers should realize
the value of parks and open spaces as a resource for urban disaster resilience. In
conclusion, planners andmunicipal authorities should develop resilience strategies
that include parks and open spaces before disasters such as the Hanshin Earthqua-
ke occur. This includes the maintenance of extensive and varied open spaces di-
spersed throughout the city. These spaces can potentially serve different functions
during the disaster relief and recovery phases, and can create flexibility in respon-
ding to unanticipated problems. In the absence of disasters like the 1995 Hanshin
Earthquake, these spaces serve as an important urban and ecological amenity that
has been proven to improve quality of life for city residents.
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Transportation as a Resilience Enhancing Tool
Urban Dualism and the Latin American City
Diego Silva Ardila
In the last decades, and with increasing intensity in recent years, resilience has
become an important intervention framework for imagining the future of urban
settlements (Zhang/Li 2018). Policy makers, politicians, bureaucrats, urban plan-
ners, academics, and others regularly advance the narrative that cities need to de-
velop robust capacities to overcome diverse shocks. In Latin America, this concern
with crisis is understandable. The cities explored in this essay have experienced
environmental adversities, persistent urban violence, massive immigration flows
and debilitating economic crises. Over the mid and long-term, though, these cities
have continued to deliver urban services, economic prospects and collective goods
that attract population, improve quality of life, and urban amenities. This seeming
paradox – between crisis driven narratives and existing pertinacity– is one of the
reasons that resilience as a concept, discourse, and practice has found such a re-
ceptive audience in Latin American urban policy frameworks. All of this, though,
raises several questions. The first question pertains to the novelty of the resilience
framework. Is ‘resilience’ really something new or is it rather part of the DNA of
cities, as Vale and Campanella argue (2005)? Second, is resilience a quality or cha-
racteristic that develops organically over time, or is it possible to fabricate resilience
within urban frameworks? If it is possible to ‘create’ resilience, what areas should
planners and designers target? Too often, analysts, policy makers, politicians and
private sector actors call for more resilient cities, without really questioning what it
is they expect to create, and how that might be different from what already exists.
The failure to ask and answer these questions has a number of potentially nega-
tive consequences, not the least, that it opens up resilience frameworks to a variety
of neoliberal actors and interests (e.g., transnational insurance companies and glo-
bal financial markets (Evans/Sewell 2013; Lamont/Hall 2013)). This does not mean
that resilience as an analytical framework should be excised from urban policy dis-
cussions, or that all resilience building projects are neoliberal. Rather, it suggests
that an historically informed approach to contemporary urbanism debates can help
us to distinguish between resilience narratives that are driven by a neoliberal agen-
da, and those that have the potential to create more just, equal, and accessible ci-
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ties. In this chapter, I examine the differing roles of urban transportation in four
Latin American cities in order to 1) identify urban resilience enhancement logics
under specific urban social dynamics in the region and 2) understand tensions bet-
ween private and public sector approaches to resilience building.
In the introduction to this work, Dorothee Brantz and Avi Sharma argue that
recognizing the asymmetrical power relationships between the different actors is
extremely important for understanding the dynamics of resilience in discourse and
practice. This point should equally be made for research into dynamics of urban
transportation, where powerful political and economic interest groups (dis)engage
with the needs and demands of local populations. While these negotiations pro-
mise to meet the needs of the population as a whole, they tend to marginalize the
voices of the most vulnerable citizens. Resultant gaps in service have generated a
range of alternative interventions aimed at remediating this unequal access. Re-
cent urban transportation interventions aimed at ameliorating the circumstances
of marginalized persons can offer insights into efforts to build more inclusive re-
silience frameworks for Latin American cities.
By exploring transportation as an infrastructure for resilience enhancement,
I hope to demonstrate that there are, in fact, two resilience processes that are si-
multaneously at work in many (Latin American) urban areas. On the one hand, one
sees a wide range of urban planning and top-down actions that have developed
over the longer history of cities as a way of managing disruption and mitigating
shocks. On the other hand, there is an organically developed complex of resilien-
ce practices that citizens use in their everyday lives to navigate the city (Castillo de
Herrera 2009). Researchers from a wide range of disciplines tend to define the first
complex of practices as “formal” and second one as “informal”, and many scholars
argue that Latin American cities are the sum of a formal and an informal city (Ama-
to 1970; Gilbert 1996; Castillo de Herrera, 2009). This has been a richly productive
body of scholarship, but I want to approach the cases from a slightly different per-
spective to add a new dimension to debates about in/formality. I argue that these
two tendencies – the formal and informal – are so historically entangled and so
mutually constitutive that they must be seen not as distinct and discrete spaces,
but as what may be conceptualized as an ‘urban dualism’ that is much more than
the sum of its parts. By using the term ‘urban dualism’, I hope to advance an in-
terpretation that emphasizes the constant co-creation of two allegedly distinctive
spheres, and to show how power and vulnerability create the urban form through
dynamic interaction.
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Metropolitan Configurations in Latin America during the 20th Century
Across Latin America, the 19th century saw the end of more than three centuries
of oppressive ties with the Spanish Empire (Castells 1973; Carmagnani 2004). In
that period of new nation-state formation, the attendant social, political, legal and
economic transformations dominated the discourses among political elites, most
of whom were concentrated in former colonial political capitals (Almandoz 2002;
Mejía Pavony 2013). These upheavals – and the military conflicts that were com-
mon in the last decades of the century – created some spaces for social mobility
within urban environments. Because economic activity across the continent con-
tinued to be essentially focused on mining and agriculture, though, the period of
decolonization saw rural areas change far more than urban ones (Cerrutti/Berton-
cello 2003). Only in the 20th century did industrial manufacturing truly begin to
draw the working poor to Latin American cities.
Of course, there were dramatic differences in the urbanization patterns of La-
tin American cities, with factors like geography, demography, and access to global
markets shaping the temporalities of urbanization (Almandoz 2014). In general,
though, it can be said that the leading cities in Latin America – among them Bue-
nos Aires, São Paulo, Mexico City and Caracas – adopted innovations like electrici-
ty, railroad systems, radio, cinema, automobile, and other technologies earlier and
more fully than elsewhere. Cities became attractive for populations who were able
to afford the new urban lifestyle, but it also drew poor migrants from the coun-
tryside. Ideas about “modernity” came to dominate the minds of urban dwellers
in Latin America, while modernization transformed the material fabric of urban
landscapes (Almandoz 2002, 2013b, 2014; Mejía Pavony 2013).
While the first decades of 20th century saw relatively slow urban growth, the
decades after World War II saw dramatic transformations. During these decades,
urban growth accelerated to a level that overwhelmed cities’ capacities to react,with
new housing construction and infrastructure failing to meet dramatically increa-
sing demands (CEPAL 1963; Greenfield 1994). It was at this moment of urban acce-
leration that dualism emerged as an attribute of large and rapidly growing cities
in Latin America (Abramo 2003; Castillo de Herrera 2009; Mejía Pavony 2013). Ex-
plosive urban growth is not unique to Latin American cities – indeed, cities across
the globe have experienced these kinds of transformations. What was, perhaps,
unique was the way in which different actors in Latin American cities addressed
the negative consequences of rapid urbanization. In cities like Bogotá,Mexico City,
Lima or Caracas, low-income and elite urban dwellers developed an asymmetrical
but still symbiotic relationship aimed at managing extreme housing scarcity and
inadequate infrastructure (Mejía Pavony 2003; Almandoz 2014).
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The most remarkable example of this process is the allocation of land for
housing. Housing in fast growing Latin American cities was allocated and built
by state actors, with market-based financing strategies playing a subsidiary
role. In their capacity as landowners, capital holders and governmental actors
played a crucial role in crafting these programs. During the second half of the
20th century, when experiencing urban massification, top-down strategies like
publicly financed housing were important for managing housing scarcity. Other
kinds of bottom-up strategies – land invasion and occupation, for example –
also became common. These alternative housing strategies of the urban poor are
widely thought to constitute the origins of the so-called informal city. Sometimes
portrayed as a confrontation where new urban dwellers invaded vacant land to
build homes, these processes were in fact typically aimed not just at securing space
but bypassing urban building regulations. To be clear, it is essential to recognize
that occupying space is not just about gaining access to land but evading the
authority of restrictive regulatory regimes. The “informal” cities, contrary to the
most common narratives, emerged in cities in Latin America with the consent of
different elite actors.
Indeed, in many cases, elite groups facilitated the occupation process in order
to enable building projects that would otherwise have been derailed by building or
other regulations (Castillo deHerrera 2009; Almandoz 2014).When land occupation
did in fact occur spontaneously, and when confrontation emerged, elites tried to
recover their value by using legal practices to collect the money via governmental
policies or via “formalization” strategies (Castillo de Herrera 2009). So, informal
developments were not spontaneous and discrete phenomena separated from the
rest of urban dynamics, but an entrenched and entangled process that involved
economically and politically privileged urban actors.
Alan Gilbert has argued that traditional informal/formal approaches to Latin
American cities treat the informal sector as “the sector of last resort, whose func-
tion is merely to help sustain those whose labor is not required in the capitalist sec-
tors of the economy. It performs no effective economic role and contributes nothing
to the modernization process” (Gilbert 1998: 16). Gilbert’s analysis fails to capture
the complexity of the “informal” economy and its role in society more generally.
In fact, contrary to what Gilbert argues, informal sectors are critical dimensions
of the economic and political organization of Latin American cities, underpinning
both processes of modernization and modernity narratives. Indeed, Latin Ameri-
can cities were able to manage periods of explosive urbanization – and attendant
pressures on urban services – precisely because new urban survival strategies that
bypassed urban regulatory regimes operated parallel to and in tandem with insti-
tutional policy agendas (Almandoz 2014). The present chapter offers the concept of
urban dualism as a way of understanding this symbiotic relationship of the for-
mal and informal sectors and shows that this entanglement was part of the very
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formation of Latin American urbanities. The enduring capacities of cities in Latin
America to function in the absence of transparent, robust and comprehensive local
governance is a consequence of urban dualism that creates capacities that func-
tion not as “best case scenarios,” but second-best solutions.The emergence of what
I have called urban dualism during the second half of the 20th century points to
the active linking bonds between local elites and low-income inhabitants. Resilien-
ce should, in this sense, be observed and analyzed as a complex of social practices
resulting from the interaction, bargaining and negotiations between ruling elites
and low-income communities in cities in Latin America.
Urban Dualism and its Manifestations in Urban Transportation in Latin
American Cities
Urban transportation solutions in Latin American cities grew in tandem with po-
pulation growth and spatial expansion in the second half of the 20th century. By
the 1950s, for example, only Buenos Aires had a developed underground metro sys-
tem1, while Mexico City inaugurated its subway system (Metro) only in 1969 as a
project complementing large-scale investments in public works for the 1968 sum-
mer Olympics. São Paulo and Santiago implemented Metro services in the mid-
1970s, with four other Brazilian cities, and Caracas in Venezuela following suit in
the 1980s (Figueroa 2005). Overall, Metro systems were quite rare because they de-
pended not only on substantial financial resources and coordinated government
action, but also a steady commitment from national level governments (Almandoz
2013a).
1 Buenos Aires is an exceptional case that opened its first subway line in 1913. By 1955, the city
hadfive lines anddeveloped abus irrigation system that facilitated themobility of thousands
of urban dwellers. (Figueroa 2005).
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Figure 1: Buenos Aires “Subterraneo” (Silva Ardila 2012 ).
In contrast to metro systems, which are still relatively rare, the most com-
mon transportation solution in Latin American cities was the urban bus (Almandoz
2013a; 2014). By the mid-20th century, urban growth put pressure on the existing
transport systems, but it was politically complicated to increase fares.This, in turn,
made the expansion of networks impossible. As Figueroa has shown, though, small
companies that established bus routes provided an alternative to other transport
services (Figueroa 2005: 112). This was a process that occurred spontaneously, lar-
gely without coordination by the urban authorities.
The principal advantage of the bus was its flexibility: companies could change
their routes quickly and regularly extend their service to the edge of the city. So, by
the 1950s large cities in Latin America had incorporatedmotorized bus systems that
either replaced or ran parallel to already existing horse-drawn or electrical trams
(Figueroa 2005; Almandoz 2002; Mejía Pavony 2013). Urban buses, typically owned
either by a private company or individual owner-operators, provided transporta-
tion services that used organic route-design and profitability calculations to reach
a maximum number of riders. Minimally regulated and using local government
permits resulting from interaction between bus operators and local officials, the-
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se buses supplemented inadequate transportation services, providing low-quality
employment for drivers and ticket-takers, and generating profits for company ow-
ners (Figueroa 2005). Oscar Figueroa argues that, by the 1960s, “the bus systems
in all of the cities (Buenos Aires, Mexico City, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Lima)
were run mainly by private companies.” And while “the form of those companies
differed widely… those differences reflect the different histories of transport deve-
lopment of each city” (ibid: 113). While urban buses added capacity to inadequate
transportation infrastructure, they did not fully service the needs of residents of
fast-growing Latin American cities: “under these circumstances, public transport
has not fulfilled its social function and has become another source of congestion
and disorganization.Most operators increasingly used smaller buses and toomany
bus companies run old buses,which contain large numbers of standing passengers,
along routes crowded with other traffic” (ibid: 119).
Limited transportation and mobility solutions make urban dwellers more vul-
nerable in a whole range of ways: for economically vulnerable persons, for example,
it can make access to work and urban amenities extremely time-consuming and
costly (Figueroa 2005).This, in turn, can lead to higher levels of unemployment, lo-
wer levels of educational attainment, poor health and other negative outcomes – all
of which have a direct impact on the levels of urban violence, economic capacities
and social relations that affect urban resilience. In a direct response to the ina-
dequate provision of public transportation, different spontaneous forms of urban
mobility have evolved across Latin America. While these are sometimes viewed as
isolated and ad hoc, they are deeply entangled with local economic powers. These
ad hoc infrastructures show how vulnerable communities adapt to gaps in public
service provision. This was not, however, simply a matter of vulnerable urban po-
pulations filling a gap in services left by elite actors. In fact, elite actors played an
important role in facilitating these adaptations by providing resources and estab-
lishing alliances that defined and limited the possibilities of transportation solu-
tions that appear to have emerged organically. Capital allocation, the creation of
legal frameworks, policy design and implementation, police and juridical support
are just a few of the areas where elites supported allegedly informal activities. (Silva
Ardila 2020).The cases of Buenos Aires, Bogotá,Mexico City andMedellín highlight
several elements that can illuminate issues of urban dualism, and resilience nar-
ratives and practices. The distinctive urban transportation cases presented in this
chapter operated in different contexts, and with different assumptions and levels
of regulation, that produced different solutions. As I hope to show, these outcomes
do not easily correspond to specific economic, political, or ideological models. In-
stead, I hope to show that resilience is a collectively produced attribute of urban
landscapes that is defined by contextual constraints.
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Remises in Buenos Aires: Solutions for Individual Needs
By the end of the 1950s, Buenos Aires had a consolidated rail-based system and
a solid network of buses servicing neighborhoods in the expanding metropolis,
but taxi services were also widely used by growing upper-middle income inhabi-
tants. Beginning in the early 1920s, taxi service was regulated by the municipality
to protect drivers and passengers, with emphasis on reducing long working hours.
Because the supply of drivers was not increased, though, this led to shortages in
availability – particularly during the evening hours that saw high demand from an
expandingmiddle class whowanted to use urban amenities like the theater, restau-
rants, and dance venues (Clichevsky 2000). As an expected market reaction, inde-
pendent automobiles (privately owned, often unlicensed and unregulated) started
offering services door-to-door from the central city to peripheral neighborhoods.
These services – called remise from the French, and sometimes castilianized as remís
– quickly grew in popularity, offering services from informally designated collec-
tion points during the evening and nighttime hours. During the 1960s spontaneous
gathering areas in the city center transformed into permanent facilities known as
remiserías. Similar little stations and offices popped up in the neighborhoods (Cli-
chevsky 2000; Gutiérrez 2012).
Initially remiseswere similar in form and service to regulated taxi services, with
well-maintained automobiles and elegantly dressed drivers providing the experi-
ence expected by sophisticated middle-income urbanites. However, despite steady
growth, remis services were never regulated, instead functioning as an informal
strategy of satisfying a specific urban demand. It is important to note that, at least
in the 1950s and 60s remis services operated only at specific times of the day and
were not, therefore, in competition with existing taxi services. In the 1970s, though,
the growing remis system evolved in response to a more profound fragility of ur-
ban mobility in the city: identifying gaps in service provision to peripheral neigh-
borhoods, the remis model generated strong incentives to invest in an alternative
network that was designed to serve (and draw profit from) under-served areas of
the city, Susana Kralich states that remis proliferation and explosive growth during
the 1980s and especially 1990s responded to unemployment growth, self-employ-
ment entrepreneurship initiatives facing the economic crisis and the incremental
demand growth caused by the deterioration of public transportation services (Kra-
lich 2005: 1) Spontaneous allocation of neighborhood remiserías facilitated the pro-
vision of local short-distance trips covered neither by the inflexible metro system
nor by the bus routes.
The expansion of the remis across the city generated several financial and other
innovations, with groups of drivers pooling resources to invest in automobiles, fa-
cilities, and publicity. Pressures emanating principally from invested capital and
resources forced remises operations to run on a 24-hour basis, and this expanded
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service provision was facilitated by loose police oversight. It was not until the 1980s
– when the system was ubiquitous in metropolitan Buenos Aires - that the remis
was labeled as “private service of public interest” in order to initiate the much-
needed regulatory intervention (Kralich 2005). The remis system was neither a cen-
tralized nor a planned solution, but an organically organized one that developed
in response to inadequate service in a rapidly expanding urban marketplace. It is
worth pointing out that, while this spontaneous and decentralized transportati-
on intervention resulted from the identification of market failures – periods of
no service, areas that were underserved – it was also critical in meeting the needs
of vulnerable citizens living in peripheral neighborhoods. While solutions did not
come from state actors, or even regulated private-sector actors, the remis did ul-
timately constitute a parallel infrastructure that provided low-cost transportation
solutions to many people who were otherwise excluded.
The economic crisis of the 1990s saw thousands of unemployed factory workers
find temporary employment in the remises (Gilbert 1996; Kralich 2005; Blanco 2010).
Newly unemployed workers with some available capital invested into existing remís
cooperatives, and while this generated intensive competition, it also allowed ex-
tremely precarious individuals and families to reach subsistence levels during the
hardest years of the long-lasting economic turmoil (Kralich 2005).
Remisesmoved from discretionary and sporadic trips to a more frequently used
service within the city, particularly due to the competitive prices. And when tou-
rism (mainly due to the attractiveness of exchange rate advantages) sky-rocketed,
the remises became a good source of dollars access in an economy that had limi-
ted access to foreign currencies. This is not, in any way, a normative argument
about whether spontaneously evolved, under-regulated, market-driven alternative
transportation infrastructures should be a solution tomobility gaps in fast growing
cities. It is not, in other words, my purpose to argue that this is a ‘good’ model or a
‘bad’ one. Rather it is an attempt to show how these alternative mobility infrastruc-
tures developed, functioned, and ultimately stabilized mobility gaps and economic
livelihoods in the context of a rapidly expanding urbanity. The case of Bogotá, ex-
plored directly below, offers different insights.
Bogotá and the Struggle for Public Regulation in Highly Privatized
Transportation Contexts
In 1948 in Bogotá, a young presidential candidate named Jorge Eliécer Gaitán –
openly opposed traditional elites and with a high likelihood of victory – was mur-
dered in the streets when leaving his office for lunch. In less than twelve hours of
rioting, still remembered as the Bogotazo, substantial parts of the city’s core were
badly damaged by angry supporters (de Urbina González/Zambrano 2009). What
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happened next was perhaps more surprising. Over the next several days, as do-
cumented by de Urbina González and Zambrano (2009), unscrupulous real estate
owners and developers took the opportunity to demolish dozens of buildings that
were protected by historical preservation regulations (Aprile-Gniset 1992; de Urbina
González/Zambrano 2009; Niño Murcia/Reina Mendoza 2010: 78).
On the April 9, 1948 protesters destroyed a publicly owned tramway connecting
downtown with some of the urban expansion areas in the north and west sections
of the city.Three years later,Mayor FernandoMazuera decided –without consulta-
tion with the tramway company’s governing board (Mazuera 1972) – that the tram
line was no longer needed. He ordered public works employees to cover the tracks
with asphalt, paving the way for a privately owned and operated bus service to ex-
pand operations. In Bogotá, private interests ruled urban transportation services
during the next five decades.
This privileging of private transportation providers in the 1950s and 60s is one
reason why unregulated bus service gradually replaced the publicly owned tram-
way company, but these networks also grew because they filled a genuine need for
connectivity to new neighborhoods during the peak years of urban expansion. In
Bogotá, every neighborhood had an urban transportation provider that was focu-
sed on connections with the downtown area, which was primarily a commercial
district (Acevedo 1990). During the 1980s each company created a small geographi-
cal monopoly, functioning as the sole service provider for captive neighborhoods.
Monopoly attributes implied that companies could reduce their service standards
without fear of customers choosing alternative transportation providers (Acevedo
1990; Ardila Gómez 2004; Figueroa 2005). Service was provided using a franchise
scheme that was commonly labeled as “Guerra del Centavo” (war of the pennies),
which described the aggressive and sometimes violent competition. During this
period, bus operators essentially “rented” the right to sell their services on designa-
ted routes from a small number of private companies who owned official permits
that allowed them to provide bus service. It is important to emphasize that these
companies did not own buses. They owned the right to provide service along de-
signated routes, and then sold these rights on a concessionary basis. This complex
transactional network was extremely profitable for the companies holding permits;
it could be profitable for bus owners. For bus drivers, though, it contributed to ter-
rible working conditions, with low wages, long hours, and extreme pressure to fill
passenger quotas.
The poor quality of service caused anger among riders, but it was the chaotic
and often dangerous traffic in congested urban areas that drew public attention
(Silva Ardila 2016). While there was public pressure to resolve the situation, power-
ful stakeholders – including bus operators, permit owners, and local politicians and
public servants – involved in these quasi-monopolistic franchises had an incentive
to maintain the status quo, as it offered a steady income stream. The problem of
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concessionary bus transportation was discussed publicly for more than three de-
cades, but reforms were consistently obstructed by elites who were profiting from
the high demand for transportation solutions to everyday needs. Public policy was
constantly obstructed by elite groups who were profiting from the public’s basic
need for transportation services (Silva Ardila 2016).
In 1991, the landscape of transportation services began to change, in large part
due to transformational political events: in that year, a newly ratified Constitution
modified the territorial organization of Colombian provinces, granting increased
autonomy tomunicipalities. In this new scenario, local governments – increasingly
exposed to public scrutiny – experienced intense pressure to reform mobility in-
frastructures. Owners of transportation concessions also recognized that, if they
hoped to retain access to profitable routes, they would have to accept new forms
of service allocation (Ardila Gómez 2004). In this case, political transformations
created the conditions for new constellations of transportation policies. The poli-
tical changes did not, however, immediately displace vested interests (Silva Ardila
2016). Instead, political and economic elites turned to techno-infrastructural solu-
tions to address two of the primary areas causing popular anger: badly outdated
buses and congested arterial roads in downtown areas.
Resulting from more than a decade of debate about design and policy, and in-
augurated in December 1999, Transmilenio2 is a trunk-based bus system3 function-
ing with articulated buses that increase operating capacity. Using dedicated lanes
that reduce overall congestion, Transmilenio dramatically improved average com-
muting times in the city. While the design innovations – trunk-based systems and
dedicated transit lanes – are globally recognized transportation models, perhaps
the most important improvement was the upgrading of a large proportion of the
urban bus fleet, which won widespread approval from local citizens. The World
Bank reported this labeled “best practice” as “following pioneering experiences in
Curitiba and São Paulo and a recent successful implementation of the Transmilenio
system in Bogotá, Colombia, the bus based rapid transit (BRT) mode has emerged
as a great hope for cities interested in high-quality public transport services at a
moderate level of capital and operating costs (Hidalgo/Graftieaux n.d.). In Bogo-
tá, this widely implemented techno-infrastructural approach solved existing pro-
blems of congestion, pollution, and ease of access without taking control away from
the private companies who were largely responsible for the mess in the first place
2 Transmilenio officially designates the publicly owned regulatory agency of Bogotá, but it is
commonly used to mean the whole transportation system, which includes both thematerial
infrastructure (which is public) and the private bus operators.
3 A Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) or a trunk-based system uses large scale buses – sometimes bi-
articulated or tri-articulated – with a dedicated right-of-way and off-boarding fare collection
system similar to metro systems. BRT sometimes use a platform level boarding system that
forces the use of stations to board the buses.
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(Ardila Gómez 2004). While existing permit and concession owners had to adjust
their business model, they could retain control of their companies. The new urban
transportation system replaced large parts of the previously existing material in-
frastructure. It was, however, built upon the already existing networks of actors
and stakeholders. Transmilenio may not have addressed the issue of the influence
of special interests on politics at all scales, but it did largely resolve the most pres-
sing mobility challenges facing residents of this city of more than seven million
residents.4
4 Transmilenio ultimately modified but did not replace the business model that allowed the
majority of previous owners to retain their control public transportation. It did, however, also
create a new institutional capacity via the creation of a publicly owned regulatory, planning
and management company. While this new urban transportation system discarded most of
the previously existingmaterial infrastructure, it was constructed on top of existing networks
of actors and stakeholders. This was a solution that was adequate in terms of time, context
and interests and constraints, but not an ideal solution.
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Figure 2: Transmilenio at a downtown intersection where tramways were
asphalted in the 1950 (Silva Ardila).
Initially, at least, it appeared that Transmilenio’s impact would be relatively
limited in scope, constrained by the influence of other interests. The policy su-
perficially transformed the transportation service by substantially improving ser-
vice quality for a more engaged citizenship while retaining most of the economic
structures that had contributed to monopolistic control of urban transportation.
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Nevertheless, the developments in the last 20 years suggest that large scale cen-
tralized planning strategies have the potential to generate systemic disruptions
which profoundly transform deeply entrenched and organically developed infrast-
ructures: the success of the single bifurcated service line triggered continual ex-
pansion, with seven lines now servicing once peripheral neighborhoods and after
years of negotiations with remaining “traditional system” providers, a comprehen-
sive system was created under the label of SITP (Sistema Integrado de Transporte
Público) (Hidalgo/King 2014).The professionalization of urban planning and trans-
portation policy in Bogotá can be directly traced to the success of Transmilenio.
But this innovative system also modified behavioral patterns in the city in ways
that have led to a reorganization of the urban mobility patterns that service the
new bus rapid corridors: novel forms of transportation such as pedicabs, moto-
taxis, and collective taxis or vans emerged in different nodes of the urban lands-
cape to facilitate access to the central transportation corridors (Mejía-Dugand et al.
2013). These adaptations were entirely unanticipated by transportation designers,
but they are another manifestation of the urban dualism that is shaping cities li-
ke Bogotá over the long-term. Urban dualism is defined by continual adaptations
of the urban form. As such, it serves to create urban resilience, while also being
evidence of the resilience of the urban form.
Mexico City: David vs. Goliath
When Mexico City inaugurated its rail-based Metro system in 1969, it represented
a huge investment in the potential for transportation infrastructure to generate
urban transformation. Metro service, though, was never enough to satisfy the mo-
bility needs of the city’s rapidly growing population, and even as the municipal
authorities attempted to expand services, alternative transportation solutions –
the ubiquitous VW Beatle taxi, an expanded network of private buses, and private
automobiles – grew across the city. By the 2000s,Mexico City was a huge urban ag-
glomeration with a wide range of transportation alternatives, but it was still facing
a profound urban mobility crisis (Gilbert 1996; Montoya 2006).
The geographies of mobility in Mexico City also, though, very clearly marked
the city’s extreme economic inequalities. City residents literallymoved across space
in two distinct vertical planes. Low-income groups and vulnerable urban dwellers
travelled on the surface on buses and underground in the Metro, while those who
could afford private cars traversed the city using the stunning urban elevated Peri-
férico Highway – a “segundo piso” or “second floor” constructed since 2003 that allo-
wed them to use a 23 kilometer second story highway on top of a surface highway to
travel high above the congested surface arteries. In the 1980s, urban transportation
systems in Mexico City became a visible manifestation of the historical divisions
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between rich and poor (Rodríguez López/Navarro Benítez 1999). Two examples sug-
gest how transportation in this emerging mega-city can help us to understand the
dynamic processes that underpin urban dualism: Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) and bicy-
cle infrastructure.While it is not possible to discuss these examples in depth in the
present chapter, I do want to briefly discuss a couple of elements that show how
allegedly distinct formal and informal infrastructures and practices in fact emerge
in tandem.
The implementation of a BRT in Mexico City is a clear example of the way that
policy diffusion works: because of the triumphal narratives emerging out of Bogo-
tá, BRT-policies rapidly achieved aworldwide recognition as an urban best-practice
that could be easily replicated in diverse global settings (Wood 2015; Silva Ardila
2016, 2020; Montero 2017). In Mexico City, Metrobus adapted the “Bogotá model”
by using the BRT corridors as a complement to, and feeder for, the existing me-
tro lines. Rather than functioning as primary arteries across the city, the Metrobus
provided enhanced access to the Metro in a way that was similar to the ways that
alternative transportation services like collective taxis brought riders to the Trans-
milenio in Bogotá. Results varied during the following years and the model slowly
adapted to the conditions of Mexico City. But for the purposes of this chapter, I
want to highlight one unexpected product of the new system which emerged when
the construction of BRT corridors created new segregation spaces for urban mobi-
lity.
The premise of the BRT system is a simple one – create dedicated lanes for
buses which stop at regular loading platforms at scheduled times in order to take
on passengers in the most efficient way. The advantages of the BRT are many. The
dedicated lanes reduce braking times which grow asymptotically according to the
number of vehicles, mitigate “bunching”, and minimize lane changing.The relative
simplicity of BRT is one of the reasons it is so easy to replicate and is so effective
at speeding transit times and reducing traffic congestion. And as transportation
engineers have demonstrated through congestion studies, BRT does in substantial
measure realize these goals (Mejía Dugand et al. 2013).
What is surprising, though, is the way that the transport ecology adapted to
reduced congestion. Those without cars take the metro if it goes near their de-
stination, but otherwise rely on buses or collective taxis. In Mexico City, though,
middle and upper-income individuals who owned or could afford to purchase a
car responded to reduced congestion by driving more. In other words, more effici-
ent public transit in Mexico City incentivized a substantial segment of individual
users – those with the financial means to own cars – to drive in increasing num-
bers. Now heavily congested avenues provided specific lanes to the use of public
transport, thereby creating spaces for more individual automobiles in the remai-
ning lanes. This increased the average speed in the corridors but diminishes the
irrigation possibility of the system which at the end affects the most vulnerable
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making their commute more expensive due to the financial and physical cost of
reaching the corridors. The real problem in Mexico City was rising car ownership.
And as Rowland and Gordon have shown,when “people own a car, they use it” (1996:
112). Congestion and pollution remain at increased levels despite more sustainable
transportation alternatives.
Increased car traffic also made it more difficult for pedestrians to navigate an
increasingly car-centered urban environment: more cars traveling at higher speeds
now meant that pedestrians had to cross at designated crossings rather than fin-
ding a path through slow moving autos and buses. This problem was amplified
by the fact that dedicated bus lanes are separated from other traffic by a concrete
barrier, which means that pedestrians either have to cross streets at designated
crossing points or climb over a small wall. In some cities – Berlin or Munich, for
example – this might not have changed mobility in any noticeable way. But in La-
tin American cities,where pedestrians regularly share roadswith cars,motorcycles,
trucks and buses, this constituted a major change in urban rhythms. BRT in Mexi-
co City was a public solution based on global best practices, but it generated a host
of place-specific problems. These problems, in turn, led to another major public
intervention, this one, aimed at transit on two wheels.
Figure 3: Contesting urban transportation spaces (Silva Ardila).
Cycling is hardly new to Latin American cities and has long been a means of
transportation for the urban poor, and a cheap way of moving goods around the
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city. During the early 2000s – as city planners were introducing the BRT system
– urban policy designers simultaneously adopted an ambitious policy to enhance
biking infrastructure. However, with a vast increase in bike lanes across the city
during the last ten years – and a public relations campaign aimed at highlighting
the health, environmental, and aesthetic benefits of cyclo-mobility – bicycling has
become an increasingly popular way for some middle and upper-middle class ur-
banites to travel the city. Of course, this is part of a larger global trend towards
a certain brand of metropolitan citizenship. Because it is relatively new in Mexico
City, though, “bicycle culture” has generated tensions between drivers who are used
to “owning the road”, and cyclists who are staking claims to urban space. As the
city introduced bike lanes onto major arterial roads, neighborhood ways, and bou-
levards, these spaces became a new topography of conflict between combustion-
based commuters and human-powered alternatives.
These conflicts take on a particular dynamic in the present case because, unlike
projects in cities like New York, which was championed by Citibank, or the for-
profit bike-sharing ventures of companies like Jump (owned by Uber), the Mexico
City ECOBICI initiative does not focus on profitability nor does it target exclusive-
ly privileged areas. Mexico City’s comprehensive plan means that sharing the road
with bicyclists is not a predictable “inconvenience” confined to hip neighborhoods
or tourist districts. It includes most of the metropolitan region, and affects most
urban citizens, if only by changing customary ways of using the road. While the
bike initiative may generate conflicts based on customary and new usages in the
short term, there are good reasons to think that it will adapt and adjust in the fu-
ture for better functionality.The inclusion of a large public asset (the bike fleet and
the required technological equipment) and the creation of incentives for cyclo-mo-
bility in the form of a state organized, publicly funded bike-share system, should
be understood as adaptations to the unintended consequences of the BRT. In this
case, ECOBICI complements the BRT by providing mobility access to the consoli-
dated transportation corridors. And while these twin metropolitan strategies are
clearly informed by urban managers’ desire to provide a globally recognized brand
of urban amenity, it is also very intentionally focused on reducing the vulnerabi-
lity of low-income populations who have been isolated by changing urban spatial
practices.
All the urban adaptations to mobility poverty we have seen so far – the “private”
solutions in Buenos Aires; the public strategy that left private interests in place in
Bogotá; and the public-public approach to transit in Mexico City – can be seen to
produce ancillary challenges which, in turn, force adaptation. In the case of Medel-
lín, directly below, we see an extremely interesting alternative – one in which the
politics and land use practices of urban elites follows from and builds upon the spatial
appropriations of the most vulnerable citizens. While the danger of “capture” by
purely economic interests is possible, as shown by Marcela López’s chapter in this
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volume,my own research suggests that, if the rights of access to urban space of the
city’s most vulnerable residents can be protected by legal mechanisms, this need
not become a case of the rich taking over spaces that were urbanized by the poor.
Medellín: Wiring the Fragmented City
As we have already seen in Marcela López’s contribution to this volume, Medellín
has come to symbolize urban resilience on a global stage. Indeed, the UN Hub as-
sociated with urban resilience is now called the Medellín Collaboration for Urban
Resilience (MCUR) (UN-Habitat n.d). Some critics suggest that this resilience nar-
rative is simply good branding, pointing out that violence and inequality persist in
spite of the fact that Medellín is one of Colombia’s richest and globally networked
cities. These objections are not without merit, but it is worth remembering that –
despite a small uptick in violence in recent years – homicide rates are down more
than 95 per cent from their peak in the 1990s, and that economic development has
generated upward mobility for hundreds of thousands of people.TheMedellín case
offers us a dramatic view not just of tensions within resilience discourse, but also
of the urban dualism that is an important characteristic of the cities explored in
this chapter. From almost any vantage point in this city that sprawls across a steep
valley, it is possible to observe the ways that the “formal” and “informal” city co-
produce the urban form. Indeed, the city as it exists today was shaped in powerful
ways by the internal violence – drug cartel violence, paramilitary organizations,
rebel armies – that displaced so many of the Colombians who eventually moved
to Medellín. It is understandable, then, that advocates of resilience-based develop-
ment point to Medellín as a city that experienced and, in many ways, overcame a
profound urban crisis. By focusing on the urban dualism, we can better see how the
city and its residents have managed to “be(come) resilient” in the face of enormous
challenges.5 What follows is a brief discussion of a set of innovative transportati-
on policies centered on the aerial cable cars, and the ways that these have shaped
social and economic relations in the city, enhanced many of those attributes that
are associated with urban resilience, and created an easily replicated best-practices
model for urban integration.
The aerial cable cars were part of larger strategy that aimed to use municipal
financial resources and institutions to reduce violence and create economic oppor-
tunities. Here, state intervention was seen as the key to reaching urban locations
5 Without romanticizing Medellín’s transformation in recent decades – one that can be traced
to constitutional reforms in 1991 – it is clear that the city is less violent, better prepared for
environmental disruptions, and more accessible to its most vulnerable citizens.
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and populations that had never before been the target of public, collective, or go-
vernment initiatives. As in the case of the Transmilenio in Bogotá, new political
forces that were empowered by the constitutional reform of 1991 began to mani-
fest themselves in metropolitan politics in the early 2000s. In the case of Medellín,
though, new democratic initiatives and transparent programs directly challenged
entrenched corruption and vested interests in ways that, in Bogotá, they were un-
able to do. Later these successful policies were theoretically framed under the con-
cept of Social Urbanism (Montoya Restrepo 2014; Leite et al. 2020).Multiple projec-
ts were designed and implemented attempting to use public resources to enhance
the social fabric in a fragmented city. In Medellín, the fragmented materiality of
the city was the result not of a catastrophe or an economic or social crisis, but a
slow historical process that has seen elites fracturing urban space to create enclaves
and zones of distinction. Indeed, local elites have been building their segregated
spaces since the 19th century, when massification happened without control, regu-
lation, or political contestation (González 2010). InMedellín, fragmentation existed
by default.
In Medellín, low-income urban dwellers, mostly displaced rural populations,
learned urban life on their own. They built their own houses, created their own
public spaces, connected illicitly to public utilities networks, and created their own
transportation systems. During the 1950s and 60s, the Medellín of the vulnerable
was built at their own risk with little if any state intervention. In this context –
rapid population expansion with little state involvement in planning or infrastruc-
ture development – resilience capacities developed on an individual basis that was
slowly integrated into the city as part of a long-term process of urban consolidati-
on.Here, the topography represented a particular challenge: because steep hillsides
that were difficult to access were the only available land near the urban center, they
were a predictable – and predictably difficult – site for land occupation by vul-
nerable groups. In many of these areas, “walking home” could better be described
as hiking. And due to a lack of transportation service providers and limited finan-
cial resources, residents of these neighborhoods found themselves challenged not
just by their social and economicmarginality, but the urban topography. Ad hoc so-
lutions did, of course, emerge, includingmotorcycles, private vehicles for collective
use, and vans and small buses. In a vacuum left by municipal inaction, citizens had
to find ways to navigate the steep slopes that separated their homes from places of
employment, everyday consumption, and leisure (Dávila 2013).
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Figure 4: First cable line in Medellín. San Antonio. The city has built five
additional lines in the coming year (Silva Ardila).
During the first yeas of the 20th century, new political relationships between
metropolitan elites and vulnerable citizens began to emerge, and in this context,
urban managers turned to an existing technology – used primarily for winter
sports or summer tourism – to connect peripheral urban dwellers with core urban
localities. Medellín hung wires across its mountains to connect these vulnerable
citizens with a Metro system that traversed the city center. This was not, however,
just a transportation infrastructure. Indeed, each cable car station was designed
to connect with newly built urban amenities like public libraries or parks. Because
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of the spatial logic of this aerial infrastructure, these new institutions were built
on the urban peripheries. Designed, in many cases, by internationally recognized
architects, these stations function as points in a changing urban geography –
one where the city’s most vulnerable residents are able to access the same public
resources as more privileged residents of the urban core. Enhancing mobility and
reducing the cost of accessing urban goods, this new transportation model has
mitigated some of the many vulnerabilities of Medellín’s poorest residents. First
slums, next public infrastructure (cable cars, libraries, parks), and later tourists
and selfies – this process highlights how a symbiotic relationship between the
poor and elites has defined the urban cartography.
Final thoughts
Resilience narratives and practices in cities in Latin America are defined by their
local contexts and the specific configurations of urban landscapes.TheWorld Bank
report titled “Cities in Transition” stated that “in many rapidly growing cities in
the poorest countries, weak local governments have been unable to perform even
minimal functions, so that households and informal institutions have become the
main providers of infrastructure, housing, and social services. While this solution
meets some essential needs, it has also resulted in fragmented urban economies”
(World Bank 2000: 7). From many urbanists, the fragmented urban realities have
been viewed through an analytical framework that is structured by a binary under-
standing of distinct kinds of urban space. This analytic can be referred to as the
formal/informal model.
Themodel suggests that there is a spatial segregation within cities, and in most
cases, this is easy to observe. Wealthy urban areas often offer a stark contrast to
precarious dwellings and neighborhoods. This model also, though, tends to sug-
gest that the social and economic processes of exclusion mean that formal and
informal processes occur independently of – and with little connection to – one
another. In some cases, this has led to the mistaken view that the “informal econo-
my” is a parallel economy that has little to contribute to the social and commercial
development of Latin American cities. In this chapter, I have tried to advance an al-
ternative view. By using the concept of Urban Dualism, I try to show that these two
allegedly distinctive spheres are in fact deeply entangled and mutually dependent.
This does not, in any way, diminish the fact that there are extreme inequalities in
Latin American urban landscapes. It is simply to show that, while these inequali-
ties may create spaces of exclusion, they are unable to stop the dynamic process
of interaction between different urban actors – including those who are the most
precarious. Long-term historical processes have created a symbiotic (though often
unhealthy) relationship between different sets of urban actors who despite their
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differences, depend on one another. In this view, so-called informal economic and
social practices are not independent from the formal city. Instead, they are a fun-
damental element of the city, andmust be part of any attempt to understand urban
dynamics.
Urban dualism has profoundly shaped the governance and political culture of
cities in Latin America, and ones of the reasons it is so deeply embedded is because
it contributes to a plasticity that tends to generate social or economic mechanisms
that help to stabilize a system that is experiencing hazards or risks. To a certain
extent, Latin American cities combine both sides of Ash Amin´s coin: technolo-
gies and governmental action on one side, and active citizens on the other. In this
chapter I argued that urban dualism of cities in Latin America can provide a theo-
retical framework to better understand why urban areas in the region display such
strong resilience capacities despite the weaknesses of their institutional architec-
ture and governance structure. For all the direct and indirect complications that
this dualism creates, the discussion of urban transportation solutions in four La-
tin American cities shows how urban dualism materializes different possibilities
for resilience in the face of large and small hazards.
Transportation systems that facilitate the dailymovements of people and things
in the city depend both on technical and material infrastructures, but I would sug-
gest that designing, planning and developing effective mobility solutions is not
possible without a good understanding of the urban dualism of Latin American
metropoles. Contrary to the widely held view, urban dualism shows that formal
and informal systems are not possible to separate: instead, they are profoundly
intermingled, adapting to one another according to needs and demands, but al-
so to the interests and power capacities of different urban actors. Formal systems
such as rail-based metro systems, Bus Rapid Transit systems, Bike-sharing sys-
tems or cable car lines interact with the untidy emergence of informal means such
as “remises”, bus services or motorcycle and bike taxis. This interaction is a clear
form of dualism and a relevant case for the study of transportation and its relation
with urban resilience. The central argument is that these informal responses have
worked as a buffer for risks in urban areas in Latin America, not only with regard
to transportation but many dimensions of urban life.
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Urban Resilience Has a History – And a Future
Timothy Moss
As I compose the epilogue to this volume, in late January 2020, the world is steeling
itself for a global epidemic of the Corona virus. What originated just a few weeks
earlier in a food market in the city of Wuhan, China, has already spread across
continents on the coattails of globalized travel. People in Wuhan, a megacity of 11
million inhabitants, are not permitted to leave, with all transport links suspended.
They are effectively being held in collective quarantine in a drastic effort to stem
the spread of the disease. Meanwhile, in other countries around the world, health
officials and politicians are reassuring their citizens that contingency plans are in
place to deal with a potential pandemic. All the same, they are calling on people
to be vigilant and take the necessary precautionary measures to minimize the risk
of contagion. The Corona virus hit the news headlines just a fortnight after these
were dominated by scenes from some of the worst bushfires ever experienced by
Australia. Extending over an area of some 10 million hectares, these fires have de-
vastated forests, wildlife and homes, especially in the states of New South Wales
and Victoria.The smoke from the fires made Canberra and Sydney temporarily the
most air-polluted cities in the world. Reporting in the media focused on the he-
roism of the fire-fighters, the resilience of local communities and criticism of the
prime minister’s nonchalant response. The crisis confronting the emergency ser-
vices in Australia was compounded subsequently by torrential rainfall and major
flooding in many of the areas damaged by fire.
These two life-threatening events, happening so close together in time, can tell
us a lot about the practices, policies and discourses of resilience that have come to
characterize our responses to vulnerabilities today. Such crises, we are being told
by experts, are likely to become more frequent, more intense, more widespread
and more unpredictable in the future. Climate change will make extreme weather
events – such as flooding, bushfires and drought – increasingly common, occur-
ring in places rarely affected in the past. Pandemics will spread faster, following
the highly mobile human race into any corner of the globe. Terrorist attacks are
targeting not only major transport hubs, but also pubs, concert venues, places of
worship and open streets. The message, in essence, is that no place on the planet
is free from the risk of some kind of shock event. The consequence is that we all –
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citizens, local communities, businesses and governments – need to accept this risk
as the ‘new normal’, taking precautions to minimize the occurrence and damage of
such an event whilst acknowledging that no level of preparation will ever be able to
eradicate the possibility of one happening. What both the Chinese and Australian
cases illustrate is that citizens cannot rely on the state to address these challen-
ges, but are being expected to develop resilience responses of their own, whether
individually or collectively.
In the public debate on crisis resilience, cities are treated as prominent entities.
On the one hand, cities are seen as especially vulnerable to shocks and stresses. By
virtue of their population density and high level of interpersonal contact, they face
heightened risks from infectious diseases.Their built infrastructures, being exten-
sive and costly, are particularly vulnerable to damage from extremeweather events.
Places where many people come together to enjoy urban life are favored sites for
terrorist attacks. On the other hand, cities are more likely to possess the human
capacity, financial resources and local expertise required to avert or mitigate a cri-
sis. They may well have units dedicated to crisis management, are likely to be a
high priority in national contingency plans for critical infrastructures and general-
ly have public health services better than the national average. For these reasons,
cities are regarded as a pioneer locale of resilience thinking and action. The resili-
ent cities programs of the Bloomberg and Rockefeller Foundations, theWorld Bank
and other development organizations are testimony to the significance accorded to
cities in the global response to crises.
Many urban planners, managers and architects are rising to the challenge and
designing strategies, scenarios and buildings that are meant to render cities more
resilient to disturbance or disaster. As several chapters in this book illustrate, resili-
ence has a powerful appeal to practitioners and academics dedicated to organizing
and structuring urban society. For urban planners, frustrated with their limited
ability to shape a city in our globalized, market-driven world, planning for poten-
tial crises can lend a new purpose to the profession. Architects and civil engineers
have, in resilience thinking, a novel rationale for reordering the city in its myri-
ad material forms. Building flood-proof homes or providing back-ups for a power
outage are examples of the ‘can-do’ attitude that pervades much of this technical-
managerial expertise.
The confident manner in which resilience has been embraced by many urban
managers has alarmed other commentators. The literature on urban resilience is
rife with critiques of the concept and the practice, as many chapters in this volume
testify. For some critics, resilience is an instrument of neo-liberalism, generating a
permanent sense of crisis to justify measures designed to keep the existing system
ofmarket-based governance operative.The resilience debate, from this perspective,
deflects attention away from deeper, systemic crises of the capitalist political eco-
nomy. Others have pointed out how vulnerability to crises affects different people
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in different ways, often exacerbating inequalities of geography, social class, race
or gender. Vulnerabilities, they argue, rarely come alone. An environmental crisis,
such as a drought event, will often compound the existing economic and social
vulnerabilities of disadvantaged communities.
This critical literature has been hugely valuable in unpacking the normative
meanings, market logics, techno-managerial solutionism and elitist thinking un-
derpinning so many urban resilience programs. In deconstructing the concept and
the practice, this body of scholarship has proven highly effective, at least within the
academy. It has proven less effective, however, in offering ways forward in dealing
with the very real challenges encountered by cities today. Beyond calls for a radi-
cal overhaul of neo-liberal urbanism, critics of resilience offer little in the way of
orientation for urban citizens, communities and governments struggling to cope
with their real and perceived vulnerability to multiple threats.
This volumemakes the case for revaluing urban resilience.Whilst it acknowled-
ges and, indeed, embraces many of the criticisms voiced above, the general tenor
of the book is not to dismiss the concept of resilience, but to explore new ways of
interpreting it that can provide both critical reflection and constructive orientati-
on.The chapters in this book investigate the multiple histories, varied geographies
and contested politics of urban resilience in order to reveal how far resilience does,
or can, work as an urban practice as well as a development discourse.
Real-Life Urban Resilience in Past and Present
Looking across the chapters of this book, key messages emerge that contribute
to this critical, yet constructive reappraisal of urban resilience. They all point to
the value to be derived from taking a closer look at resilience practices, strategies
and discourses at work in particular spatial-temporal contexts. Although strongly
empirical in orientation, they all to some degree question the way resilience is con-
ceptualized in the literature. In doing so, they make a powerful case for the value
of inductive approaches to resilience research.
Themost striking contribution of the book is, undoubtedly, to historicize urban
resilience. Revealing how resilience has a history – as an urban strategy, as well as
an everyday practice – is illuminating for a debate where it is widely regarded as
a very contemporary phenomenon.The rich selection of historical cases in this vo-
lume challenge the narrow ‘presentist’ perspective of much resilience research. As
Sönke Kunkel argues in his chapter, resilience may be a modern buzzword, but it is
not a new way of thinking. He traces the historical roots of the resilience discour-
se well beyond awareness of global ecological crises to the logics of cold war risk
management. These, he argues, were reproduced in strategies of urban disaster
prevention that reflected the techno-scientific responses of the 1960s. Other aut-
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hors look to the aftermath of wartime devastation as a source of resilience planning
and practice. Koenraad Danneels, Bruno Notteboom and Greet De Block describe
how the destruction of Belgian cities during the FirstWorldWar inspired landscape
architects to reimagine the city as an ecosystem in order to render it more resili-
ent to crisis events.The use of socio-biological metaphors then and throughout the
twentieth century points to interesting predecessors of the more familiar social-
ecological framing of resilience today, as well as the influence of natural science
perspectives on urban reconstruction. Ann Maudsley’s chapter demonstrates how
a different nature-based utopia inspired urban design in postwar Swedish towns
within the Arctic Circle. Constructing buildings to withstand the shocks of extreme
weather was an innovative plan that nevertheless failed, intriguingly owing to the
involvement of Swedish oil companies. As Avi Sharma argues, resilience has a past
not only as urban policy, but also as everyday practice. He uses the case of Berlin
after the Second World War to describe personal strategies of survival and self-
help in the face of food deprivation, housing shortage and inadequate clothing,
interpreting these as forms of individual resilience in a crisis situation.
Besides histories of urban resilience, this book highlights the multiple geogra-
phies it can entail. On a straightforward level, the chapters cover a huge range of
spatial contexts, with cases studies of cities in New Zealand, Germany, Colombia,
Sweden and Belgium. Collectively, these pieces emphasize the huge importance of
place in urban resilience. What counts as vulnerability in one locale may be trea-
ted very differently in another. Many of the chapters address unsung spaces of
resilience. It is not the control rooms of urban operating systems or the hubs of
critical infrastructures that feature in this book, but rather spaces where resilien-
ce emerges through close analysis. Some of the resilient practices documented –
such as at community gardens in Christchurch after the earthquake or over car-
washing in Medellín – are not even termed as such by those involved, but can ne-
vertheless reveal a lot about coping under duress and uncertainty. What is also
striking about the cases, from a spatial perspective, is the interaction of physical,
political and social geographies. Each chapter addresses, explicitly or implicitly,
socio-material associations that are distinctive of a particular urban setting. This
is especially apparent in Marcela Lopez’ piece on institutionalizing informal car-
washing practices on the streets of Medellín, in which human and non-human ele-
ments are assembled to create resilience for the city’s water supply, public water
utility and car washers. Taking a spatially sensitive approach to resilience can al-
so reveal overlapping crises in a single locale. This is evidenced in the chapters on
post-war Berlin, where residents had to cope with physical, economic and politi-
cal disruptions alike, and on Belgian cities, where wartime destruction combined
to exacerbate existing challenges of urbanization and environmental degradation.
As several of the chapters argue, it is the promise of resilience to tackle multiple
vulnerabilities that contributes to its appeal today. At the same time, many of the
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measures devised to enhance resilience reveal a degree of selectivity that belies this
message of inclusivity. A case in point is the use of maps and urban plans to cir-
cumscribe the vulnerable, identifying – and thereby maligning – ‘problem areas’
of a city requiring remedial action.
The politics of urban resilience is a third dimension that emerges powerfully
from many chapters of this book. Whose resilience is at stake is a question that al-
ways needs asking.This is a crucial point already familiar from critical research into
urban resilience. We are now sensitive to the enrolment strategies underpinning
many resilient cities programs and urban resilience strategies around the world,
which claim commonality in policies and practices whilst privileging certain in-
terests and approaches over others. What several chapters in this book suggest,
though, is that dismissing urban resilience as a neoliberal ploy overlooks the em-
powerment that, in certain circumstances, can emerge through practices of resili-
ence. Two examples stand out.The first is theMedellín case, in which the formaliza-
tion of car-washing practices by the local water utility, in providing the car washers
with contractual documentation, has helped strengthen their rights to employment
and public services. The second is Andreas Wesener’s piece on Christchurch, whe-
re community gardens became, after the earthquake, sites of post-trauma therapy
offering mutual support for those affected. As this example illustrates, ancillary
benefits of this kind often only become apparent in the longer term, once the im-
mediate crisis has passed. At the same time, many authors of this book are keen
to highlight the limits to resilience strategies. As the editors point out, some crises
overwhelm the capacity of governments or communities to respond. We should
never assume that resilience can be an effective response to every potential danger
or uncertainty.
Futures for Urban Resilience Research
To conclude this epilogue, I make the case that resilience has not only a past worth
exploring, but also a promising future in urban research. Reflecting on the contri-
butions within this book and the wider debate on urban resilience, I draw out four
pointers for a research agenda that takes contemporary debates forward –with the
help of historical analysis.
Beyond ‘presentism’: The relative novelty of the term resilience implies that the
phenomenon, too, is a feature of the contemporary world only. Much of the litera-
ture on resilience, whether supportive or critical, emphasizes the exceptionalism
of modern crises. This ‘presentist’ focus discourages ventures into the history of
resilience.There is no denying the specificity of temporal contexts or the particular
severity of today’s social-ecological crises. However, this is no reason to dismiss
history as irrelevant to contemporary understandings of resilience. Looking to the
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past can trace the roots and legacies of modern-day resilience. It can draw atten-
tion to the importance of spatial-temporal contexts in analyzing resilience. It can
offer a corrective to simplistic trajectories of resilient thinking. It can reveal past
forms of resilient thinking and action that, by virtue of their differences to the mo-
dern world, challenge our preconceptions. The first plea, therefore, is to do more
to historicize resilience research.
Beyond ‘eventism’: Resilience research tends to focus on real or potential crisis
events. It is the devastating flash-floods, large-scale fires, destructive terrorist at-
tacks or sudden electricity grid failures that capture the attention of the media,
governments and scientists alike. Resilience research, as a consequence, has a pro-
nounced tendency towards ‘eventism’. What is needed is more attention to the less
visible, but no less impactful, vulnerabilities experienced as a result of structural
or compounded disadvantages. These can be everyday existential challenges, such
as securing a livelihood under duress, localized conflicts that fail to attract wide
attention or alternatives to mainstream resilience strategies. Although often mun-
dane and small in scale, these phenomena are widespread, making their overall
impact profound. The second aspiration, therefore, is for more work on ‘real-life’
resilience happening below the radar of globally mediated crises.
Beyond ‘essentialism’: Resilience is not a given. Nor, for that matter, is vulnera-
bility. Indeed, one person’s resilience can be someone else’s vulnerability. A dam
built to redirect water to an urban water network – and thus render the city more
resilient to drought events – could endanger the livelihood of farmers downstream
dependent on that water for agricultural production. This example illustrates how
measures introduced to improve the resilience of one aspect can reduce the re-
silience of another. This highlights the importance of treating resilience not only
in a context-specific way, but also as a relational phenomenon. Resilience involves
complex assemblages of human and non-human elements which are brought toge-
ther – or fall apart – in particular spatial-temporal circumstances. Understanding
how these diverse elements interact to create, destabilize or re-stabilize specific
resilience configurations is key to getting beyond simplistic, normative notions of
resilience as a desirable, benign status. The third strand of my proposed research
agenda is, thus, about unpacking the relationality of urban resilience.
Beyond ‘disciplining’: This all calls for us to embrace multiple perspectives on re-
silience. Resilience can mean very different things in the hands (and minds) of
different actors. We should not underestimate the degree to which resilience is so-
cially constructed to conform to particular interests or assumptions. Resilience can
also look very different depending on whether it is studied as a concept, as a policy
or as a practice. The process of translating a resilience policy into urban practice
can reveal major disjunctions, just as everyday forms of resilience can go unobser-
ved by urban managers intent on making their city more resilient. As researchers,
we need to be wary of interpretations of resilience – whether in the literature or in
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the field – that claim to be universal. Wittingly or not, they represent an attempt
to discipline us along a particular line of reasoning that, when analyzed closely, is
often revealed to be selective. Consequently, we need to study who gets to deter-
mine meanings and measures of resilience in particular spatial-temporal settings.
We need to explore ways in which those conventionally excluded or disregarded in
debates on resilience can be included or considered, for they are often the most
vulnerable groups in society. Finally, we need to unpack the disciplining work per-
formed by academic disciplines.This means investigating how the natural sciences
have framed the resilience discourse, how engineering sciences have given resili-
ence material form and how the social sciences have focused on critique. Revealing
some of these disciplinary divides and their legacies for research and policy could
go a long way towards reinvigorating a concept and a practice that, given the state
of the planet, are unlikely to go away in the foreseeable future.
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